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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyses the dynamics of inequality and classes, from a 
positive and a normative viewpoint, focusing on two distinct, but related 
approaches -  Analytical Marxism and the theory of equality of opportunity, -  
which raise significant philosophical, economic, and political issues. The 
importance of a dynamic perspective in the analysis of normative theories is 
emphasised as an essential tool in the process of theoretical construction. 
Indeed, this dissertation analyses some important anomalies of egalitarian 
and Marxian theories that arise in the dynamic context and suggest to 
reconsider our established views on inequality and classes.
First, the proper temporal unit of egalitarian (or Marxian) concern must 
be defined: agents’ whole lives or selected parts of them. Egalitarian 
principles based on different units incorporate different normative concerns, 
both in the analysis of existing inequalities and, unlike in the static setting, in 
the definition of the egalitarian benchmark. No principle seems entirely 
satisfactory in the analysis of unequal distributions, but corresponding 
segments egalitarianism defines the appropriate intertemporal egalitarian 
benchmark.
Second, egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated 
equalising some objective measure of individual well-being, rather than 
subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static 
environment. In a dynamic context, equality of opportunity for some 
objective condition is incompatible with human development over time. This 
incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare.
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Thus, ‘subjectivism’ seems necessary to obtain both equality of opportunities 
and the development of human capacity.
Finally, the modem theory of exploitation emphasises asset inequalities 
as the fundamental injustice of competitive economies. However, in dynamic 
equilibria with persistent asset inequalities and capital scarcity, exploitation 
tends to disappear. Asset inequality is therefore a normatively secondary 
(though causally primary) wrong. The analysis of the dynamic economy also 
raises doubts on the possibility of providing robust micro-foundations to 
Marxian concepts by means of Walrasian models.
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A Vanda e Bruno.
For them, justice and equality have 
never been mere academic subjects.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyses the dynamics of inequality and classes, from 
both a positive and a normative viewpoint. In particular, two distinct, but 
related theoretical approaches to the analysis of inequalities and classes are 
considered: Analytical Marxism and the theory of equality of opportunity. 
Analytical Marxism represents one of the most controversial, analytically 
sophisticated, and thorough interpretations of Marx’s theory. It proposes an 
original analysis of the Marxian concepts of exploitation, inequality, and 
classes. The theory of equality of opportunity provides a different perspective 
on inequality and classes within the liberal egalitarian tradition originated 
from Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice (1971). It raises deep philosophical issues -  
such as the relation between equality and responsibility -  and it has 
significant political and economic implications. The relevance of both 
approaches can be measured by their interdisciplinary impact in the social 
sciences and by the vast literature they have generated.
Unlike most of the literature on both approaches, which has adopted a 
static framework, this dissertation emphasises the importance of a dynamic 
perspective in the evaluation of egalitarian (more generally, normative) 
theories. In particular, a dynamic analysis is an essential tool in the process of 
theoretical construction and in order to reach a reflective equilibrium. Indeed, 
this dissertation can be thought of as analysing some important anomalies 
(Kuhn, 1970, p.52) of egalitarian and Marxian theories, which arise in the 
dynamic context and possibly suggest the need to reconsider some 
established views on inequality and classes.
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Chapter 1 sets the theoretical and methodological framework of the 
analysis. It provides a general introduction to Analytical Marxism and the 
theory of equality of opportunity and a comprehensive survey of the vast 
literature on both approaches. It also clarifies the methodology and scope of 
the analysis and indicates some directions for further research. Finally, it 
provides an independent contribution to the history of economic thought by 
highlighting the conceptual links, and theoretical lineage, between Analytical 
Marxism and the modem theory of equality of opportunity.
Chapter 2 analyses some conceptual problems of egalitarian theories 
which arise in the dynamic context. Since agents’ lives extend over time, it is 
necessary to define the proper temporal unit of egalitarian concern: agents’ 
whole lives or selected parts of them (e.g., focusing only on inequalities 
between all agents living in the same period). However, egalitarian principles 
based on different units incorporate different normative concerns and have 
different policy implications.
Thus, different intertemporal egalitarian principles provide different 
insights in the analysis of inequalities and in this context no principle seems 
entirely satisfactory: several views are possible, each of which seems 
plausible in some cases and implausible in others. However, an important 
theoretical and methodological distinction is emphasised: unlike in the static 
setting, intertemporal egalitarian principles also define different egalitarian 
states to reach. The two issues are connected but they should be kept 
conceptually distinct. This is even more evident for policy purposes since the 
definition of the ideal egalitarian distribution to reach and the transition to it
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raise different problems. It is argued that Corresponding Segments 
Egalitarianism (CSE) - which focuses on the corresponding stages of agents’ 
lives (e.g., childhood, middle age, old age, etc.) - defines the appropriate 
intertemporal egalitarian benchmark.
The trade-offs between different egalitarian principles and other non- 
primarily-egalitarian ethical concerns, -  namely, Rawls’s maximin and 
utilitarianism -  are also analysed. An overlapping generations model is set up 
to analyse intertemporal as well as intratemporal inequalities in the context of 
all things considered judgements. It is proved that the intertemporal maximin 
path tends to be incompatible with growth (Proposition 1), that intratemporal 
inequalities persist, but do not seem ethically relevant (Proposition 2), and 
that CSE has desirable properties in relation to both Rawlsian and utilitarian 
concerns (Proposition 3).
Chapter 3 extends the analysis of the dynamic implications of 
egalitarian views and of the relation between egalitarian and non egalitarian 
concerns, focusing on the theory of equality of opportunity (EOp). In order to 
avoid the conceptual problems discussed in chapter 2, it is assumed that 
agents live for one period, but the economic environment is considerably 
enriched by dropping the assumption of a representative agent in each 
generation, by allowing agents to care about functionings (and not only 
consumption), and by analysing educational investment. Hence, a larger set 
of issues can be explored, including the dynamics of intergenerational and 
intragenerational inequalities and classes, and the choice of the appropriate 
equalisandum, which are not discussed in chapter 2.
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Three dynamic models are analysed under different assumptions on the 
relevant equalisandum. It is proved that if an objectivist equalisandum, such 
as functionings, is adopted, the intergenerational EOp path is inconsistent 
with sustained human development (Proposition 1), even if agents have 
altruistic preferences (Proposition 2). This suggests that the three desiderata: 
(i) protracted human development; (ii) equality of opportunity for some 
condition; and (iii) the condition be an objective characteristic of the 
individual, are inconsistent. This incompatibility can be resolved by 
equalising opportunities for welfare (Theorem 1), a result that suggests that 
‘subjectivism’ may be necessary if we are to hope for a society which can 
both equalise opportunities and support the development of human capacity. 
Moreover, while the dynamics of mfragenerational inequalities and classes 
with an objectivist equalisandum cannot in general be determined, in the 
intergenerational ‘subjectivist’ EOp path, wfragenerational inequalities and 
classes disappear after a finite number of periods.
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the dynamics of inequality and classes from a 
different perspective, focusing on John Roemer’s (1982a , 1988a ) theory of 
exploitation and classes. In chapter 4 a dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s 
subsistence economy with labour-minimising agents is set up to analyse 
exploitation, inequalities, and classes. In particular, chapter 4 evaluates the 
causal and normative relevance of Differential Ownership o f Productive 
Assets (DOSPA) in generating exploitation and classes as persistent features 
of a competitive economy; and the possibility of providing robust 
microfoundations to Marxian economics by means of neoclassical models, -
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whereby the concepts of class and exploitation emerge as the product of 
constrained individual optimisation.
The conceptual issues raised in chapter 2 are proved to be relevant in 
this context, too, since in a dynamic framework two criteria to define 
exploitation and class emerge: one focuses on the agent’s status in each 
period of her life, the other on the agent’s whole life. The two criteria are 
equivalent only in an interior equilibrium in which no agent saves.
A dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s theory is provided (Propositions 
5 and 6) and exploitation and classes are proved to be persistent phenomena 
if agents discount future labour expended (Theorems 1 and 2). However, it is 
argued that the normative relevance of time preference is dubious and it is 
shown that, with no time preference, in equilibrium exploitation disappears in 
the long run, while asset inequalities and classes persist (Theorems 3 and 4). 
Roemer’s results are derived in an essentially static environment in which 
agents face no intertemporal trade-offs: intertemporal credit markets are 
absent and savings are impossible. Chapter 4 proves that it is sufficient to 
allow agents to save to contradict Roemer’s results. Hence, asset inequalities 
are argued to be normatively secondary, though causally primary in 
explaining exploitation, Roemer’s definition of class based on the net amount 
of labour performed is questioned, and several doubts are raised on the 
possibility of providing robust microfoundations to Marx’s concepts by 
means of Walrasian general equilibrium models.
Roemer’s models essentially have a static environment where agents 
face no intertemporal trade-offs: intertemporal credit markets are absent and
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savings are impossible. Chapter 4 proves that it is sufficient to allow agents 
to save to contradict Roemer’s results.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of the dynamics of exploitation, 
inequality, and classes to economies with maximising agents and the 
possibility of capital accumulation. On the one hand, chapter 5 evaluates the 
robustness of the main conclusions of chapter 4 in a different analytical 
framework which incorporates an important feature of capitalist economies, 
namely capital accumulation. On the other hand, chapter 5 pursues one of the 
main substantive and methodological issues raised in chapter 4, namely the 
mechanisms generating exploitation, inequalities, and classes as persistent 
phenomena in a competitive economy. From this perspective, the model of an 
accumulating economy is extremely interesting, due to the role of differential 
ownership of scarce productive assets in the derivation of Roemer’s results, 
and given that, unlike in static economies and in the subsistence model, it 
allows the modelling of two crucial features of a general theory of 
exploitation, namely technical progress and unemployment.
Chapter 5 analyses the role of DOSPA in generating persistent 
exploitation in a dynamic framework where agents maximise lifetime 
consumption opportunities and face a consumption-savings trade-off, so that 
capital accumulation is the outcome of optimal intertemporal choices. A 
dynamic generalisation of the Fundamental Marxian Theorem -  which 
establishes that exploitation is synonymous with positive profits -  is proved 
(Theorem 1). It is shown that without technical progress there is no 
equilibrium with persistent accumulation and persistent exploitation
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(Proposition 2). Then, the conclusions reached in chapter 4 are strengthened 
(Theorem 3): if capitalists discount future consumption, there are equilibria 
in which revenues are entirely consumed in every period and exploitation 
persists. However, this result crucially depends on a strictly positive rate of 
time preference, rather than on unemployment or capital scarcity.
As concerns equilibria with capital accumulation, first, balanced growth 
paths -  in which the whole economy grows at a uniform rate and reaches a 
steady state -  are characterised. Next, it is proved that at a balanced growth 
path exploitation disappears, although DOSPA and classes persist (Theorem 
4). Finally, it is proved that unlimited labour-saving technical progress may 
yield persistent exploitation by ensuring persistent unemployment in the 
labour market (Theorem 6), but in more general cases such result does not 
hold, and a more general analytical framework is advocated to analyse 
exploitation, inequalities, and classes.
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CHAPTER 1. THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF 
INEQUALITY AND CLASSES
“If you can look into the seeds of time,
And say which grain will grow and which will not,
Speak then to me” {Macbeth, Act I, Scene III)
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyses the concepts of inequality and classes, their 
definition and implications, from both a positive and a normative viewpoint. 
It is primarily an exploration of both concepts, rather than a systematic 
defence of their relevance. Methodologically, the relevance of the notions of 
inequality and classes is supposed, it is an a priori of the analysis. However, 
a deeper understanding of both concepts should strengthen the case for their 
normative and positive importance.
In particular, two distinct, but as shown below, theoretically related 
approaches to inequality and classes are considered, namely Analytical 
Marxism (AM) and the theory of equality of opportunity. AM is one of the 
most controversial, analytically sophisticated, and thorough interpretations of 
Marx’s theory -  and one of the last “schools” of Marxist thought. It provides 
an original interpretation of the Marxian notions of exploitation, inequality, 
and classes. The theory of equality of opportunity provides a different 
perspective on inequality and classes within the liberal egalitarian tradition 
originated from Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice (1971). It raises deep 
philosophical issues -  such as the relation between equality and responsibility 
-  and it has far-reaching political and economic implications. The relevance
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of both approaches can be readily measured by their interdisciplinary impact 
in the social sciences and by the vast theoretical and empirical literature they 
have generated. However, most, if not all, of the vast literature has adopted a 
static framework.
This dissertation, instead, emphasises the importance of a dynamic 
analysis in the evaluation of egalitarian - more generally, normative - 
theories. There are some clear reasons why a dynamic approach may provide 
interesting insights from both a positive and a normative viewpoint: the 
problem analysed may be inherently dynamic (e.g., intergenerational justice 
or economic growth); a dynamic analysis may complement a static theory as 
a matter of generality; or it may provide crucial insights on the robustness or 
relevance of a theory even if the main object of analysis is not per se 
dynamic. (For instance, the main results of traditional Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory, such as existence and uniqueness, need not be analysed in 
a dynamic framework. However, arguably their theoretical -  and even 
philosophical -  relevance can be properly evaluated only with a dynamic 
analysis of price movements (see, e.g., McCloskey, 1991).)
This dissertation highlights a different role of dynamic analysis as a 
crucial tool in the process of theoretical construction and in order to reach a 
reflective equilibrium. In fact, a dynamic analysis may generate anomalies 
(Kuhn, 1970, p.52) that lead to reconsider a normative theory, as illustrated 
for instance, by the well-known difficulties in the application of utilitarianism 
in the intertemporal context -  e.g., the issue of time preference (Sidgwick, 
1907; Ramsey, 1928; Rawls, 1971), or the problems in the determination of
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optimal population (Parfit, 1984). Indeed, this dissertation can be thought of 
as analysing some important anomalies of egalitarian and Marxist theories 
which arise in the dynamic context, possibly suggesting the need of a major 
reconsideration of some established views on inequality and classes.
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it puts the research project in 
a broader perspective, by introducing the theories analysed and by providing 
a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature. Second, it clarifies the 
methodology and scope of the analysis and it indicates some directions for 
further research, based on the results presented in this dissertation. Third, it 
provides an independent contribution to the history of economic thought by 
highlighting the significant conceptual links, and theoretical lineage, between 
AM and the modem theory of equality of opportunity.3 Section 1.2 discusses 
AM, while Section 1.3 focuses on the theory of equality of opportunity.
1.2. EXPLOITATION, INEQUALITY, AND CLASSES
One of the two approaches analysed in this dissertation is Roemer’s 
(1982a , 1982b , 1982c , 1982e , 1986a , 1988a ) theory of exploitation and 
classes. Although the main focus of this dissertation is normative, Roemer’s 
theory raises several methodological and positive issues. Sections 1.2.1 and 
1.2.2 review the extensive literature on Analytical Marxism, as a general 
approach to Marx’s philosophy (Elster, 1982a , 1985), economic theory
2 This chapter focuses on general methodological and theoretical issues. Surveys focusing on 
specific aspects can be found in the following chapters.
3 The only author who has explicitly analysed the theoretical link between market socialism 
(rather than AM) and the theory of equality of opportunity is Sugden (2004).
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(Roemer, 1980, 1981; van Parijs, 1983), theory of international relations 
(Roemer, 1983a ), theory of class stratification (Wright, 1984, 1994, 2000; 
van Parijs, 1986), and theory of class conflict and political struggles 
(Przeworski, 1985a ). Section 1.2.3 provides a more specific review of the 
literature on Roemer’s theory of exploitation and classes. Section 1.2.4 
emphasises the normative aspects of Roemer’s theory and the conceptual link 
with the theory of equality of opportunity.
1.2.1. ANALYTICAL MARXISM
Given the significant theoretical, methodological, and even political 
heterogeneity of Analytical Marxists, it is difficult to define the boundaries of 
AM, either theoretically or in terms of membership (Wood, 1989; Wright, 
1989).4 However, one of the main tenets of AM and its main departure from 
classical Marxism is the denial of a specific Marxist methodology5 and the 
emphasis on the need to apply the tools of mainstream analytical philosophy, 
sociology, and economic theory to Marx’s theory. More precisely, Wright 
(1989, pp.38-9) identifies four specific commitments that characterise AM.
D efin ition  1. {WeakAM) AM is identified by
4 AM emerges during the decline of structuralist Marxism and the renaissance of liberal 
egalitarianism: G.A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory o f History appears in 1978 and the annual 
seminars of the group in London start in 1979. See Carling (1986) and Wright (1989).
5 “Orthodox Marxism ... does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s 
investigations. It is not the ‘belief in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. 
On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method” (Lukacs, 1971, p. 1).
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Cl. “A commitment to conventional scientific norms in the elaboration 
of theory and the conduct of research.”
C2. “An emphasis on the importance of systematic conceptualisation 
[...]. This involves careful attention to both definitions of concepts and 
the logical coherence of interconnected concepts.”
C3. “A concern with a relatively fine-grained specification o f the steps 
in the theoretical arguments linking concepts.”
C4. “The importance accorded to the intentional action o f individuals 
within both explanatory and normative theories.”
Definition 1 encompasses all Analytical Marxists; however, it is so 
general that it hardly identifies AM as a specific approach.6 For instance, in 
principle virtually all Marxist mathematical economists -  such diverse 
authors as Morishima, Steedman, Desai, etc. -  could be included. Definition 
1 does not capture the originality of AM and cannot really explain the
n
controversy it has generated, since in order to identify the minimum 
common denominator of all Analytical Marxists, it does not include the two 
most controversial axioms of AM, endorsed by its most prominent exponents,
6 As noted by Wright (1989, p.39), “it would be arrogant to suggest that Marxism lacked 
these elements prior to the emergence of Analytical Marxism as a self-conscious school”.
7 Basically all critics focus on the strong definition given below. In his review of Wright, 
Levine, and Sober (1992), who adopt instead the weak definition, Foley simply notes that the 
conclusions “are on the whole mild, sensible and, as the options are presented, persuasive” 
(Foley, 1993, p.298). He objects mostly to “the authors’ addiction to philosophic and 
sociological jargon, extreme caution in the formulation of hypotheses, involuted prose, and 
painfully slow movement toward minimally exciting conclusions” (ibid.).
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in particular Jon Elster and John Roemer. The definition of strong AM, also 
known as rational choice Marxism (Carling, 1986; Wood, 1989; Carver and 
Thomas, 1995; hereafter RCM), can be summarised as follows.
D efinition  2. (Strong AM,, or RCM) RCM is defined by C2 and C3 plus
C l’. A commitment to the use of “state of the arts methods of analytical 
philosophy and ‘positivist’ social science” (Roemer, 1986d , pp.3-4). 
C4’.(a) A commitment to methodological individualism as “the doctrine 
that all social phenomena -  their structure and their change -  are in 
principle explicable in ways that only involve subjects -  their 
properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions” (Elster, 1985, p.5); 
C4’.(b) A commitment to rational actor models.
Definition 2, and in particular C4’, does not apply to all Analytical 
Marxists: Cohen’s (1978, 1983a ) reconstruction of Marx’s theory of history
Q
is functionalist; Van Parijs (1982, 1983) supports the search for Marxian 
microfoundations, but questions the “absolutism” of C4’ admitting the 
possibility of alternative explanations; the weak “methodological 
individualism” endorsed by Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) in line with 
Definition 1, has arguably little in common with C4’. However, Definition 2
8 Elster distinguishes a weak functional paradigm, according to which “an institution or 
behavioural pattern often has consequences that are (a) beneficial for some dominant 
economic or political structure; (b) unintended by the actors; and (c) not recognized by the 
beneficiaries as owing to that behavior” (Elster, 1982a, p.454); and a strong Junctional 
paradigm, according to which “all institutions or behavioural patterns have a function that 
explains their presence” (ibid.).
23
captures the essential elements of originality of AM, -  more precisely, RCM, 
-  and it clarifies the main terms of the controversy.
First, the main methodological corollary of Definition 2 is that 
methodological individualism is the only legitimate foundation for social 
science (Elster, 1982a , p.463). Consequently, in a RCM perspective, the only 
parts of Marx’s theory which “make sense” (Elster, 1985) are those that can 
be analysed within a methodological individualist perspective or more 
narrowly, with standard “rational choice models: general equilibrium theory, 
game theory and the arsenal of modelling techniques developed by 
neoclassical economics” (Roemer, 1986c, p. 192). Elster argues that Marx 
was “committed to methodological individualism, at least intermittently” 
(Elster, 1985, p.7). However, largely due to the influence of Hegelian 
philosophy, Marx was not a consistent methodological individualist 
throughout his writings. Indeed, Elster reads various passages (especially 
those in the Grundrisse on the movement of capital and the subordinate 
explanatory role of competition) as an “explicit denial of methodological 
individualism” (ibid.). Then, he concludes that Marx was methodologically 
inconsistent or, more strongly, intellectually weak, since “it is difficult to 
avoid the impression that he often wrote whatever came into his mind, and 
then forgot about it as he moved on to other matters” (ibid., p.508).
Second, by adopting methodological individualism, AM typically 
reaches two kinds of substantive conclusions concerning Marxian concepts 
and propositions: some are considered either wrong or impossible to 
conceptualise in a rational choice framework, and thus are simply discarded.
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Roemer (1981) disposes of the labour theory of value, the theory of the 
falling rate of profit, and the Marxian theory of crisis (see also Elster, 1985). 
After a long journey through Marx’s theory, Elster concludes that “Today 
Marxian economics is, with a few exceptions, intellectually dead” (Elster, 
1986, p.60).9 Przeworski (1985a ) and Elster (1982a ) challenge the Marxian 
theory of the class struggle and the theory of the state.
Other concepts and propositions, instead, can be analysed in a rational 
choice framework, but need a substantial re-definition (this partly explains 
the AM emphasis on C2 and C3). Some intuitions on the symbiotic 
interaction between classes can be analysed in a game-theoretic framework 
(Elster, 1982a , pp.463-478; Przeworski, 1985a ), although at the cost of a 
substantive shift in both meaning and political implications (see Burawoy, 
1989, 1995). The concepts of class and exploitation can be derived as the 
product of agents’ constrained optimisation (Roemer, 1982a ); but this leads 
to the rejection of Marx’s surplus value definition of exploitation, as a 
relevant positive and normative concept, in favour of the analysis of 
differential ownership o f scarce productive assets (DOSPA). Similarly, 
Roemer provides microfoundations to the Marxian theory of unequal 
exchange (Roemer, 1983a ) and outlines a micro-based Marxian political 
philosophy (Roemer, 1988b ), thanks to (and possibly at the cost of) a 
reduction of Marx’s theories to an almost exclusive emphasis on DOSPA.
9 The main exception is the theory of technical change (Elster, 1986, p. 188). According to 
Elster, scientific socialism, dialectical materialism, and the theory of productive forces and 
relations of production, too, are dead (ibid., p. 186-200).
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Given the scope and relevance of the issues analysed, it is not surprising 
that AM has generated a vast literature both on methodology and on 
substantive propositions.
1.2.2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
“We should look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature o f the 
subject admits” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, bk. I: ch.3, 1094b 25.
A first set of methodological objections to AM concern the use of 
mathematics. According to some critics, mathematical models are inherently 
associated with bourgeois science and politics. Thus, in the struggle for 
socialism “any means-ends or cost-benefit calculation would tend to produce 
reformist solutions” (Kieve, 1986, p.574): the real issue is “not a question of 
quantitative, individualistic means-ends or petty or cost-benefit calculations, 
but a question of life and death” (ibid.).10 This objection is not entirely 
convincing: as shown by Smolinski (1973), Marx studied pure mathematics 
and was convinced about the opportunity to apply it to the social sciences. 
Furthermore, the objection relies on the rather arbitrary claim that there exists 
no mathematical object (in a potentially infinite-dimensional space) that can 
be used to analyse any part of Marx’s theory. This view seems as one-sided 
as the “mathematical fetishism” often attributed to Analytical Marxists.
10 Kieve (1986, p.574) quotes Rosa Luxemburg (1970, p.189): “in every individual act of the 
struggle so very many important economic, political and social, general and local, material 
and physical, factors react upon one another in such a way no single act can be arranged and 
resolved as if  it were a mathematical problem.” Then, Kieve argues that formal models and 
rational choice theory are inherently petty-bourgeois and counter-revolutionary.
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More subtly, post-modern Marxists (Ruccio, 1988; Amariglio, Callari, 
and Cullenberg, 1989) do not reject a priori the use of mathematical models, 
but deflate their explanatory power -  and their usefulness in general -  to the 
vanishing point. According to them, mathematics is a “form of ‘illustration.’” 
For Marxists, mathematical concepts and models can be understood as 
metaphors or heuristic devices” (Ruccio, 1988, p.36). However, it is unclear 
whether this argument can be supported by Marx’s writings: Ruccio (1988) 
provides no textual evidence, while as already noted Smolinski’s (1973) 
detailed analysis suggests a somewhat different view. Actually, rather than a 
specific interpretation of Marx, this view seems to reflect the adoption of a 
general post-modern epistemological stance, which reduces mathematical 
language, and indeed all (scientific) languages to mere “discourse.” This 
position seems quite problematic since it is unclear how competing 
hypothesis and theories can be rationally evaluated, let alone tested.11 Finally, 
the interpretation of mathematics as “illustration” reflects the post-modem 
anti-essentialist denial of the explanatory power of theoretical (and not only 
mathematical) abstractions. However, the emphasis on loosely defined 
“historically concrete social processes” does not seem to lead beyond either a 
focus on infinitesimally small phenomena or the formulation of vague, if not 
empty, general statements, such as the claim that “in order to be individuals 
(and individual needs), there has to be an infinity of other social processes 
that constitute their ‘species-being’” (Ruccio, 1988, p.42). Or the claim that 
Marxian classes “can be analysed as the determinate result of the entire
11 Unsurprisingly, econometrics, too, falls under Ruccio’s (1988, p. 18) axe.
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constellation of social processes that can be said to make up a society or 
social formation at any point in time; in turn, it will be only one of the myriad 
determinants of those nonclass social processes” (ibid., p.38).
A different critique of the use of mathematics is based on the idea that 
the essential concepts of Marxian social science cannot be fully captured by 
formal models. An emphasis on formalism can obscure the more important 
theoretical and political issues and “enervate Marxist theory in the name of 
rigor” (Anderson and Thompson, 1988, p.228), while some critical facts 
about capitalist societies “can be established without mathematical proof’ 
(Wood, 1989, p.466). This objection is more forceful, as acknowledged by 
Roemer himself (1981, pp.2-4), and cannot be dismissed a priori, but it does 
not necessarily entail a rejection of mathematical models.
As concerns the use of mathematics in the social sciences, and in
particular in Marxist theory, the approach adopted in this dissertation is both
pluralist, in that no exclusive or a priori primacy is assigned to mathematical
modelling; and minimalist in that it is based on the idea that a model “says
what it says” and a rigorous interpretation of assumptions and results, of their
1 0scope and limitations, is necessary. However, it also recognises the 
usefulness of mathematics in theoretical analysis. “‘Mathematics,’ or models, 
cannot capture all that is contained in a theory. A model is necessarily one 
schematic image of a theory, and one must not be so myopic as to believe 
other schematic images cannot exist. Nevertheless this is not a reason not to
12 “If we are going to be rigorous we should be rigorous, not rigorous about the proof and 
extremely sloppy about its range of applications” (McCloskey, 1991, p. 10).
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use mathematics in trying to understand a theory: for ... the production of 
different and contradicting models of the same theory can be the very process 
that directs our focus to the gray areas of the theory” (Roemer, 1981, p.3). 
From this perspective, the choice of the appropriate modelling tool is more 
important than the a priori discussion on the use of mathematics.
A second set of objections focus precisely on the neoclassical models 
used by AM, both general equilibrium (e.g., Roemer, 1981, 1982a , 1983a) 
and game theoretic models (e.g., Elster, 1982a ; Roemer, 1982a , 1982c). The 
basic argument is that neoclassical models necessarily lead to neoclassical, or 
at least non-Marxian, conclusions and thus AM’s mainly negative results are 
not surprising (Anderson and Thompson, 1988; Wood, 1989). This objection 
is theoretically relevant, since it is grounded in the difficulty of inter- 
theoretic reduction, a problem that is well-known in the philosophy of 
sciences (Sensat, 1988; Weldes, 1989). Indeed, its relevance is indirectly 
confirmed by the mainly negative results reached by AM. However, while it 
may be forcefully raised against the specific models set up by AM, its 
generality is less evident as it relies on a rather narrow, if unrealistic,
n  m
description of neoclassical economics. For instance, even the Marxian 
labour/labour-power distinction, whose absence is widely considered one of 
the main limits of Roemer’s models, can be modelled within a broadly 
defined neoclassical framework (Bowles and Gintis, 1990, 1993). Moreover, 
game theory represents a vast and flexible arsenal of techniques, which do
13 Neoclassical models “seem ill-suited to modeling anything but supply, demand, and 
technical relationships” (Anderson and Thompson, 1988, p.225).
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not require any individualistic assumptions and can be fruitfully applied to 
Marxian economics, as suggested by various critics of AM (e.g., Lebowitz, 
1988, pp. 195-7; Sensat, 1988, p.215; Weldes, 1989, p.374).
Thus, although the objections concerning the non-neutrality of 
techniques and the problems of intertheoretic reduction are important, they 
do not seem sufficient to reject a priori all attempts at cross-fertilisation, 
especially if one considers neoclassical economics as a vast, heterogeneous 
arsenal of tools. Chapters 4 and 5 argue that the specific model set up by 
Roemer -  a version of the Walrasian general equilibrium model, -  may be 
inadequate to analyse Marxian economics, and that it is unclear that the 
standard “neoclassical model of a competitive economy is not a bad place for 
Marxists to start their study of idealized capitalism” (Roemer, 1986c, p. 192). 
However, no general impossibility result is proved; instead, the analysis 
suggests alternative assumptions and formalisations.
Notwithstanding the relevance of the previous issues, the main 
methodological debate on AM focuses on C4’ and on its relevance for 
Marxist social science. Although the AM critiques of teleological arguments 
and functionalism14 are rather persuasive, the arguments in favour of 
methodological individualism cum rational choice and the critiques of Marx’s 
theory on methodological grounds are less convincing. As for the latter issue, 
“nowhere does Elster show Marx committed to views that in principle deny 
microfoundational accounts” (Levine, 1986, p.726). Instead Elster (1985) 
finds Marx guilty of functionalism and teleological reasoning based on an
14 Especially in its strong variant; see fh. 8 above for a definition.
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arguably objectionable piecemeal reading of Marx’s texts, with a propensity 
to extrapolate relevant passages from the context (Levine, 1986, pp.725-6; 
Sensat, 1988, pp.206-7; Wood, 1989, pp.475-6; Carver and Thomas, 1995, 
p.4), or as in the case of the theory of history -  which generated the first AM 
debate on methodology (see the special issue of Theory and Society, 1982) -  
based on the identification of Marx’s theory with Cohen’s functionalist 
interpretation of it. At most, Elster’s (1985) analysis shows that Marx does 
not support methodological individualism cum rational choice, and more 
specifically the neoclassical variant of the latter approach, hardly a startling 
result and arguably not enough to reject Marx’s theory.15
As concerns methodological individualism cum rational choice, first, the 
AM critiques of functionalism do not automatically provide support for C4’, 
and in particular its neoclassical variant: basically all critics of AM -  
including post-modem and post-structuralist Marxists,16 -  have rejected both 
functionalist arguments and the rather reductionist RCM view of individuals
15 Actually, Levine (1986, p.723) suggests that Elster’s (1985) main methodological 
propositions would not stand up to his own procedure of critical assessment. Warren (1988) 
argues that Elster (1985) does not provide a single consistent definition of methodological 
individualism and often slips from one to another without proper justification.
16 See, e.g., Ruccio (1988). Actually, post-modern Marxists have turned the accusation of 
functionalist reasoning against AM: “the reason why a full-blown functionalism is not 
needed is that the agents who comprise the economic structure are endowed initially with 
attributes which are functional to the system of exchange that AM imagines to constitute ‘the 
economy”’ (Amariglio, Callari and Cullenberg, 1989, p.362).
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and of social science.17 Thus, C4’ should be evaluated per se as the proper 
explanatory strategy in the social sciences, rather than in opposition to 
functionalism and teleological reasoning, which sometimes appear in AM 
writings just as a rhetorical “straw man” (Foley, 1993, p.301). However, 
neither AM arguments nor the debates in the philosophy of science provide 
decisive support for C4\
C4\(a) encompasses two separate assumptions: the first one postulates 
the possibility of intertheoretic reduction, namely the reduction of macro­
level theories to micro-level theories, without loss of meaning or explanatory 
content. A thorough analysis of this important issue of the philosophy of 
science goes beyond the limits of this dissertation. However, as forcefully 
shown by Sensat (1988) and Weldes (1989, p.363-6), even setting aside all 
doubts about methodological individualism, intertheoretic reduction is in 
general extremely problematic and may lead to “the complete replacement of 
the secondary theory, including its ontology, with the primary theory due to 
the transformation of both the meanings and the content of the secondary 
theory” (Weldes, 1989, p.365). As noted above, this is an important warning 
to identify the “hard core” (ibid., p.372) of Marx’s theory when evaluating 
the adoption of neoclassical tools in Marxian economics.
17 Sensat (1988) and Weldes (1989) thoroughly discuss alternative approaches to Marxist 
methodology from a general philosophical viewpoint.
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The second assumption states that “ultimate ontological and explanatory
1 9priority is accorded to the individual” (ibid., p.356). This is considered a 
self-evident “first principle,” a defining principle for all good science, and 
thus it tends to be simply asserted by AM, by appealing to an alleged state- 
of-the-art scientific methodology. “The tension between individual and 
structural explanations is thus resolved (or dissolved), by fiat, by denying 
ontological and explanatory status to social structures” (Weldes, 1989, p.356; 
see also Howard and King, 1992, p.353, fii.38).
Yet, this assumption, too, is quite problematic. At the ontological level, 
it is unclear why the process of reduction should end at the level of the 
individual: first, individuals can be understood as structures liable of further 
decomposition in more elementary parts (e.g., cells; Howard and King, 1992, 
p.346). Second, even neoclassical economics admits supra-individual units, 
by only requiring that they be well-defined decision makers (e.g., the 
household). Indeed, Elster himself moves from a definition of 
methodological individualism as “the doctrine that all social phenomena -  
their structure and their change -  are in principle explicable only in terms o f 
individuals” (Elster, 1982a , p.453, italics added) to C4\(a), where the 
emphasis is instead on more generic subjects.
More important, in any case “ontological reducibility (decomposability 
without remainder) does not entail explanatory reducibility” (Levine, 1986, 
p.724): not only macro-level theories might provide a satisfactory answer to
18 Weldes argues that C4’.(a) also requires the additional assumption that “individuals should 
be construed as intentional actors” (Weldes, 1989, p.356).
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certain questions, but it is not always true that the provision of a micro- 
mechanism would improve the understanding of a given phenomenon. Thus, 
“World War II was, in the sense in question, just an aggregation of subatomic 
particles in motion. But knowing all there is to know about these subatomic 
particles would not help us, in all likelihood, in knowing, say, the causes of 
World War H” (ibid., pp.724-5, fo.12).19
However, as regards the issues analysed in this dissertation, the most 
problematic aspects of methodological individualism concern the role of 
structural limits to individual choice and the atomistic conception of agents. 
The former issue relates to the problem of generalising individual-level 
predicates to group-level predicates: as is well-known in logic, if the 
individual property is not generalisable, a fallacy of composition may arise. 
As noted by Elster (1978, 1985), fallacies of composition are central to social 
science: “economic agents tend to generalize locally valid views into invalid 
global statements, because of a failure to perceive that causal relations that 
obtain ceteris paribus may not hold unrestrictedly” (Elster, 1985, p. 19), 
leading to counterfinality and social contradictions (Elster, 1978, chapter 5). 
However, fallacies of composition and counterfinality imply that “the group 
as a whole faces a constraint that no individual member of the group faces” 
(Lebowitz, 1994, p. 167), a property that suggests at least a refinement of 
methodological individualism. First, in general both individual and structural 
constraints shape individual choices. From this viewpoint, Przeworski’s 
(1989) emphasis on abstract atomistic individual choice in the analysis of
19 See also Sensat (1988, pp.201-3) and Howard and King (1992, pp.346-7).
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classes and social conflict in advanced economies seems rather misleading 
and arguably misses Marx’s point. Instead, chapter 4 below suggests that 
Roemer (1982a) can adopt a purely individualistic perspective, while 
retaining some crucial Marxian insights, only by focusing on a rather special 
case of general equilibrium in a static quasi-Walrasian economy where 
individual constraints severely limit agents’ choices.
Second, the existence of structural constraints implies that the analysis 
of the whole cannot be strictly reduced to the analysis of its parts. In the 
context of Marx’s theory, this issue forcefully emerges in Cohen’s (1983b) 
analysis of the structure of proletarian unfreedom. Cohen rejects the idea that 
proletarians are forced to remain in their class and stresses that they are 
individually free to improve their social conditions. However, to generalise 
such individual freedom would involve a fallacy of composition: since it is 
not possible for all proletarians to exit their class in a capitalist economy, 
each proletarian “is free only on condition that the others do not exercise their 
similarly conditional freedom” (Cohen, 1983b , p.ll). Individual freedom 
coexists with collective unfreedom.21 But then, fundamentally, knowledge of 
group-level properties and constraints “is prior in the explanatory order to
20 Thus, if “a person acquires membership in a certain class by virtue of choosing the best 
option available subject to the constraints she faces” (Roemer, 1988a, p.9), it is the latter part 
of the statement that should be emphasised, rather than the agents’ free choice.
21 Cohen (1983b) uses the famous example of ten workers in a locked room with a key on the 
floor that is assumed to work only once: each of them is free to exit the room, but only one of 
them can do it, and thus nine workers will remain in the room in any case.
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understanding the conditional and contingent state of the individuals” 
(Lebowitz, 1994, p. 167).
The second problem of methodological individualism (at least in the 
stronger versions) is that it requires an asocial view of individuals, whereby 
individuals are logically prior and individual attributes are not socially 
determined (Sensat, 1988, pp. 197-9), or else structural features would play a 
fundamental explanatory role, via their effect on individuals’ preferences and 
beliefs.22 However, the very distinction between individual and social 
predicates is problematic, since at a general methodological level, “the 
individual-level predicates relied on by the individualist have built into them 
salient features of the relevant social context” (Weldes, 1989, p.361). 
Arguably, many AM assumptions, such as utility or profit maximisation, and 
the existence of enforceable property rights and of a labour market, 
incorporate certain social relations. More specifically, even within the context 
of given social relations, many individual attributes are socially determined, 
as acknowledged by AM’s own emphasis on endogenous preference 
formation (see, e.g., Elster, 1978, 1979). For instance, Roemer rebuts the 
traditional neoclassical defence of DOSPA based on differential rates of time
22 Sensat (1988, pp.195-6) identifies other three attributes of individualism: psychologism 
(“individual-level explanations o f social phenomena must appeal to the operation of 
cognitive and motivational dispositions in specified settings” (ibid.)); generality (“the 
individual level must bring a transsocial generality to explanations of behavior in social 
settings” (ibid.)); and cardinality (“there is a small number n such that all social-scientific 
laws are derivable as applications to specific situations of (general, psychological) laws of 
interaction among n or fewer individuals” (ibid.)).
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preference, because “it is a mistake to consider those differences to be a 
consequence of autonomous choices that people have made... Attitudes 
toward saving are shaped by culture, and cultures are formed by the objective 
conditions that their populations face” (Roemer, 1988a , p.62).
Although they acknowledge the importance of the social determination 
of individuals, and indeed the limits of individual rationality, AM have 
essentially neglected these issues in their models,24 which are instead based 
on a conventional view of individual agents and of instrumental rationality as 
in C4’.(b) (Levine, 1986, pp.726-7; Howard and King, 1992, pp.347-8).25 
Chapter 4 suggests, however, that a standard interpretation of economic 
agents and of their interaction may be unsuitable to analyse Marx’s theory. 
Roemer provides Walrasian microfoundations to Marxian economics only by 
substantially moving away both from the Walrasian framework, since in his 
static models agents have a severely limited set of choices and their optimum 
is basically determined by their constraints; and from the Marxian
23 Actually, much of Elster’s work “rather paradoxically, shows the limitations of a rational 
choice paradigm” (Howard and King, 1992, p.347). See, e.g., Elster (1978, 1979).
24 This leads to a seemingly inconsistent behaviour: Elster and Roemer “use models founded 
on neoclassical principles, and make claims about Marxism on this basis, but they do not 
believe that these principles are true” (Howard and King, 1992, p.349).
25 According to Weldes, C4’.(b) is not a necessary requirement o f methodological 
individualism but it is implied by the AM adoption of a conventional positivist and 
empiricist epistemology whereby “social scientific explanations must be deductive in order 
to achieve adequate predictive and explanatory power” (Weldes, 1989, p.357).
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framework, since the agents’ constraints, their interaction, and their class and 
exploitation status have no inherently social dimension.
The analysis of endogenous preferences (and structural constraints) 
seems a promising line for further research, which may be in contradiction 
with existing AM models, but not with a more general interpretation of the 
approach. To acknowledge that individuals are inherently social beings 
whose preferences, beliefs, and constraints are socially determined blurs the 
distinction between holism and methodological individualism and may 
provide some ground for dialogue. More important, the incorporation of 
structural constraints and endogenous preferences might lead to a more 
realistic and less one-sided (also, but not exclusively, from a Marxist 
viewpoint) relational conception of individuals as part of a social context 
(Weldes, 1989, pp.373-4). Indeed, it might lead to a more satisfactory 
“microfoundation” of Marx’s theory (Sensat, 1988; Burawoy, 1989, 1995; 
Weldes, 1989; Bowles and Gintis, 1990), based on a concept of individual 
choice which escapes the dichotomy between abstract atomistic free choice 
and complete social determination of individual behaviour (Howard and 
King, 1992, p.348; Wood, 1989, pp.468-9). Although the normative analysis 
of exploitation is based on the historical determination of DOSPA, at the end 
of Free to Lose, Roemer notes that “there is a key dimension along which the 
autonomy of persons in capitalist society could be challenged; this I have not 
exploited. For if people’s conceptions of welfare are themselves determined 
by the economic structure in which they live, then a welfare distribution 
might stand condemned for the further reason that the structure shaped those
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conceptions. Having a theory of how capitalism (or any economic structure) 
shapes preferences would add to the story” (Roemer, 1988a , p. 177).
1.2.3. ROEMER ON EXPLOITATION AND CLASS
Many of the AM substantive propositions, too, have generated intense 
debate: from Cohen’s (1978) analysis of forces and relations of production in 
Marx’s theory of history (Foley, 1993), to Przeworski’s (1985a) analysis of 
class conflict and the political process (Burawoy, 1989; Przeworski, 1989; 
Wood, 1989; Burawoy, 1995), to Elster’s (1982a , 1985) analysis of class 
alliances, revolutionary motivations, and social change (Weldes, 1989). This 
section reviews the literature on Roemer’s (1982a , 1982b , 1982c, 1988a) 
theory of exploitation and classes, which is examined in this dissertation.
Although Roemer’s models are thoroughly analysed in chapters 4 and 5, 
it is opportune to briefly summarise them here. Roemer (1982a) assumes that 
there are N  agents with identical preferences and equal access to the 
production technology of n goods. Production requires capital which is, in 
principle, unequally distributed. He defines Marxian exploitation as unequal 
exchange of labour: agent i is exploited (an exploiter) if she works more 
(less) time than is embodied in the consumption bundle she consumes.
First, Roemer (1982a , chapter 1) considers a pre-capitalist subsistence 
economy with labour minimising agents and no labour market (only physical 
goods, inputs and outputs, are traded). He proves that in equilibrium 
aggregate labour is equal to the amount of time embodied in the aggregate 
subsistence requirements, but given DOSPA labour time is not equally 
distributed: asset-rich agents are exploiters while asset poor agents are
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exploited. This, according to Roemer (ibid., Theorem 1.6, p.38), proves that 
exploitation can logically exist without the institution of labour exchange and 
thus without domination at the point of production.
Next, Roemer (ibid., chapter 2) introduces a labour market in the 
subsistence economy. This allows him to define classes in Marxian terms 
based on “the way in which an agent relates to the means of production -  
hiring labour power, selling labour power, working his own shop” (ibid., 
p.70). Roemer (ibid., Theorem 2.5, p.74) proves that classes emerge as the 
product of individual optimisation: in equilibrium asset rich agents are 
capitalists (net hirers of labour power), asset poor agents are proletarians (net 
sellers of labour power), and there exists a class of petty bourgeois who are 
self-employed. Finally, asset-rich agents are exploiters while asset-poor 
agents are exploited and the Class Exploitation Correspondence Principle 
(ibid., Theorem 2.7, p.79) holds: capitalists are exploiters, proletarians are 
exploited, and the petty bourgeois have an ambiguous exploitation status.
Then, Roemer (ibid., chapter 3) proves the functional equivalence of 
credit and labour markets. The subsistence economy with a labour market is 
isomorphic to an identical economy with a capital market: asset rich agents 
are exploiters and belong to the class of net lenders, while asset poor agents 
are exploited and belong to the class of net borrowers. According to Roemer, 
this proves that “there is nothing in the institution of the labour market 
intrinsically necessary for bringing about the Marxian phenomena of 
exploitation and class. [Instead] competitive markets and private, differential
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ownership of the means of production are the institutional culprits in 
producing exploitation and class” (ibid., p.93).
Having proved the positive and normative priority of DOSPA (similar
results hold in accumulation economies with revenue-maximising agents
(ibid., chapter 4)), Roemer highlights some analytical and conceptual
problems of Marxian exploitation conceived as unequal exchange of labour:
in an economy with a more general cone technology labour values cannot be
defined prior to prices (ibid., chapter 5). Moreover, if agents’ labour
endowments (e.g. skills) or preferences over leisure are heterogeneous, “it is
possible for some very wealthy producers to be exploited and for some very
poor producers to be exploiters” (ibid., p. 175). Hence, according to Roemer,
Marx’s theory of exploitation should be abandoned as a problematic proxy
for the normatively relevant phenomenon, namely DOSPA and the resulting
welfare inequalities. Roemer (ibid., chapter 7) provides an alternative, game-
theoretic definition of exploitation based on DOSPA which aims to
26generalise Marxian exploitation, capturing its essential normative content.
Many critiques have been expounded on Roemer’s definitions and his 
models, mainly based on issues of interpretation of Marx’s theory. Lebowitz
(1988) argues that Roemer gives logical priority to property relations over 
capitalist relations of production, while in Marx’s theory the former are 
determined by the latter. Thus, Roemer does not realise that, according to
26 Roemer analyses exploitation mainly from a normative viewpoint, however exploitation 
also plays an important role from a positive viewpoint, e.g., in Roemer’s interpretation of 
historical materialism (Roemer, 1982a, 1986b, 1988a, 1989).
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Marx, “the situation in which the purchase of labor-power did not occur was 
explicitly pre-capitalist” (Lebowitz, 1988, p.206). For instance, in the 
subsistence economy with a capital market, what Roemer calls exploitation is
97more precisely defined as usury (see also Kieve, 1986, p.563). Furthermore, 
Lebowitz (1988) argues that by assuming perfect information, perfectly 
enforceable contracts (especially in the purchase of labour-power), and no 
restrictions to the use of any technology, Roemer has effectively assumed 
away all possible effects of the relations of productions on the production 
function, and thus on profits and exploitation.
Anderson and Thompson (1988) also stress Roemer’s neglect of the 
labour/labour-power distinction, which is equivalent to assuming that 
workers do not resist being exploited, and note that profits in his model are 
just a scarcity rent. Moreover, by neglecting the actual features of the labour 
process, Roemer’s models cannot really capture the concept of class: lacking 
any direct social relation among workers, or between them and the capitalists, 
it is unclear how a sense of class comradeship could arise.
Foley (1989) criticises Roemer’s concept of class as nothing more “than 
a static typology of equilibrium labor allocation and an associated inequality 
in control over social resources and consumption of social product” (Foley, 
1989, p. 191); and Roemer’s definition of exploitation as “private and
27 More generally, Kieve (1986) claims that Roemer’s subsistence economies are models of 
advanced capitalism where some “theoretically troublesome” features “such as surplus value, 
surplus labor, capitalist class relations” (ibid., p. 561) have been abstracted away.
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ahistorical” (ibid., p.189).28 Instead, according to Foley, “the important 
historical aspect of class societies is that exploiting classes, through their 
control over social surplus production, shape the reproduction of the society 
and in particular the directions in which change can take place” (ibid., p. 191). 
Based on this interpretation of Marx’s theory, Foley finds Roemer’s 
emphasis on the normative aspects of exploitation as an abstract measure of 
injustice misplaced (see also Wood, 1989, p.465). Furthermore, the exclusive 
stress on DOSPA inverts the understanding of exploitation and inequalities 
from Marx’s viewpoint, whereby “exploitation is in the first instance an 
injury to the life of direct producers, because it removes from them ... the 
control over a part of the fruits of their energies, talents, and efforts (ibid., 
p. 192), and it is for this reason that it gives rise to inequalities.29
Dymsky and Elliot (1989) and Wood (1989) note that Roemer defines 
exploitation as unjust advantage, a form of inequality, -  secondary rather 
than primary exploitation, according to Marx -  and thus his conclusion that 
only DOSPA matters is not surprising.
These critiques are arguably relevant, but they do not seem conclusive. 
To be sure, interpretive and definitional issues are crucial in the evaluation of 
Roemer’s theory, especially as an interpretation of Marx’s theory. Indeed, 
most critics provide considerable textual evidence against Roemer’s reading 
of Marx, which would suggest that his models- albeit interesting -  are not
28 The ahistorical character of Roemer’s theory has been emphasised, to various degrees and 
extent, by all critics (see in particular Burawoy, 1990, pp.790-2; Wood, 1989, Section 3).
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suitable to evaluate Marx’s theory. Yet, as various endless debates show, 
very few issues in Marxist thought can be satisfactorily settled uniquely at the 
level of definition and interpretation. Moreover, an a priori rejection of 
Roemer’s models can lead to “throw the baby away with the dirty water,” 
both methodologically (see Section 1.2.2) and from a substantive viewpoint. 
As shown in chapters 4 and 5, a detailed critical analysis of Roemer’s models 
suggests interesting directions for further research.
More important, fidelity to Marx’s writings is not a major constraint for 
Roemer and Marx’s concepts and definitions are substantially revised. So, a 
critique entirely based on textual evidence arguably misses the point. For 
instance, Anderson and Thompson (1988) argue that Roemer’s subsistence 
economy with a labour market is equivalent to another economy in which the 
only non-produced input is a natural resource, say coal, and nobody works. 
But then, “we are forced by Roemer’s logic to say that those who must sell 
coal-power are coal-exploited” (ibid., p.220). This is true; but the 
Generalised Commodity Exploitation Theorem (e.g., Roemer, 1988a , p. 53) 
is precisely one of Roemer’s arguments to prove the irrelevance of the labour 
theory of value, and a fortiori of Marxian exploitation.
A priori critiques of the abstract and static nature of Roemer’s models 
are not per se conclusive either. Roemer repeatedly acknowledges the static 
nature of his models and the importance of disequilibrium and dynamics 
(most explicitly in Roemer, 1982d). Yet, “constructing a model of capitalism
29 A general critique of Roemer’s interpretation of Marxian exploitation along similar lines is 
advanced by Sensat (1984) and Reiman (1987).
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that would reveal its essentially dynamic features is a different task from 
what mine was” (Roemer, 1992, p. 150). The logical structure of Roemer’s 
argument is different: “in the real world we observe X  (DOPA), Y (coercion 
in the labour process), and Z (class and exploitation). We have, if you will, an 
‘empirical proposition’ that Y+ Y=> Z. Now I construct a model in which the 
following theorem holds: X  + not Y => Z; from this I say that X  is the 
‘fundamental’ cause of Z in the real world, not T” (ibid.).
But then a forceful critique of Roemer’s core logical argument cannot 
be limited to noting that his models and definitions are ahistorical; that many 
empirically relevant features of the capital/labour relation are neglected; that 
the labour/labour-power distinction is not considered; that money, hard 
uncertainty, and institutions, including firms, are absent (Hodgson, 1989); or 
that unemployment and coercion in production are neglected, and that in 
general the description of production processes is simplistic (Devine and 
Dymsky, 1991). Arguably, these objections prove that “Roemer’s inference is 
irrelevant for capitalism, because ‘not Y’ is false for capitalism” (Roemer, 
1992, p. 150), a point that does not challenge the basic logical argument. 
Moreover, given the lack of a formal analysis of Roemer’s models, it is often 
a priori unclear whether the suggested changes would lead to significantly 
different conclusions.30
From a methodological viewpoint, the adoption of an abstract model, 
and indeed of the most abstract model in neoclassical economics, the
30 For instance, as shown in chapter 4 below, contrary to Anderson and Thompson’s (1988) 
claim, Roemer’s assumption of non benevolent capitalists is not crucial for his results.
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Walrasian model, is explained by Roemer’s attempt to provide general 
microfoundations to exploitation and class. In his comment on Bowles and 
Gintis (1990) which aims to provide microfoundations to Marxian economics 
based on the concept of contested exchange (which incorporates issues of 
contractual incompleteness and conflicts of interest between the parties to the 
exchange), Roemer (1990) explicitly argues that market imperfections are a 
“thin thread” to provide general microfoundations to Marxian economics.
In chapters 4 and 5, a priori issues of interpretation are left aside and 
Roemer’s core logical argument is directly examined. Various dynamic 
extensions of Roemer’s models are set up in order to evaluate the theoretical 
and analytical robustness of his methodological and substantive claims at the 
appropriate level of generality. Roemer’s models are essentially static: they 
can be interpreted as describing either a succession of one-period economies 
or an infinitely lived generation, but in either case there are no intertemporal 
trade-offs: intertemporal credit markets and savings are ruled out, and the 
latter assumption in particular seems unduly restrictive. Thus, they do not 
seem suitable to analyse the persistence of exploitation and classes.
Instead, from a methodological viewpoint, a formal dynamic model 
proves extremely useful in the analysis of the possibility of providing 
neoclassical (more specifically, Walrasian) microfoundations to Marxian 
economics. In particular, a model that aims to provide microfoundations to
31 In one of the (surprisingly) few economic models in the AM tradition, Yosihara (1998) 
attempts to provide a synthesis of Roemer (1982a) and Bowles and Gintis (1990). However,
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Marx’s concepts of exploitation and class must be able to account for their 
persistence, since, according to Marx, they are inherent features of a capitalist 
economy (see, Roemer, 1982a , p.6). From a substantive viewpoint, a 
dynamic model allows one to assess the causal and moral relevance of 
DOSPA, focusing on its role in generating exploitation and classes as 
persistent features of a competitive economy in which agents can save and 
the distribution of productive assets can change over time.
The advantage of this strategy is twofold. First, the robustness of 
Roemer’s core arguments can be directly evaluated at the appropriate level of 
generality. Thus, the results derived in chapters 4 and 5 can be interpreted as 
follows. Let D denote the dynamic features of the economy (agents living for 
more than one period, savings, intertemporal optimisation). Roemer proves 
that X  + not Y + not D => Z as a persistent phenomenon; instead chapters 4 
and 5 prove that X  + not Y+ D=> Z is not persistent. Second, by avoiding an 
a priori rejection and focusing on specific issues arising from Roemer’s 
models, this dissertation provides ground for dialogue and for further cross­
fertilisation, and it suggests various interesting lines for further research.
1.2.4. EXPLOITATION AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Inter alia, chapters 4 and 5 raise doubts on Roemer’s interpretation of 
Marx’s theory of exploitation as “a kind of resource egalitarianism” (Roemer, 
1994a , p.2) and on the claim that his own definition of exploitation based on
the model is not entirely convincing given some ad hoc assumptions (for instance, he 
assumes a competitive economy with only one firm hiring labour).
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DOSPA generalises Marx’s theory capturing its essential normative content -  
which is interpreted as requiring “an egalitarian distribution of resources in 
the external world” (ibid., p.3). However, Roemer’s property rights definition 
of exploitation is arguably interesting per se.
Let el = ((/I, cd, d , d) be the endowment of agent i, living under 
feudalism: $  denotes z’s degree of feudal privilege, where (f > 0 if z is a 
feudal lord, while < 0 if z is a serf, and is normalised so that ^  = 0; 
cd is the vector of z’s private alienable assets; d  is z’s vector of labour skills; 
and d is the vector of z’s needs, where d is normalised so that vj = 0 implies 
that z has a normal level of need j ,  while vj > 0 indicates freedom from need j  
enjoyed by z, and if vj < 0 then z is needy in j. The following taxonomy of 
exploitation can be derived (Roemer, 1986b): a coalition S is feudally 
exploited at a given allocation if there is an hypothetically feasible alternative 
such that by withdrawing with es = (0, LissoJ, 'Lies d , Lies d), i.e. with its per 
capita share of feudal privilege and its own private property of everything 
else, the welfare of S improves; a coalition S is capitalistically exploited if it 
would improve by withdrawing with es = (0, (S/N)Ljes<rf, Lies d , Lies d), i.e. 
with its per capita share of both feudal privilege and alienable property; a 
coalition S is socialistically exploited if it would improve by withdrawing 
with es = (0, (S/N)T,iesaj, (S/N)I,isS d , XieS v'), i.e. with its per capita share of 
all assets, alienable and inalienable; a coalition S is needs exploited if it 
would improve by withdrawing with es = (0, (S/N)Li€s(d, (S/N)Lies d , 0), i.e. 
with its per capita share of all assets and needs. Whereas the elimination of 
socialist exploitation implies equality of income (skills are socialised ex­
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post), the elimination of needs exploitation requires an unequal distribution 
of income, as in the famous dictum: “To each according to his needs.”
Based on this taxonomy of exploitation Roemer suggests an original 
interpretation of historical materialism, according to which “history 
progresses by the successive elimination of dynamically socially unnecessary 
forms of exploitation” (Roemer, 1986b , p.146).32 Thus, for instance, when 
feudal exploitation becomes a fetter to the development of the forces of 
production, class struggle leads to its elimination and to the passage from a 
feudal to a capitalist mode of production.
More importantly, for the purposes of this dissertation, this theory 
naturally leads to an original normative approach by defining an historical 
materialist ethical imperative which requires the elimination of (socially 
unnecessary) exploitation in order to promote the self-actualisation of men 
and of man as the “unquestionable good” (ibid., p.147).33 But also on 
distributive grounds, since the exploitation-free society provides a natural 
egalitarian benchmark, with an unequal distribution of transferable resources 
to compensate for unequal endowments of skills and needs. Nevertheless, 
Roemer’s asset-based theory of exploitation is not a complete theory of 
distributive justice: “The injustice of an exploitative allocation depends upon 
the injustice of the initial distribution [of alienable and inalienable assets]” 
(Roemer, 1988a , p.57). While the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of
32 For a discussion of the notion of statically and dynamically socially necessary exploitation, 
see, e.g., Roemer (1986b, pp. 143-5).
33 For a definition of self-actualisation of men and man, see chapter 3, fn.l, below.
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feudal privilege is rather clear, the same is not true for skills, needs, and most 
importantly, physical assets (see, e.g., Nozick, 1974).
In Free to Lose (1988a), Roemer explicitly discusses the morality of 
DOSPA (and a fortiori of capitalist exploitation) and suggests that it is 
morally objectionable since it is typically the product either of immoral 
original accumulation - “robbery and plunder” (ibid., pp.58-9) - or of morally 
arbitrary factors, such as socially determined differential rates of time 
preference and entrepreneurial abilities or sheer luck (ibid., pp.60-9). In the 
latter case, even if asset inequalities have arisen in morally respectable ways, 
Roemer briefly suggests that the resulting exploitation can still be condemned 
on grounds of equality o f opportunity (ibid.), even though no comprehensive 
discussion is provided. From this perspective, Roemer’s asset-based theory of 
exploitation can be seen as an equality of opportunity approach in nuce, 
which suggests the (fairly controversial) view that the Marxist ethical 
imperative requires the progressive elimination of different forms of 
exploitation in order to equalise opportunities,34 This establishes an 
interesting unexplored link between AM and the modem theories of equality 
of opportunity which are the object of the next section.
1.3. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under 
bridges, beg in the streets or steal bread.” (Anatole France, The Red Lily, chapter 7).
34 Roemer (1994b) proposes market socialism as the best way to achieve equality of 
opportunity as a core socialist objective. (For a critique, see Ameson, 1994; Levine, 1994).
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The other egalitarian approach adopted to analyse the dynamics of 
inequality and classes in this dissertation is the theory of equality of 
opportunity (EOp) proposed by Ameson (1989) and Cohen (1989), and 
formalised by Roemer (1996, 1998, 2002). In particular, by adopting an EOp 
perspective, the dynamics of inequality and classes are analysed assuming 
different variables of egalitarian concern. This section surveys the three main 
strands of literature relevant for the analysis. Section 1.3.1 presents the 
general EOp approach and Roemer’s specific proposal and surveys the 
extensive philosophical and economic literature on both. Section 1.3.2 
focuses on the contributions on the appropriate currency for distributive 
justice and on the intertemporal egalitarian (more precisely, maximin) paths.
1.3.1. OUTCOMES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Since Rawls’s (1971) rejuvenation of egalitarianism, individual choice 
and responsibility have played an increasingly important role in egalitarian 
thinking. Arguably, they are present in nuce in Rawls’s (1971) and Sen’s 
(1980, 1985) emphasis on, respectively, primary goods or functionings as the 
appropriate equalisandum, given their role as a means for agents to reach 
their freely chosen ends. However, they are put at the centre of the stage only 
in Dworkin’s (1981a,b) theory of ‘equality of resources’, according to which 
distributive justice requires that agents be not compensated for the outcomes 
of their autonomous choices and preferences. According to Cohen, Dworkin 
“has performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating
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within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian right: the 
idea of choice and responsibility” (Cohen, 1989, p.933).35
In recent years, many authors have proposed theories of distributive 
justice in which individual choice and responsibility play a crucial role, and 
which can be broadly classified as theories o f equality o f opportunity. This 
dissertation focuses in particular on Ameson’s (1989, 1990) and Cohen’s
(1989) theories, as developed and formalised by Roemer (1993, 1995a , 1996, 
1998, 2002). However, in order to examine the main philosophical tenets of 
this approach, a general framework of analysis is provided first.
Let N  be the set of agents in the economy, indexed by i = 1, ..., N. Each 
agent i is characterised by a vector 6 1 e <9 c  91n denoting Vs personal 
features and actions. Let o' e O c  f  be the level of the relevant outcome
/ ifiattained by i: o could denote income, welfare, functionings, etc. Let !Fbe 
the set of feasible allocations of transferable resources: a policy is a function 
R: N  —> % such that r = (r1, ..., r^) describes the allocation of resources to all
35 Roemer (1996, chapters 6-8) interprets the EOp approach as the latest stage of a 
progressive evolution of egalitarian thinking since A Theory o f Justice (1971). For a succinct 
exposition, see Ameson (2000c), Sugden (2004), Roemer (2001a). For a critique of this 
interpretation, see Daniels (1990), Wolff (1998, p.l 16ff) and Anderson (1999, p.290ff).
36 Alternative definitions include “luck egalitarianism” (Anderson, 1999; Ameson, 2000b), 
“responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism” (Mason, 2001), “liberal egalitarianism” (Levine, 
1999), or, with a pejorative connotation, “conservative egalitarianism” (Fleurbaey, 2001).
37 In addition to the authors mentioned in the main text one may include Kymlicka (1990), 
Nagel (1991), Rakowski (1991), VanParijs (1991, 1995).
38 See section 1.3.2. In principle, ol can be a vector of outcomes, rather than a single variable.
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agents. The first postulate of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is 
captured by the following assumption.
A ssu m pt io n  1. (9 can be partitioned in two subsets ©c and 0 r such that 0cl e 
@c denotes Vs arbitrary factors -  her circumstances, -  while 0rl e 0 r denotes 
the variables she is deemed responsible for. Then, 0 l = (6C\  Or).
The next assumption states that Vs outcome level depends on
-IQ
government policies and on Vs circumstances and choices.
A ssu m pt io n  2. There is a function o: Wx ©c x 0r -> O such that, for all z, ol 
= o(r\ 0j, Or).
A general formulation of EOp can now be stated.
D efinition  (G en era l  EOp; Roemer, 2002, p.456). Egalitarianism seeks to 
equalise individual outcomes to the extent that they are due to differences in 
arbitrary factors 0C, but allow differences in outcomes to the extent that they 
are due to differences in responsible factors 0r.
Thus, if an opportunity is an “access to advantage” (Cohen, 1989, 
p.907), the EOp promotes “equal access but the individual is responsible for 
turning that access into actual advantage” (Roemer, 1998, p.24).
This general framework is suitable to describe different EOp theories 
focusing on two coordinates: the choice of outcome and the 0J0r partition.
39 So far, no uncertainty is assumed (although the variables may be the result of random 
processes); however with a slight abuse of notation 0rl can be interpreted as the outcome of a 
gamble deliberately chosen by agent i. See below for a discussion of luck.
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Thus, according to Dworkin (1981 A,b ), 0r should include agents’ choices and 
preferences (as long as they identify with the latter) and 6C should include 
extended resources (both transferable and nontransferable, such as talents and 
handicaps). However, he does not define the opportunity equalisandum o and 
proposes instead that bundles of extended resources be equalised.40 More 
precisely, he proposes that taxation systems should mimic the functioning of 
an ideal insurance market where agents are placed under a thin veil of 
ignorance (they are assumed to know their preferences) and have the same 
budget to buy goods and to insure against an adverse realisation of the lottery 
of talents and handicaps.
Ameson (1989, 1990) proposes equality of opportunity for welfare and 
criticises Dworkin’s partition, -  “Dworkin’s cut” (Cohen, 1989) -  arguing 
that involuntarily acquired tastes may call for compensation. He argues that 
6C should include all characteristics that are beyond an agent’s control, while 
0r are the variables within her control.41 Then, “equal opportunity for welfare 
obtains among persons when all of them face equivalent decision trees -  the 
expected value of each person best (most pmdent) choice of options, second-
40 Thus, Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism is different from an equality of opportunity 
theory, narrowly conceived (Dworkin, 1981b , p.307). However, the definition of general 
EOp provided above encompasses his approach, too.
41 Ameson (2000a , 2000c) states that different EOp theories advocate different “divisions of 
responsibility” between individuals and society. However, this terminology is slightly 
misleading as it conflates responsibility as accountability (for individuals) and responsibility 
as moral obligation (for society).
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best... H-best is the same. The opportunities persons encounter are ranked by 
the prospects for welfare they afford” (Ameson, 1989, pp.85-6).
Cohen (1989) suggests advantage as the appropriate outcome -  which 
includes welfare but is closer to Sen’s (1980, 1985) functionings, -  but 
proposes a similar 0J9r partition. However, the precise definition of 
advantage and the actual mechanism to implement EOp are not specified.
This dissertation focuses on Roemer’s (1998, 2002) theory, which is the 
most comprehensive and rigorous attempt to provide an operational 
definition of the EOp. Roemer’s proposal is captured by the following 
additional assumptions. Let the type of an agent be her circumstances 6C and 
let Tbe the set of types in the population, with cardinality T<N:  agents with 
the same circumstances belong to the same type, denoted by t = 1, ..., T, so 
that if agent i is of type t her circumstances can be denoted as 6c 42
Assum ption 3. Let <9r c= jfl+ and interpret 6r as effort43
The policy r allocates resources to agents of different types based on 
their effort: r\0,) is the amount of resources received by an agent of type t if 
she expends effort 6r. However, 6rl will in turn depend on the government’s 
policy r, which will generate a distribution of effort levels for each type. 
Thus, let P denote the set of probability distributions on
42 Formally, the function t: N  -> T defines a partition of N  into types, such that if  i belongs to 
t(i) then her circumstances are Off*. The notation in the text is used for simplicity.
43 The assumption that effort is unidimensional can be replaced by (Roemer, 2002, p.461):
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A ssu m pt io n  4. There is a mapping F: T x P which associates to any 
government policy r, a distribution of effort F(6r\ r , t) for each type.
Assumption 4 entails a potential contradiction: since effort distributions 
are type-specific, 0rl is partially determined by Vs circumstances,44 and thus 
the effort level 6rl is not a satisfactory index of agents’ responsible choices. 
Assumption 5 suggests to focus on the agents’ degree of effort as measured 
by their rank, the quantile jt> in the effort distribution of their type.
A ssumption 5 (Roemer, 2001a , p.8). (i) Two agents of type t have tried
equally hard if and only if they sit at the same rank of their type distribution 
of effort F}\ (//) Two agents of different types have tried equally hard if and 
only if they sit at the same rank of their respective distributions of effort F/.
Assumption 5 provides a plausible level-comparable inter-type measure 
of effort -  a measure of “sterilized effort” (ibid., p. 18), -  which incorporates 
the intuition that each agent’s effort -  conceived as volition rather than 
disutility (Risse, 2002, p.726; Roemer, 1998, pp.21-2) -  should be measured 
“on her own hook.”45 Hence, if 0}{n, r)  is agent Vs effort level,
A ssumption 3 ’. There is a set of increasing functions f l: ©r —> 91, t — 1, r, which
represent indices of effort, such that O is increasing in f ,  all t.
44 Alternatively, one may interpret the model as being based on the profile (0’c, 0 ’r), which is 
a proxy for the true vector (0C, 6r). See Fleurbaey (1998, p.220) for a thorough discussion.
45 Roemer (1998, p. 15) justifies Assumption 5 with the assumption o f charity (AC), which 
states that (i) beneath their circumstances agents possess a deep individuality, including a 
propensity to expend effort, and (ii) the distribution of this propensity is the same in all 
types. Hurley (2002a) and Risse (2002) argue that, from a philosophical viewpoint, AC is
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corresponding to the quantile n  of the conditional distribution Fr\  then 
F{Or{n, /) | r, t) = n. Hence, assuming the mapping F  to be known, it is 
possible to compute the indirect outcome functions r)  = o{r\6r{n, r)),
Or(n, f), 6c) which give “the level of [o] for individuals of type t at the 
quantile of the effort distribution for type t when the policy is [r]” (Roemer, 
2002, p.458). Roemer’s version of EOp can now be stated.
D efinition  (R o em er ’s EOp). The ideal EOp policy is defined as follows.
rK= Arg Maxr Min, v\n, r), for all n.
Although they are rather intuitive, EOp theories (both the general EOp 
and Roemer’s specific proposal) raise deep economic, philosophical, and 
political issues. The purpose of this dissertation is not to provide an articulate 
defence of the EOp, but rather to analyse its implications. However, in the 
remainder of this section a thorough review of the debate on the EOp is 
provided. This discussion aims to clarify the essential features of the EOp, 
the main differences with respect to other theories, and the reasons why it is a 
promising line for further research in liberal egalitarian thinking.
A first set of critiques of EOp theories concern the implementation of 
the proposal. On the one hand, there is an issue of feasibility: it may be 
difficult to gather all the necessary information to determine (a) the 
components of 0 within and those beyond the agents’ control; and (b) every 
agent’s vector 6C (or, equivalently, her type), especially if the possibility of
unsatisfactory and possibly leads to a fundamental incoherence. However, AC is by no 
means essential: for an alternative, less controversial justification, see e.g. Roemer (2001a).
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manipulation is considered (Fleurbaey, 1995a , p.30). Moreover, in general 
the implementation of the EOp may require a vast, expensive bureaucracy 
(Solow, 1995; Epstein, 1995).
Even if the set of types is correctly specified, 6r (say, effort) may be 
unobservable or extremely difficult to measure, especially if it is a vector, if 
it is not monotonically related to outcome, and if uncertainty plays an 
important role. Moreover, in modem economies conceived as cooperative 
endeavours, various market failures (externalities, market incompleteness, 
asymmetric information, etc.) might make it difficult to implement effort- 
based distributions (Levine, 1999).46
On the other hand, even if feasible, the application of the EOp may 
require an intolerable intrusion in people’s lives in order to evaluate how 
genuine their choices are (Fleurbaey, 1995a , pp.46-7) and their full set of 
circumstances (Fox-Genovese, 1995).47 Moreover, if preferences are 
determined by factors beyond agents’ control, including their family 
situation, this may motivate a substantial intrusion in people’s lives and in 
parental choices on EOp grounds (Daniels, 1990, p.291).
These issues should be taken into account when designing EOp policies, 
but they do not question the theoretical foundations of the EOp. Moreover, at 
the empirical level, Roemer’s proposal is not particularly vulnerable to them:
46 In economies with high unemployment, job incumbency is (at least to a degree) morally 
arbitrary and there are agents who would like to expend effort but cannot (Levine, 1999).
47 This problem is even more evident if the equalisandum is (or includes, as in Cohen’s 
notion of advantage) welfare. As Cohen (1989, p.910) puts it: “Hi! I’m from the Ministry of 
Equality. Are you, by any chance, unusually happy today?”
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although the number of types may quickly become very large (Solow, 
1995), in empirical applications (e.g., Roemer et al., 2003) a suitably small 
set of circumstances can be chosen and the EOp policy can be interpreted as 
proving that even a minimal egalitarian commitment leads to a significant 
amount of redistribution (Fleurbaey, 2001).
A second set of problems relate to the existence of the EOp policy. Let 
<y be the set of outcomes that i can reach by an appropriate choice of 0rl; that 
is, (J = {ol\ ol = o(r\ 6C\ 0?), 0rl e ©,-}. A natural formalisation of the general 
EOp (Fleurbaey, 1995a , p.29) may require that the allocation of resources r 
equalises the choice sets (O', 6rl), for all i = 1, .., N. However, unless a fairly 
strong separability requirement is imposed on the function o, the EOp 
solution will not exist (ibid.). In general, various axioms formalising the two 
principles underlying the EOp have been proposed (namely, “the principle of 
compensation” and “the principle of natural reward” defined below; see, e.g., 
Fleurbaey, 1995a , 1998; Maniquet, 2004) and “the economic analysis has 
revealed that in most contexts, there is a substantial conflict between [them]” 
(Fleurbaey, 2001, p.509).49
This problem is even clearer in Roemer’s EOp. Suppose that there is a 
continuum of agents in every type: in general it is not possible to equalise 
something for an infinite number of populations at the same time, and the set
48 Solow (1995) raises also the important issue of the appropriate choice of the egalitarian 
time unit -  whole lives or shorter spans, - which is discussed in chapter 2 below.
49 The issue of existence of the EOp policy is raised by Roemer (1996, chapter 8) in his 
discussion of Ameson’s (1989) equivalence condition of different decision trees.
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{rn | n  g  [0, 1]} solving Roemer’s EOp will normally consist in a continuum 
of different policies (Roemer, 1998, p. 27). Thus, Roemer suggests to adopt a 
second-best approach whereby “the objective function of each effort slice of 
the population ... is weighted by its size” (Roemer, 2002, p.459).50
R o e m er ’s r ev ised  EOp: The EOp policy is defined as follows.
tF°p = Arg Maxr |  Min, v\n, r) dn.
Fleurbaey (1998, pp.221-2) notes that as the number of types decreases, 
Roemer’s revised EOp approaches the utilitarian objective function, which 
contradicts the EOp view that agents should bear the consequences of their 
responsible actions.51 However, this criticism is not convincing since it 
neglects the second-best nature of Roemer’s revised EOp.
The next two sets of critiques relate to general theoretical issues and 
highlight the differences between the EOp and other theories of distributive 
justice. The EOp consists of two logically separate principles (Fleurbaey, 
1998, pp.210-9; 2001, pp.506-12): the principle o f compensation, which 
states that equality of outcomes should prevail if responsibility is absent (e.g., 
Cohen, 1989, p.914); and the principle o f natural reward, which states that 
agents must bear the consequences of their responsible actions (e.g., Ameson,
50 Alternatively, the EOp policy could be defined as the average of the rn policies (Roemer, 
2002, p.459, fn.l) or, more simply, one may focus only on one effort slice (say, the median) 
of the population (Roemer, 1993, 1998).
51 Fleurbaey (1998, pp.221-2) argues that if instead the revised EOp is defined as focusing 
only agents sitting at a certain quantile 7t (say, the median) of their type’s distribution of 
effort, then the EOp policy may require giving all the resources to them.
60
1989, p.86; Cohen, 1989, p.913). “Distributive justice does not recommend 
any intervention by society to correct inequalities that arise through the 
voluntary choice or fault of those who end up with less, so long as it is proper 
to hold the individuals responsible for the voluntary choice or faulty behavior 
that gives rise to the inequalities” (Ameson, 1989, p. 176).
Due to the principle of compensation, the EOp differs from theories of 
formal equality of opportunity based on the merit principle (or non­
discrimination principle), according to which agents “should be recmited to 
positions in society according to their merits, ... that is, according to the 
attributes they have that are relevant to performing the tasks of the position in 
question” (Roemer, 1998, p.84). This principle contains a negative and a 
positive prescription (Mason, 2001): the negative prescription requires that 
no one be discriminated against, due to characteristics that are irrelevant for 
the competition (e.g., race, gender, religion, etc.); the positive prescription 
requires that the most qualified candidate obtains the position.
The principle of compensation requires to implement policies to “level 
the playing field” among individuals who compete for positions. Thus, the 
EOp encompasses the negative prescription of the merit principle, but goes 
beyond it, since it advocates compensatory transfers for circumstances 
beyond agents’ control and for which they should not be held accountable, 
such as their race, gender, family’s socio-economic status, but also, more 
importantly, inborn natural talents. Thus, as noted by Roemer (1998) and 
Mason (2001), the EOp is in conflict with the positive prescription of the 
merit principle, since it may require to allocate positions based on effort
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rather than merit, which, at least in some situations, - e.g., in surgical schools 
or in basketball teams - seems undesirable.
Yet, the differences between the EOp and the merit principle do not 
seem sufficient to abandon the former. In its negative part, the merit principle 
is a very basic requirement of fairness, which advocates open -  rather than 
equal -  opportunities (Hansson, 2004, p.315), but it is unsatisfactory as a 
complete conception of justice. In fact, it lacks independent justification, 
since a broader concept of justice is necessary to define what constitutes a 
legitimate qualification for a position (see, Mason 2001; and references 
therein). Moreover, “it says nothing about the size of the rewards that can be 
justly attached to various positions” (Scanlon, 1995; see also Hansson, 2004; 
Mason, 2001; and contra Flew, 1981). Finally, the merit view reflects a 
purely procedural conception of justice (Hansson, 2004, p.315) which -  
paraphrasing Anatole France -  requires that the well-nourished and educated 
rich and the destitute poor have the same right to compete for relevant social 
positions.52 Hence, it is not surprising that a theory of distributive justice may 
be in conflict with the merit view.
Instead, in its positive part, it can be understood as incorporating an 
intuitive social efficiency condition for allocating individuals to at least some 
socially relevant positions. Thus, the inconsistency with the EOp can be 
interpreted just as the specific form that the equity vs. efficiency trade-off
52 This criticism echoes Marx’s famous critique of equality of rights in his Critique o f the 
Gotha Programme. For a thorough discussion, see Wood (1979b). See also Rawls’s analysis 
of the “system of natural liberty” (Rawls, 1971, § 12).
62
takes in this context. Therefore, although distributive justice may require 
social positions to be allocated according to the EOp, considerations of merit 
should play an important role in the determination of the scope and extent to 
which opportunities should be equalised (Roemer, 1998, chapter 12) in the 
context of all things considered judgments (Temkin, 1993)
Due to the principle of natural reward, the EOp differs from outcome 
egalitarianism: even if opportunities are equalised, the actual levels of the 
equalisandum could differ considerably across agents. This allows the EOp to 
avoid some problems of pure outcome egalitarianism (e.g., the levelling down 
objection or the allocation of enormous amounts of resources to 
“irresponsible” agents). However, it has been argued that in the EOp the core 
of the egalitarian idea is lost, due to the adoption of the non-egalitarian (if not 
<2H/z-egalitarian; Fleurbaey, 2001, pp.509-10) principle of natural reward.
According to some critics, the EOp may be in conflict with the absolute 
value of equal respect, equal social status, and equal participation which 
should lie at the heart of egalitarianism (Anderson, 1999, p.295ff; Wolff, 
1998, p.l05ff). “First, its rules for determining who shall be included among 
the blamelessly worst off fail to express concern for everyone who is worse 
off’ (Anderson, 1999, p.303), since it refuses aid to the victims of bad option 
luck (see below), no matter what the amount of the loss incurred. “Second, 
the reasons it offers for granting aid to the worst off are deeply disrespectful 
of those to whom the aid is directed” (ibid.): agents receive compensation 
due to lack of talents or handicaps or other personal characteristics which are
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considered to make them inferior.53 Thus EOp conditional transfers are likely 
to decrease the “respect-standing” (Wolff, 1998, p. 107) of the agents who 
receive them. Finally, the EOp does not promote a culture of solidarity, since 
the main motivation for compensation relies on pity -  for the disadvantaged -  
and on envy -  for the lucky ones (Anderson, 1999, pp.306-7), while altruistic 
and morally motivated acts are treated as voluntarily cultivated expensive 
preferences which entail no compensation.
These issues are quite relevant and should be taken into account when 
implementing EOp policies. However, they do not question the theoretical 
core of the EOp. Besides, it is unclear whether competing approaches, 
including Wolffs (1998) and Anderson’s (1999) ideal of democratic equality 
(see also Daniels, 1990), would fare better than the EOp in practice, beyond a 
rather vague general emphasis on the equal moral worth of persons as human 
beings, as agents in a system of cooperative production, and as citizens.
A more worrying set of critiques suggest that EOp policies may be in 
contradiction with egalitarian considered judgments. First, according to the 
EOp, “When deciding whether or not justice (as opposed to charity) requires 
redistribution, the egalitarian asks if someone with a disadvantage could have 
avoided it or could now overcome it. If he could have avoided it, he has no 
claim to compensation, from an egalitarian viewpoint” (Cohen, 1989,
53 “When racial and sexual prejudice have been reduced, we shall still be left with the great 
injustice of the smart and the dumb, ... the talented and the untalented, or even the beautiful 
and the ugly” (Nagel, 1979, p. 105).
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p.920).54 This view seems unacceptably unforgiving -  and much tougher than 
existing legal and welfare state systems, -  from an egalitarian viewpoint, 
since it is insensitive to the amount of loss and does not take into account the 
possibility of changes in preferences over time (Anderson, 1999, pp.295-302; 
Fleurbaey, 1995a , pp.40-2; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001, pp.549, 557-9).55 As 
acknowledged by Ameson, the EOp “is blind to results once equal 
opportunities have been provided ... [but] in some circumstances the refusal 
to tender more resources is unfair” (Ameson, 1994, p.225).56
Second, consider a stochastic environment. EOp theories distinguish 
two concepts of luck: “Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and 
calculated gambles turn out -  whether someone gains or loses through 
accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined. Bmte luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense 
deliberate gambles” (Dworkin, 1981b , p.293). The general EOp is usually 
constmed to entail compensation for the outcomes of bmte luck, but not for 
the consequences of deliberately chosen gambles. However, on the one hand, 
it is unclear that if bmte luck is neutralised and opportunities equalised, there 
should be no further egalitarian objection to outcome inequalities. Suppose 
that two agents face effectively equivalent sets of options and both opt for the
54 See also Ameson (1989, pp.85-6). Both Dworkin (1981b , pp.293-5) and Rakowski (1991, 
69-81 and passim) take a similar, if not stronger position.
55 According to Ameson (1990, p. 179), there is just a “canonical moment” of passage to 
adulthood, after which people are entirely responsible for their choices.
56 According to Levine (1999, p.404), in the limit, according to the EOp there would be no 
egalitarian objection to slavery, if it is the result of deliberately taken gambles.
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most prudent course of action (with the same expected value by assumption). 
As argued by Lippert-Rasmussen (1999, pp.482-4; see also Lippert- 
Rasmussen, 2001), it is difficult to maintain that if one of them ends up badly 
off and the other well off, there is no egalitarian objection because such 
inequalities are the product of choice. By the same token, it is unclear that 
inequality of opportunity is a sufficient condition for an outcome to be bad 
with regard to inequality. Suppose that two agents face almost equivalent 
opportunity sets, which differ only for the (expected) outcome of an 
irrelevant and remotely possible course of action. If both choose their most 
prudent outcome and end up equally well off, it seems difficult to claim that 
the distribution is objectionable due to the initial differences in opportunities 
(Lippert-Rasmussen, 1999, pp.484-6; see also Christiano, 1991).
Third, arguably, the EOp fails according to the principle that “To count 
as egalitarian, a doctrine must, for some X, favor relatively more equal 
patterns of distribution of X over relatively less equal patterns of X, other 
things equal” (Hurley, 2001, p.52; see also Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001). From 
an EOp viewpoint, an allocation with large outcome inequalities is equivalent 
to another allocation in which agents end up equally well off, if in both cases 
outcome levels are the product of agents’ responsible choices. Actually, an 
EOp policy may yield greater outcome inequalities if the existing allocation 
does not reflect agents’ responsible choices. Moreover, according to the EOp, 
a policy that removes differential circumstances (e.g., by eliminating slums, if 
they negatively affect agents’ outcomes) is in principle equivalent to another 
policy that compensates for them (e.g., by providing subsidies to slum
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dwellers), a conclusion that most egalitarians would reject (Lippert- 
Rasmussen, 2001, pp.575-9). The problem is that per se the notion of 
responsibility is not a relational concept and the EOp is consistent with any
c n
view on the default distribution of outcome (Hurley, 2001, 2002a ).
As acknowledged by EOp theorists (Ameson, 1994, 1999, 2000b), these 
objections cannot be easily dismissed. Ameson (2000b) suggests that by 
abandoning the idea of responsibility altogether one may end up spending 
enormous amounts of resources on irresponsible individuals. It remains tme, 
though, that no satisfactory egalitarian theory can be completely insensitive 
to outcome inequalities, even if opportunities are equalised (Lippert- 
Rasmussen, 2001). This suggests an interesting line for further research 
aimed at integrating the EOp with outcome-egalitarian concerns. However, in 
this dissertation, these issues can be left aside. First, Roemer’s EOp aims to 
provide an algorithm to implement any egalitarian view as defined by the a 
priori choice of the 6J0r partition: at one extreme, libertarians can be taken 
to advocate 0= 6n which implies that there is only one type in the population 
and no redistributive policy is needed; at the other extreme, outcome
• c oegalitarians may be seen as defining 9 = 9C. Second, as already noted, the 
empirical literature (Roemer et al., 2003) suggests an interpretation of
57 Hurley (2001, 2002a) argues that the aim to neutralise luck (in the form, e.g., of different 
circumstances) can at most indicate what should be distributed but not how.
58 However, libertarians may be described as denying the normative relevance of the 0J0r 
distinction altogether, based on the view that choice is uncaused (Risse, 2002, p.728) and 
that self-ownership entails a right to the revenues accruing from 0C (Levine, 1999, p.406).
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Roemer’s EOp as a pragmatic theory for the egalitarian planner (Roemer, 
1993) which proves that even a minimal egalitarian commitment leads to 
significant redistribution. Finally, in line with Roemer’s approach, in chapter 
3 it is assumed that the outcome function o is continuous -  so that small 
mistakes lead to small losses -  and that uncertainty plays no role so that 
agents can predict the outcomes of their responsible choices.
Actually, thanks to the latter assumption, in chapter 3 the controversial 
distinction between brute and option luck need not be discussed, which is the 
object of another set of criticisms. First, option luck requires that the risk (i) 
should have been anticipated; (ii) might have been declined; and (iii) is 
isolated.59 Conditions (i)-(iii) are crucial to make the distinction normatively 
appealing: for instance, as noted above, if the risk is not isolated the EOp 
may be too unforgiving.60 However, the more stringent (i)-(iii) are, the larger 
the set of cases that fall in the brute option luck category, making the 
distinction practically irrelevant. For instance, Lippert-Rasmussen (1999, 
p.483) argues that in order to rule out some paradoxical examples agents 
should have at least one effectively equivalent riskless option, a requirement 
that would severely limit the cases where option luck prevails.
Second, the theoretical distinction between option and brute luck is a 
matter of degree along all three dimensions (Vallentyne, 2002; see also
59 “A risk of a certain event occurring is an isolated risk if, and only if, its occurrence will 
only have a minor inpact on one’s life” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001, p.558).
60 Actually, condition (iii) may take care of some of the examples where the EOp seems most 
unforgiving. However, as argued by Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, p.562), it does so by 
incorporating sufficientarian, rather than egalitarian concerns.
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Cohen, 1989; Ameson, 2001); for instance, whether a risk is avoidable or not 
depends on how costly it is to insure against it. However, this blurs the 
distinction between outcomes that do or do not call for compensation.
Third, from an egalitarian viewpoint, the main issue is not to determine 
whether the outcome level of an agent is the result of option or bmte luck, but 
rather “whether an inequality between two persons is a matter of differential 
option luck or a matter of differential bmte luck” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001, 
p.562). However, it is rather difficult to provide a satisfactory definition of 
differential option luck (not discussed by Dworkin, 1981a ,b ), which should 
identify outcome inequalities stemming from voluntary choices of agents 
with equal opportunity sets. In fact, it is unclear what probabilities should be 
used to evaluate available gambles: from an egalitarian viewpoint, outcome 
inequalities due to mistakes in the subjective evaluation of risks (for reasons 
beyond the agents’ control) seem objectionable. One possibility is to define 
opportunities to be equalised “only when, first, opportunities are equal in the 
sense of objective probabilities and, second, they would have been obtained 
if the individuals had had subjective probabilities equal to the objective 
probabilities” (Fleurbaey, 2001, p.515).61 Based on this definition, however, 
it becomes very difficult to measure opportunities and to assess whether a
f t }given inequality is the product of option or bmte luck.
61 Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, p.568) uses ideal subjective (instead of objective) probabilities 
and proposes the stronger requirement that actual subjective probabilities be equal.
62 For a thorough critical analysis of the EOp concept of luck (and in particular of the idea of 
the natural lottery of constitutions) and the notion of responsibility, see Hurley (2002b).
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These critiques are quite relevant and they are the object of debate (for a 
reply, see, e.g., Ameson, 1999, 2000b , 2001). Roemer himself (1996, p.250) 
seems to question the distinction between option and bmte luck, since he 
identifies cases where differential option luck should lead to equality of 
outcomes. Indeed, as noted by Sugden (2004), Roemer’s effort-based scheme 
entails ex-post compensation to neutralise option luck so that identical people 
expending the same amount of effort get the same outcome. Nevertheless, the 
relevance of these issues for Roemer’s EOp is unclear since he provides no 
thorough treatment of uncertainty. This suggests an interesting line for 
further research; however, these issues are not essential to expose the 
problems which lie at the core of this dissertation and therefore they are 
abstracted away in chapter 3.
Another set of critiques focus on the relation between the EOp and 
efficiency. First, since the EOp view is non-welfarist, it is not surprising that 
“it may violate the most basic welfarist principle, namely, Pareto efficiency” 
(Fleurbaey, 1995a , p.34). For instance, if “agents are responsible for their 
preferences (viewed as factors of well-being), the principle of natural reward 
... [may] require the allocation to be independent of their preferences, and the 
allocation mle could not then be Pareto-efficient” (Fleurbaey, 1998, p.212). 
However, such incompatibility does not always hold (ibid.; and references 
therein) and in any case, ceteris paribus, by rewarding responsible choices 
(e.g., effort) the EOp seems to provide a more satisfactory answer to 
incentive problems than more traditional approaches.
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More relevant is Sugden’s (2004) argument that Roemer’s EOp cannot 
be implemented unless some vital market process is disabled. Sugden (2004, 
p.221ff) shows that a EOp equilibrium can be implemented in a Walrasian 
economy (Walras island) thanks to a double tatonnement process managed by 
the auctioneer. However, in an economy characterised by division o f 
knowledge (Hayek island), markets generate successes and failures which can 
be attributed ex-post to circumstances beyond the agents’ control, -  such as 
differences in beliefs due to arbitrary circumstances, -  but which cannot be 
compensated without seriously hampering the coordinating role of markets. 
This interesting argument confirms that the analysis of (Roemer’s) EOp in a 
stochastic environment should be one of the next steps in the EOp research 
program. However, arguably it does not represent an impossibility result and 
in chapter 3 it is ignored by assuming that the EOp does provide an ethically 
viable normative view. Furthermore, as already noted, uncertainty is not 
necessary to expose the problems analysed in chapter 3 and thus Sugden’s 
problem is assumed away by focusing on a deterministic environment.
Lastly, a set of critiques focus on the EOp notion of responsibility. 
Fleurbaey distinguishes two concepts. “Responsibility by control is assigned 
to an agent on a particular variable when this agent has full control over the 
value of this variable. ... Responsibility by delegation ... is assigned to an 
agent on a particular variable when the rest of society decides not to spend
63 EOp ex-ante compensation for differences in beliefs is impossible, while if feasible, an 
effort-conditional insurance scheme {ex-post compensation) would interfere with markets by 
rewarding effort independently of where it is expended (Sugden, 2004, pp.227-8).
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any resource on the outcome obtained by the individual for this variable” 
(Fleurbaey, 1995b , p.684). By adopting the first concept, -  assigning 
responsibility over factors, 0r, -  EOp theorists reject hard determinism and 
endorse a compatibilist view of free will.64 However, this approach makes 
distributive justice theory hostage of metaphysics since the philosophical 
foundations and the normative relevance of the EOp ultimately rest on the 
resolution of the free will debate (Fleurbaey, 1995a , pp.38-9; Cowen, 2002). 
Thus, the very possibility of a philosophically meaningful, widely agreed 
OJ0r partition is called into question (Scheffler, 1995).
A further complication arises since, as acknowledged by EOp theorists 
(e.g., Ameson, 1989, p.86), responsibility is a matter of degree. This may 
provide a (partial) way out of the free will problem by avoiding the need of 
“an absolute distinction between presence and absence of genuine choice” 
(Cohen, 1989, p.934), but it raises clear practical and definitional problems. 
Consider the related notion of opportunity: the availability of an option does 
not tell much about how difficult it is for an agent to access it, and thus how 
responsible she is for reaching a certain outcome.65 Thus, it would be more 
appropriate to define opportunities in terms of a degree of access to 
advantage and to define the EOp in terms of effectively equivalent options 
(Ameson, 1989, p.86). Roughly, “if I have an opportunity to get X amount of
64 More precisely, EOp theorists are agnostic on hard determinism, however the latter must 
be false for EOp to differ from outcome egalitarianism (Lippert-Rasmussen, 1999, pp.481-2). 
For a very good discussion of these concepts, see Risse (2002).
65 For a discussion of the concept of opportunity, see Hansson (2004, especially p.309-10).
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welfare, then there is a [reasonably] prudent course of action available to me 
that will yield me X if I take it, and if I do not, the responsibility for my 
lower welfare level lies with me” (Ameson, 2001, p.82).66
The concept of individual responsibility is even more elusive in the 
presence of externalities since opportunity sets are interrelated and other 
people’s actions may affect my degree of access to some opportunities 
(Fleurbaey, 1995a , pp.36-7). Actually, this raises the issue of the distinction 
between a person’s circumstances and other people’s choices: “are there 
legitimate claims to compensation if, because of other people’s morally 
impeccable choices, an individual’s life goes worse than it would had those 
people acted differently?” (Risse, 2002, p.734).67
These critiques are philosophically relevant and they are still the object 
of debate. However, Roemer’s EOp does not seem vulnerable to them. First, 
it is “not metaphysical in the sense of trying to solve the deep problem of 
what actually is beyond a person’s control; it is political in the sense that it 
depends on the current views of the society in question” (Roemer, 1995a). 
Second, Roemer’s (1998, 2002) proposal to measure the degree of effort by
66 “Your opportunity for welfare is the welfare level you would reach if  you tried prudently 
to advance your own welfare without violating strict obligations of law and morality and if 
you pursued this pmdent aim as effectively as it would be reasonable to expect of you, when 
taking into account your choice-making and choice-executing abilities and the difficulty and 
pain you would have to overcome to live prudently” (Ameson, 2000a , p.507).
67 Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, pp.571-5) also argues that in an uncertain environment the 
notion of responsibility does not help to determine legitimate claims for compensation, since 
it is unclear whether agents can be considered responsible for differential option luck.
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the individual’s ranking in the effort distribution of her type can be seen as a 
way to capture the degree of access to advantage (and a fortiori, the degree of 
responsibility) as a statistical issue, which significantly deflates Roemer’s 
proposal of complex metaphysical implications. Third, as argued by 
Fleurbaey (1995, 1998), in principle, the 0cIQr partition need not be based on 
responsibility and Roemer’s proposal itself does not crucially rely on the 
latter view. Instead, Roemer’s EOp can be naturally interpreted as a desert- 
based, rather than responsibility-based theory, advocating a just reward for 
effort (see, e.g., Roemer, 1993, 1994b ; Hurley, 2002a).
To summarise: the EOp is the object of ongoing controversy and, as 
acknowledged by EOp theorists (most notably Ameson, 1999, 2000b , 2001), 
it may need some refinements. However, the EOp, and specifically Roemer’s 
version, is an interesting approach and a promising research program in the 
liberal egalitarian tradition, which is worth exploring further. First, it offers 
various insights on important issues in egalitarian thinking, including the 
relation between equality and responsibility. Second, by leaving the 0J6r 
partition undetermined, Roemer’s EOp is inherently pluralistic, in that it can 
accommodate different views on the scope and extent of egalitarian policies 
and therefore it provides fruitful common ground for discussion. However, 
third, and most important, as shown by the empirical literature, it is a fruitful 
policy-oriented framework, which proves that significant redistribution may 
be needed even if only a minimal egalitarian commitment is endorsed.
1.3.2. OBJECTIVISM, SUBJECTIVISM, AND GROWTH
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Section 1.3.1 surveys various controversial issues raised by the EOp that 
are debated in the economic and philosophical literature, and suggests some 
interesting lines for further research within the EOp paradigm. However, the 
main contribution of this dissertation to the EOp research program focuses in 
particular on two arguably crucial issues for any theory of distributive justice: 
the choice of the appropriate equalisandum, and intergenerational justice and 
growth. As concerns the former issue, in Section 1.3.1, the EOp is discussed 
without specifying the variable of egalitarian concern. Partly, this is due to 
the fact that the general EOp is proposed by many authors with different 
views on the relevant currency of egalitarian justice. Partly, the interpretation 
of Roemer’s EOp as a pragmatic egalitarian theory naturally leads to endorse 
a “spherical” interpretation of distributive justice with different outcomes in 
different “spheres of justice” (Walzer, 1983; Roemer, 2001a) and to eschew 
the discussion of the appropriate equalisandum (Risse, 2002). However, at 
the theoretical level, the latter issue is crucial if the EOp is to provide a 
general theory of distributive justice (see, e.g. Ameson, 2000a).
Inter alia, the analysis of the dynamics of inequality and classes in 
chapter 3 aims to contribute to the EOp research program by offering various 
interesting insights on the issue of the appropriate equalisandum. Although 
no argument is provided to support an egalitarian, or more specifically, an 
EOp approach -  the analysis starts from the assumption that the EOp 
provides an ethically viable theory of distributive justice, -  the choice of the 
appropriate equalisandum is crucial in the determination of the ethical appeal 
of an egalitarian theory. The EOp is non-welfarist or more precisely, wow-
75
outcomist, since other information -  e.g. concerning agents’ responsible 
choices and their available options -  is necessary to evaluate a distribution, in 
addition to the level of the relevant outcome attained by all agents 
(Fleurbaey, 1995a , p.34). However, this does not imply that welfare cannot 
be the appropriate opportunity equalisandum.
Since Rawls’s (1971) critique of utilitarianism, the choice of the 
appropriate currency of egalitarian justice has become one of the major foci 
of discussion in egalitarian theory.68 Rawls (1971) forcefully criticises the 
subjectivist dimension of utilitarianism, i.e. the idea that the normatively 
relevant variable is utility, which can only be measured knowing the utility 
function of the individual in question, and can only be compared 
interpersonally if an interpersonally comparable unit scale exists. Instead, he 
endorses an objectivist view, i.e. the view that the equalisandum should be 
something which is measurable independently of the views of the individuals 
who have it; whence his focus on primary goods.
Rawls’s critique of subjectivism has been very influential and although 
several qualifications have been put forth as to what the equalisandum should 
be, most, although not all, participants in the discussion have advocated an 
objectivist equalisandum, such as functionings (Sen, 1980), resources 
(Dworkin, 1981), or advantage (Cohen 1989). Interestingly, although 
Ameson (1989, 1990) has argued that opportunity for welfare should be the
68 A thorough survey of the vast economic and philosophical literature on this issue goes far 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For excellent surveys, see Roemer (1996), Clayton and 
Williams (1999), andMaguain (2000).
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equalisandum,69 he has progressively moved from a subjective conception of 
welfare as preference satisfaction (albeit with a number of qualifications to 
meet objectivist critiques) to a perfectionist, “objective list” conception of 
welfare as the appropriate opportunity equalisandum (more precisely, 
distribuendum; see Ameson, 1999, 2000a). None of the major writers 
advocates subjective welfare as the appropriate variable.
In this dissertation, the issue of the appropriate equalisandum is 
analysed in the context of all things considered judgments, rather than 
directly in the context of the requirements of distributive justice. More 
specifically, in chapter 3 it is stipulated that in addition to equality of 
opportunity for some condition among members of society, most egalitarians 
would hold that that society is best which promotes human development over 
time, and the consistency of these objectives is analysed.
In order to analyse human development, the static framework usually 
adopted in the debate on the appropriate equalisandum is abandoned and 
equality of opportunity for some condition, becomes equality of opportunity 
among all adults who ever live. More precisely, the EOp assumes that 
individuals have different circumstances and exert different efforts. In 
chapter 3, differential effort is assumed away while a person’s circumstances 
are assumed to be her parent’s socio-economic status (measured by her 
parent’s wage, w) - a summary of the environmental factor which affects the 
child’s education and therefore her wage when adult - and the date t at which
69 ‘Opportunity for welfare’ is, in general, quite different from ‘welfare’ as an equalisandum. 
That difference is due to differential effort, which is abstracted away in chapter 3.
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she is bom. Children are taken as ‘adults in formation.’ Then, since effort is 
nugatory, the EOp prescribes to allocate educational resources to maximize 
the minimal level of some condition o among all adults across types, where 
an adult’s type is a pair (w, t). In other words, the EOp requires to find the 
maximin intertemporal allocation.
The analysis of intertemporal maximin paths and their consistency with 
growth has started immediately after the publication of A Theory o f Justice 
(1971). Arrow (1973a) and Dasgupta (1974a , 1974b) analyse the dynamic 
properties of the difference principle in an economy with an infinite number 
of non-overlapping generations living for one period. They assume a 
representative agent with a well-behaved utility function which depends on 
consumption of the only good produced with a linear technology. They prove 
first, that if agents are egoistic and care only about their own consumption, 
the maximin path leads to no savings and “the economy would be imprisoned 
in perpetual poverty if it begins in poverty” (Dasgupta, 1974a , p.408; see 
also Arrow, 1973a , p.325), confirming the result obtained by Solow (1974a) 
in a continuous time model.70
Second, they prove that if agents have additively separable utility
71functions displaying paternalistic altruism, the maximin does not lead to 
growth. In fact, beyond the altruistic horizon T, the maximin path “leads to
70 The issue of whether Rawlsian intergenerational justice requires the use of the difference 
principle or the just savings principle (Rawls, 1971, §44), is not relevant here. See, e.g., 
Arrow (1973a , p325); Dasgupta (1974a , p.408); Phelps and Riley (1978, p.104 and fh.4).
71 Preferences are said to display paternalistic altruism if each agent’s utility depends on her 
own consumption and on the consumption of a finite number T of her descendants
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periodic repetition of the solution with a period equal to that of the horizon” 
(Arrow, 1973a , p.333). Worse still, the maximin path is intertemporally 
inconsistent (Dasgupta, 1974a , Proposition 3), a rather worrying feature for a 
principle of intergenerational justice.
Leininger (1985) proves that similar results hold in economies with 
more general technologies and utility functions, unless initial capital is higher 
than the “golden rule” level, which maximises steady state consumption.
Instead, Calvo (1978) posits a simple form of non paternalistic altruism 
whereby every generation’s utility is additively separable and depends on 
their consumption and the next generation’s utility. Then, he proves that, 
under fairly general assumptions on technology and initial capital, the 
maximin path is time consistent and leads to capital accumulation. The 
intuition is that “non paternalistic altruism prevents time-inconsistency ... by 
letting each generation recognize the altruism of its children and thereby 
removing a source of intergenerational conflict” (Asheim, 1988, p.469). 
Calvo’s (1978) result is extended by Rodriguez (1981) to economies with 
general utility aggregators of the form Ut = V(ct, Ut+1); and by Asheim (1988) 
to an economy with non-renewable resources.
Similar conclusions on the consistency of growth and maximin justice 
are reached by Phelps and Riley (1978), in the context of an overlapping 
generations model in which labour is a productive input in a general concave 
technology and leisure enters the agents’ utility. They prove that if labour 
supply is fixed, the Rawlsian economy reaches a stationary state after one
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period of adjustment, while if labour supply can vary, in the maximin path 
there may be capital accumulation but welfare is constant. Welfare growth is 
possible only if nonpatemalistic altruism is postulated (ibid., pp. 115-6).
Although the model presented in chapter 3 may be considered an 
intellectual descendent of this literature, some important differences should 
be highlighted. First, the models just reviewed provide important insights on 
intertemporal maximin paths, but they are not suitable to analyse the 
dynamics of inequalities and classes, due to the representative agent 
assumption. Instead, chapter 3 focuses on what ^/"generational equality 
requires with respect to i/tfragenerational wage differentials, a question that 
none of the authors mentioned above poses. Unlike in the previous literature, 
two types of individuals, -  two socio-economic classes -  are assumed to exist 
at least at the early dates, and the dynamics of intragenerational class 
differences is analysed in relation to intergenerational justice.
Second, in the previous literature the choice of the equalisandum is not 
discussed and a straightforward utility-based approach is adopted, whereby 
agents are typically assumed to care only about (theirs and possibly their 
descendants’) consumption.73 In chapter 3, a more general approach is 
adopted to analyse the differences between an objectivist and a subjectivist 
view. As concerns the former, chapter 3 focuses on functionings, which are 
defined to include both consumption and the wage: the wage is a measure of
72 Phelps and Riley (1978, Theorem 2.1). See also Theorem 1 in chapter 2 below.
73 As noted above, Phelps and Riley (1978) assume that leisure also enters the utility 
function, but this does not alter the essence of the argument.
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an agent’s level of human capital and it is assumed that individuals derive 
welfare directly from their human capital. Moreover, functioning involves a 
degree of self-esteem and self-realization, and these arguably depend 
positively on an individual’s level of human capital. Formally, the main 
difference is that in the previous literature the planner has only one 
instrument each period, whereas in our model she has two instruments, 
income tax and educational resources.
Finally, since chapter 3 analyses the dynamics of inequality and classes 
in a EOp perspective, special attention is devoted to the intertemporal and 
intragenerational role of education. Therefore, unlike in previous models, the 
emphasis is on investment in education, rather than physical capital.
Nevertheless, the results derived in chapter 3 are qualitatively similar to 
the ones discussed above: it is proved that the three desiderata: (i) protracted 
human development; (iz) equality of opportunity for some condition; and (iii) 
the condition be an objective characteristic of the individual; are inconsistent. 
Only if the equalisandum is non-patemalistic, altruistic welfare -  a non- 
objectivist concept, -  equality of opportunity is consistent with human 
development. If this inconsistency is correct, then egalitarians are faced with 
a choice: either dropping their advocacy of equality (of opportunity), or of 
human development, or of objectivist equalisanda. Dropping the third 
desideratum seems the obvious choice.
However, there are three important caveats that qualify the above 
conclusions and, at the same time, indicate some lines for further research. 
First, in chapter 3 it is assumed that the EOp (for whatever condition) is an
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ethically viable conception in a multi-generation world, and that in such a 
context, it calls for equalizing opportunities across all types (f, w). However, 
even setting aside the problems discussed in Section 1.3.1, the idea that 
justice requires that a person fare no better than another simply by virtue of 
being bom at a different date is not uncontroversial. As argued in chapter 2, 
there are various possible views on the proper temporal unit of egalitarian 
concern, and according to some equality of condition among living persons is 
all that an egalitarian ethic requires. One rationale is that self-esteem is 
affected by comparing one’s condition to those of contemporaries.
In chapter 3, some intuitions that might justify the adoption of the EOp 
in the intergenerational context are briefly discussed; however from a 
philosophical viewpoint, providing a proper motivation should be one of the 
next steps of the EOp research program.
Second, this inquiry does not show that justice requires that 
subjectivism be endorsed. For at most it suggests to drop objectivism because 
of its inconsistency with equality of opportunity and human development, 
and while the ‘equality of opportunity’ part of that compound phrase refers to 
a state of justice, the ‘human development’ part does not. That is, chapter 3 
does not prove that justice requires human development, or even, more 
weakly, that justice requires human development in an environment where it 
is possible. Human development over time seems an obvious good, but it is 
unclear what to call the state of a society which has it, the way a society with 
equality of opportunity is in a state of justice.
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But then, it is crucial to investigate the robustness of the inconsistency 
result. The model examined in chapter 3 is quite general and, at least in some 
respects, fairly standard. Furthermore, the results presented are in line with 
most of the literature. However, and this is the third caveat, chapter 3 does 
not prove a general impossibility result. Actually, Silvestre (2002) provides a 
counterexample showing that “the conflict between non altruistic maximin 
and progress is not universal” (ibid., p.2 ), based on an overlapping 
generations model with (i) a positive intergenerational stock externality and 
(ii) a bound to feasible transfers from young to old agents living in the same 
period. 74 The actual relevance of the example is unclear (for instance, it 
involves only two generations and five dates) and the formal results derived 
by Silvestre (2002, Theorems 1 and 2) in a more general model only prove 
that conditions (z) and (ii) are necessary for maximin and growth to be 
compatible. Furthermore, the relevance of condition (ii) may be disputable. 
However, chapter 3 and Silvestre (2002) suggest an interesting line for 
research on the dynamics of inequality and classes in the EOp perspective, 
aimed at providing a general characterisation of intertemporal maximin paths.
74 Interestingly, Silvestre (2002) posits an index of well-being which may be an objectivist 
variable such as functionings. However, he does not consider intragenerational issues.
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CHAPTER 2. INTERTEMPORAL EGALITARIAN 
PRINCIPLES
2.1. INTRODUCTION.
Many of the crucial debates on egalitarianism, and especially those on 
the foundations of egalitarian theory, have been carried out within the 
confines of a static environment. The choice of the appropriate equalisandum 
has been explored in a “model” with a single generation (e.g., Rawls, 1971; 
Sen, 1980; Dworkin, 1981; Ameson 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1998; see 
chapter 3 below). Similarly, the analysis of different measures of inequality 
has typically focused on the distribution of the relevant variable in a single 
period (e.g., Sen 1973, 1992; Temkin 1993). Even when distributive 
dynamics have been considered, the complex economic and philosophical 
implications of the fact that agents’ lives develop over time have often been 
overlooked. In a seminal article which has generated a growing literature 
across the disciplinary borders of philosophy and economics (e.g., Temkin, 
1992, 1993; Daniels, 1993; Kappel, 1997; McKerlie, 2001), McKerlie (1989) 
noted that since agents’ lives extend over time, a sound egalitarian analysis 
requires the definition of the proper unit of egalitarian concern, i.e. whole 
lives or selected parts of them. 1 Egalitarian principles based on different units 
incorporate different moral concerns and have different policy implications.
This chapter analyses three intertemporal principles that incorporate 
what may be considered the most relevant egalitarian considered judgements,
1 In chapter 4, it is shown that similar issues may be relevant in the theory of exploitation.
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proposed by McKerlie (1989) and Temkin (1993): according to complete 
lives egalitarianism (CLE), agents’ lives, taken as a whole, are the proper 
unit of egalitarian concern. If one adopts corresponding segments 
egalitarianism (CSE), inequalities must be measured between corresponding 
stages of agents’ lives -  e.g., childhood, early adulthood, middle age, etc. 
age. Finally, according to simultaneous segments egalitarianism (SSE), only 
inequalities between contemporaries are morally relevant.
Different views have been advanced to identify the appropriate 
intertemporal egalitarian principle. On the one hand, as convincingly argued 
by Temkin (1993), in the analysis of inequalities no principle is entirely 
satisfactory: “several views are possible, each of which seems plausible in 
some cases and implausible in others” (ibid., p.291). However, an important 
distinction has been overlooked in the literature, which is a peculiar feature of 
the intertemporal context. Unlike in the static setting, apart from differing in 
the analysis of unequal distributions, intertemporal egalitarian principles also 
define different egalitarian states to reach. The two issues are connected but 
they should be kept conceptually distinct in the choice of the appropriate 
principle. This is even more evident for policy purposes, - e.g., from the 
viewpoint of a government concerned with equality, - since the definition of 
the ideal “steady-state” egalitarian distribution and the design of the 
transition process to that state raise different problems. In order to implement 
an egalitarian strategy, in addition to a correct analysis of the status quo, it is 
necessary to define the appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
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This chapter focuses on the latter issue. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the 
main results of the existing literature on the properties of the three egalitarian 
views in the evaluation of unequal distributions. Then, the methodological 
and philosophical distinction between the evaluation of existing inequalities 
and the definition of the appropriate egalitarian distribution is introduced, and 
it is argued that, as regards the distribution to establish, CSE defines the 
appropriate intertemporal egalitarian benchmark.
Since the evaluation of a distribution, e.g., for policy purposes, is 
influenced by more than one normative concern, in Section 2.3, a formal 
analysis of the trade-offs between the different egalitarian principles and 
other normative views is presented, which aims to provide a formal basis for 
all things considered judgements (Temkin, 1993). In particular, the relations 
of CLE, CSE, and SSE with two non-primarily-egalitarian normative 
concerns, Rawls’s maximin and utility, 2 are analysed. To be specific, a 
stylised model is set up, which generalises Arrow (1973a) and Dasgupta 
(1974a). The main substantive difference is that overlapping generations are 
assumed here, so that at each date there are two types of individual, young 
and elderly, while Arrow and Dasgupta worked with a representative agent. 
This allows us to analyse mtertemporal as well as mfratemporal equality. It is 
proved that the maximin solution yields CSE and CLE, but not SSE, and if the 
assumptions of the model are relaxed, CLE remains the egalitarian principle 
that can best accommodate rawlsian or utilitarian concerns, and it is easier to
2 For a discussion of the relation between the difference principle and egalitarianism, see 
Temkin (1993) and Cohen (1997).
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reconcile these concerns with CSE than with SSE. It is also worth noting that 
despite the formal differences the results presented here confirm and extend 
Arrow’s and Dasgupta’s conclusions on Rawls’s maximin principle.
2.2. THREE EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLES COMPARED.
Let x be the relevant egalitarian variable, which shall be called ‘welfare’ 
(x could be income, utility, opportunities, primary goods, etc.). Assume that 
agents’ lives can be divided into an equal number T of well-defined periods 
of equal length. Let X(T) = {x/ = ( x\x, x£ l , ..., x\jT~x), ;c?. g be the set of
vectors describing the attainment of jc'. by agent i, at date t, in period j ,  1 <j
< T, of her life. For the sake of simplicity, assume x  to be interpersonally and 
intertemporally comparable, and additive along agents’ lives, so that jc,- =
x*y~x is the lifetime attainment of x by agent i. These assumptions
make the analysis comparable with McKerlie (1989) and Temkin (1993), and 
they are quite natural if jc is a variable such as income or an index of primary 
goods. On the other hand, if a subjective variable like utility is considered, 
these assumptions give the opportunity to compare the egalitarian principles 
in vitro, as a first step towards a more satisfactory and realistic analysis.
The three egalitarian principles can be interpreted as different ways of 
evaluating distributions of the x/ vectors. Let D\, D2 , and D3 denote 
inequality measures associated with CLE, CSE, and SSE, respectively. 
Formally, Dy: X ^d  x  X (d  x  . . .  x  X (d  ^  y  =  1, 2, 3. Without loss of 
generality, let Dy = 0, y  = 1, 2, 3, denote the egalitarian distributions 
corresponding to the three principles. Given the definitions in Section 1, D\ =
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0  if and only if jc* = jc/*, for all agents i, h;D 2 = 0  if and only if jcf. = x Thj for all 
agents i, h, dates t, r, and corresponding life stages j; and £>3 = 0  if and only if 
xy = xhz f°r all agents i, h, life stages j , z, and simultaneous dates t.
In order to focus on the implications of the three egalitarian principles, - 
rather than on the features of specific measures, - no further restrictions are 
imposed on the Dy s. As in the static setting, where the problems of 
inequality measurement are reflected by the existence of several measures 
capturing different aspects of inequality (e.g., Gini index, Atkinson’s 
measure, etc.; see the discussion in Temkin, 1993), in principle there are 
many possible ways of measuring inequalities according to each criterion, 
that is, there are various specifications of every Dy. Actually, in the 
intertemporal context the choice of the appropriate inequality measure 
associated to each criterion is more complex, since the Dy s should rank 
distributions of vectors rather than distributions of real numbers.
However, as convincingly argued by Temkin (1993), one of the specific 
features of intertemporal analysis is that, unlike in the atemporal context, 
even assuming a unique possible Dy associated to each principle, the issue of 
inequality measurement would not be solved: different egalitarian principles 
highlight different kinds of inequalities and no principle, CLE, CSE, or SSE, 
seems completely satisfactory in the analysis of unequal distributions.
The main problem of CLE, first noted by McKerlie (1989), is that it 
leads to “changing places egalitarianism” (CPE). If whole lives are the unit of
3 For a thorough discussion of the three principles in the context of inequality analysis, the 
reader is referred directly to Temkin (1993, chapter 8)
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egalitarian concern, in a “situation involving differential treatment of equally 
deserving people -  no matter how significant, ... and even perverse those 
differing treatments are -  there can be no egalitarian objection as long as the 
roles of the equally deserving people are interchanged so that each receives 
an equivalent share of the treatments meted out” (Temkin, 1993, p.236).
CSE and SSE rule out CPE, since they do not allow present inequalities 
to compensate for past ones. Yet, they do not represent entirely satisfactory 
alternatives in the evaluation of unequal distributions. By focusing only on 
inequalities in selected portions of the agent’s lives, both principles can lead 
to the paradoxical conclusion that a distribution exhibiting CPE is as 
objectionable as one in which the agents’ roles are not interchanged and one 
agent is worse off in every relevant segment. Hence, it is legitimate to 
conclude that in the evaluation of existing inequalities, “several views are 
possible, each of which seems plausible in some cases and implausible in 
others” (ibid., p.291), and that it may be opportune to use the information 
conveyed by all principles rather than adopting only one of them.
However, these arguments do not extend to the choice of the appropriate 
intertemporal egalitarian benchmark, which is quite a different issue from 
the analysis of past and present inequalities. In the static context, while the 
measurement of inequalities can be controversial, the definition of egalitarian 
states is uncontroversial: different inequality measures give the same answer 
if the distribution is egalitarian.4 In the intertemporal context, it is slightly
4 See, e.g., the measures discussed in Sen (1973, 1992) and in Temkin (1993, chapter 5). 
Note that the distinctions between outcome egalitarianism, opportunity egalitarianism,
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misleading to say that different views can “be regarded as built around ways 
of measuring the inequality between lives” (McKerlie, 1989, p.487). The 
three principles stress different aspects of existing inequalities, but they also 
define different egalitarian states to reach, as shown by the fact that, unlike in 
the static context, in general Dy = 0 does not imply Dy = 0, y  * y \  The two 
issues are connected, but should be kept conceptually distinct in the choice of 
the appropriate egalitarian principle. For instance, while CPE arises in a CL- 
egalitarian distribution, Temkin’s (1993) analysis of SSE and CSE focuses on 
unequal distributions and therefore it provides little information as to the 
features of the egalitarian distributions associated with them.5
The difference between the two perspectives is even more evident for 
policy purposes, since the definition of the ideal “steady-state” egalitarian 
distribution and the design of the transition process to that state raise different 
issues. In order to implement an egalitarian strategy, in addition to a correct 
analysis of the status quo (involving the evaluation of existing inequalities 
and claims for compensation of past ones), it is necessary to define the 
appropriate intertemporal egalitarian benchmark.
Consider the three principles from the point of view of the distributions 
with Dy = 0, y  = 1, 2, 3. As noted above, CPE raises serious doubts about
maximin egalitarianism, which define different egalitarian states to reach even in a static 
setting need not concern us here (see chapters 1 and 3 for a discussion).
5 Neither McKerlie (1989) nor Temkin (1993) explicitly distinguishes the two sets of issues 
so that the scope of their conclusions is sometimes unclear. For instance, McKerlie (1989) 
discusses the choice of the egalitarian benchmark, but his arguments are based mainly on the 
analysis of the claims for compensation of past inequalities implied by the different views.
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CLE as the intertemporal egalitarian benchmark: for instance, a feudal system 
in which the roles of nobles and peasants are interchanged so as to equalise 
their overall welfare is not objectionable from a CZ-egalitarian viewpoint.
A first puzzling feature of SSE is reflected in the time-dependency of £>3 
and in particular in its sensitivity to changes in the agents’ date of birth. In 
principle, for given allocations o f x, it is sufficient a “slight” shift in the date 
of birth of an agent to change dramatically the value of £ > 3  and the egalitarian 
judgement. However, it is hard to see why if an agent is bom, say, ten years 
later, or earlier, the judgement about an otherwise identical (and possibly CL- 
and GS-egalitarian) distribution should change. This is more evident the 
shorter the stages in which agents’ lives are divided. 6
Second, according to SSE, only inequalities between contemporaries are 
ethically relevant, and therefore £>3 = 0  whenever agents’ lives do not 
overlap. However, let T — 4 and consider the following example.
Example 1 (El)
x', = (1, 2, 3,4), for all 1, t,
where D\ = D2 = 0, while any £ > 3  would definitely be positive. Suppose that 
the only available action to reach £ > 3  = 0  is the construction of a nuclear plant 
that will explode in t = 1 0  yielding the following welfare distribution.
Example 2 (E2)
6 However, in the determination of the appropriate length o f the stages, a trade-off arises 
between the robustness of the results (which tends to increase with the length of periods) and 
their relevance (since in the limit only whole lives matter).
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xf, = (t + 100, t + 101, t + 102, t + 103), for t < 6 , for all /, 
x7, = (107, 108, 109, 0), for all i, 
x8, = (108, 109, 0, 0), for all i, 
x9, = (109, 0, 0, 0), for all z, etc.
According to SSE, if future generations’ welfare is uniformly affected in 
each t, no other egalitarian consideration is necessary to evaluate a policy: the 
distribution in E2 is strictly preferable to that in El and it raises no egalitarian 
objection. Therefore the nuclear plant should be built. This conclusion would 
be rejected by most egalitarians and it raises serious doubts on SSE as the
n
appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
El and E2 also show a more general point: the requirement of CL- 
equality cannot be abandoned without generating unappealing results (from 
an egalitarian perspective). This suggests that the analysis of intertemporal 
egalitarian benchmarks should focus on the choice of the most appropriate 
restriction on CLE. Indeed, only in the context of inequality analysis the 
“views are independent of each other, in the sense that each of their 
judgments may be in agreement or disagreement depending on the particular 
case in question” (Temkin, 1993, p.242). Instead, if egalitarian distributions 
are analysed, it is misleading to ask whether “the whole lives view [should] 
be rejected entirely, and replaced by some combination of the simultaneous 
and corresponding segments views” (ibid., p.238). Neither CSE nor a
7 It is worth noting that E2 does not represent a variant of the levelling down objection: what
is objectionable is not that SSE leads to a lower welfare level in E2 than in E l, but rather that
according to SSE, E2 must be considered better than El from an egalitarian viewpoint.
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simultaneous segments restriction on CLE (discussed below) replaces the 
latter. Actually, in order to avoid CPE, any restriction on CLE should require 
all agents belonging to the same generation to have identical patterns of x 
during their lives. Hence, for a given xt equal for all i, alternative restrictions 
will differ only in the admissible patterns of x for agents belonging to 
different generations.
One possibility, suggested by McKerlie (1989, p.484), is to impose SS- 
equality in addition to CZ-equality. This version of SSE (hereafter, SSE2) is 
subject to the same time-dependency problem faced by the unconstrained 
SSE (hereafter, SSEi). Moreover, the emphasis on simultaneity as the relevant 
egalitarian restriction on the allocation of x along agents’ lives is not entirely 
convincing. SSE2 removes CPE between agents belonging to the same 
generation, but the requirement of equality in the overlapping segments of the 
lives of agents belonging to different generations seems less compelling. 
According to SSE2, the distribution in El - in which agents are treated 
identically regardless of the generation they belong to - is definitely non­
egalitarian, while the following distribution is SS2- egalitarian.
Example 3
x'; = (1,2, 3, 4), for all z, and t = Ad, d = 0, 1,2, ...
x', = (2, 3,4,1), for all z, and t = 1 + Ad, d = 0,1, 2 ,...
x', = (3, 4, 1, 2), for all z, and / = 2 + Ad, d = 0, 1,2, ...
= (4, 1, 2, 3), for all z, and t = 3 + Ad, d = 0, 1,2, ...
In E3, only agents bom every four periods have the same pattern during 
their lives. However, unless agents are assumed to be myopic and to care
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only about the inequalities that they can actually observe in every t, it is hard 
to see why a distribution exhibiting such a cyclical pattern should be 
desirable from an egalitarian perspective, and indeed why it should be strictly 
preferable to El. Notice that the egalitarian intuition behind SSEj is not the 
same as that behind SSE\\ in the latter case, the idea is that inequalities 
between contemporaries are worse than inequalities between removed 
generations - e.g., between the present generation and people living in the 
middle age. Instead, given the same total level of x, the only role played by 
simultaneity in SSEi is to constrain its allocation during agents’ lives.
Another possibility is to adopt CSE: since the distributions with £>2 = 0 
are a strict subset of those with D\ = 0, CSE can be naturally interpreted as a 
restriction on CLE.8 Moreover, unlike CLE and SSE2 , CSE fully incorporates 
the egalitarian intuition that identical agents should be treated exactly in the 
same way, since in CS-egalitarian distributions they have an identical welfare 
allocation along their lives. Formally, unlike D\ and D3, D2 = 0 if and only if 
X/ = X/j, for all i, h\ that is, D2 = 0  if and only if the vectors describing the 
pattern of the egalitarian variable along agents’ lives are identical. Thus, all 
distributions in the class with D2 = 0  can be simply described as follows.
Example 4
x, = (p, q, r, s), for all z,
regardless of agent V s date of birth. Unlike the distributions with D\ = 0 or D3 
= 0, - as CPE and E2 respectively show, - those belonging to the class with
8 If the duration of agents’ lives is uncertain, neither CSE nor SSE2 necessarily implies CLE 
ex-post, but the above arguments still hold ex-ante, if applied to expected welfare.
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Z>2 = 0  are equivalent from an egalitarian point o f view, as the comparison of 
any pair of GS'-egalitarian distributions shows.
However, it is not necessarily true that p  = q = r = s, and thus CSE 
allows potentially great inequalities between people living in the same period 
belonging to different age cohorts. For instance, a GS'-egalitarian distribution 
could imply that in every period there are happy young people, while the 
elderly live in despair. However undesirable such a distribution may be, if D2 
= 0  -  that is, if, when they were young, the elderly were treated as the current 
young - there should be no egalitarian objection to it, since identical people 
have an identical pattern of x during their lives. 9
To be sure, there may be non-egalitarian objections to the latter 
allocation and in general distributions with D2 = 0  are not equivalent all 
things considered. For instance, distributions with a higher overall welfare or 
without unbalanced welfare allocations along agents’ lives may be preferred. 
Actually, as shown by E4, if CSE is adopted, egalitarian and non-egalitarian 
concerns can be clearly distinguished in the evaluation of a distribution. The 
former reduce to the requirement X/ = x, all /, while the latter are related to the 
features of x, that is, the desirable pattern of the egalitarian variable along 
agents’ lives. All things considered a distribution with, say,/? > q = r = s may 
be rejected because of the unbalanced welfare allocation along agents’ lives.
9 If identity changed during an agent’s life, there might be an egalitarian objection to the 
distribution. However a similar critique can be moved to any intertemporal egalitarian 
principle, since it amounts to saying that the principle is analysed in the wrong context. Once 
the agents’ identity is correctly specified, all the arguments in this chapter remain valid.
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However, this is an argument regarding the welfare pattern along an agent’s 
life and not how she fares relative to others and therefore it is not an 
egalitarian reason to reject the distribution. A smoother welfare profile would 
probably be preferable but this would be the outcome, e.g., of the adoption of 
some kind of maximin principle applied to portions of an agent’s life.
2.3. EGALITARIANISM, UTILITY AND THE MAXIMIN.
In the static context, given the relevant equalisandum, different 
egalitarian views can “be regarded as built around ways of measuring the 
inequality between lives” (McKerlie, 1989, p.487) and their implications can 
be appreciated only in the analysis of unequal distributions. Instead, as noted 
above, the egalitarian state to reach is unambiguously defined. As a result, 
the differences between the various views in relation with other normative 
principles can be shown in unequal distributions, but not if one evaluates the 
desirability of reaching the common egalitarian state in relation, e.g., to 
utilitarian concerns. This is not true in the intertemporal context: different 
principles yield different trade-offs between egalitarian and non-egalitarian 
concerns also in egalitarian distributions. Since the evaluation of a 
distribution, e.g., for policy purposes, is influenced by more than one ethical 
concern, it is important to analyse these trade-offs in a systematic way.
In this Section, CLE, CSE, and SSE are analysed in relation to two non- 
primarily-egalitarian normative principles, namely Rawls’s (1971) difference 
principle and utilitarianism. If, as argued in Section 2.2, it is appropriate to 
impose a restriction on CLE, then it is important to analyse whether this
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implies a welfare loss, whether different restrictions have different effects on 
welfare, and what are the consequences for the worst-off generation.
The problem is modelled in a stark way. We generalise Arrow (1973a) 
and Dasgupta (1974a), in which the maximin criterion is examined in a 
dynamic framework. There is a society that exists for an infinite number of 
generations. Population is stationary, there is no technical progress and only 
one good that can be consumed or invested. Utility is the relevant egalitarian 
variable, and thus xj = uj = u(cj), where the subscript i denoting different 
agents belonging to the same age cohort is dropped in order to focus on 
m^generational inequalities. Assume that T — 2 and j  = 1,2 (youth and old 
age), and agents have identical additively-separable utility functions:
W(cl\ c 2"') = u(cl') + f3u(C2,+'h
where c\ is consumption of the young in t, C2 is consumption of the elderly 
i n f + l , 0 < / ? < l i s  the subjective discount factor and u satisfies u( 0 ) = 0 , 
u\cj) = du/de/ > 0 , limc_>o u'(c) = oo, and u"{cf) = d2(w)/d(c/ ) 2 < 0 .
Production possibilities can be represented by a production function 
F(K, L), where K  is the stock of capital, and L is labour supply. F is 
continuous and homogeneous of degree one. L? is proportional to population 
and it is normalised to one. Thus, if U = K!lL\ then F(K!, L!) =f{Kt/Lt, 1) = 
flkf). The function/ satisfiesf[0) = 0 , f  > 0 , / '  < 0, and Inada conditions.
For any variable z, let {zt}t = denote an infinite sequence of values 
of z. The maximin program can be written as follows.
max;, ,+1i mm* W(c\, Ci !),
’C2 j r - 0 , 1 . . . .
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subject to 0  -k! + c /  + c2‘ = 0 ) ,  all t > 0, (MP)
given k and c2 .
For any variable z, let dz = z ' - z denote a change in z. Propositions 1 
and 2  provide necessary conditions for a maximin solution.
P roposition  1: At the solution to (MP), W(c/, = W(c/+], c2t+2), allt.
Proof. Let IF* be the value of MP and suppose that, contrary to the statement, 
W(ci°, C2 1) > W*. By continuity, there is a sufficiently small dci° < 0, 
such that W(c’i°, c2 ) > W*, - dA:1 = dci° and the amount of resources 
available in t = 1 increases by [1 + f(kx)]dkx. Let dc / = f(k l)dkl > 0 and 
dk2 = dA:1 > 0  and repeat the procedure for all t > 2  so that dc\ = /T(A/)d^ 
> 0, dA^+1 = dA/ > 0, and W(c’\, C2 +x) > W*, all t, a contradiction. The 
proof of the case with W(c\\ C2 +l) > W*, some t > 0, is similar. |
In other words, a welfare distribution must satisfy CLE in order to be 
the maximin solution. In this sense the maximin criterion poses an efficiency 
restriction on CLE: the maximin solution is the CL-egalitarian distribution 
with the highest level of equal welfare.
P roposition  2: At the solution to (MP), u,(c]t)/u'(c2t+I)  = P(1 +f( tf+1)), all t.
Proof Suppose not. Then there is a dc\, dc2t+l such that dc2 +x = - [1 + 
f(k?+x)]dc\ and u\c\)dc\ + fu \c 2 +l)dc2 +x > 0. By the concavity of W, 
this implies JF(cV, c* 2 +X) > W(c\, c-2 +x) leaving unmodified c(, all j  * t  
and A/, c{, all j  ^ t  + 1, violating Proposition 1.1
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By Proposition 2, agents bom in t attain the highest W(ci, C2t+1) given 
k!+l, c\J and c{+x , j  * t. This suggests that the condition in Proposition 2 can be 
derived as the first order condition of a constrained optimisation problem, 
defining the optimal consumption allocation along an agent’s life. Given the 
assumptions on u and f  Proposition 2 implies that the maximin solution is 
unique, while none of the egalitarian criteria identifies per se a particular 
welfare distribution. However, the main implication of Proposition 2 in the 
analysis of the egalitarian views is that in general u(c\) p  u(c2t+l) so that the 
maximin allocation will not be SiS'-egalitarian.
Let c = c\ + c f  all t, denote the generic constant (total) consumption 
program and let cm =f[k°), all t.
Lemma 1: cm is the maximum sustainable aggregate constant consumption.
Proof. Consider c > cm. At t = 0, kl < k°, and thus k1 - kl = kl - k° +f[kl) -f[k°) 
< 0 , and k? - kl <kl - A0, i.e. \k* - kl\/ \kl - k°\ > 1 , and, by induction, l^ 1 
- k!\ / \kf - kf~l\ > 1. Therefore = 0 for t finite, and c is not sustainable. |  
Lemma 1 provides a natural benchmark for the maximin path. Let c f 1 = 
C2 and c\m = cm - c™', for any given C2°, no distribution in which W(c\, C2 +x) 
< W 1 -  W(am, C2m), some t, can solve (MP) . 10 Hence, let R1 =f[k!) + kf - C2*
10 Alternatively, the benchmark path could be the solution to the following problem:
max u(c i) + P  w(c2)?c ,  ,c2
subject to Ci + c2 =j[k°).
In this case, the assumption of a given c2° would be dropped, and the constraint c2° > c2 
would be necessary to guarantee equal treatment of the generation bom in t = - 1. This choice
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denote the resources available to the generation bom in t: if R* = R° then all 
generations from t onwards can reach at least Wn. Consider the following 
sequence of maximisation programs.
max , , + l u{c\) + P u { c f \
c \ c 2
subject to kf+l + c\ < R‘, (P/)
J[k!+l) + k!+l -c 2t+l>Rt+\  
given R\ Rt+l.
Let (ci*, C2*, k*) be the solution of P, with R? =  Rt+l = R°, where in 
general k* * A:0. Let V(R‘, Rt+l) denote the maximum function associated with 
P/. Let W* = W(c* i, c*2) = V(R°, R°). The main theorem can now be proved.
THEOREM 1: Let c2 be given. The maximin solution corresponds to the 
vector (c*i, c*2, k*) for each generation.
Proof. 1. The existence and uniqueness of (c\ *, C2 *, k*) is guaranteed by the 
assumptions on u and f. Note also that (c\*, C2 *, k*) satisfies the 
conditions in Propositions 1 and 2.
2. Suppose it is possible to raise the welfare of all generations above 
W*. Consider Po: by construction the first generation’s welfare can 
increase over W* if and only if R 1 < R°. Consider now generation 2: 
clearly V(Rl, R°) < W*. Moreover, V(Rl, Rt+l) is concave and its iso­
welfare contours have slope [1 +f{k{R\ R/+1))], where k{R\ Rt+l) is the
would include generation t = -1 in the definition of the just path, allowing for an explicit 
treatment of the transition to justice, instead of taking its past consumption choices as given. 
However, the main results of this chapter would not change.
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optimum value of k!+l from Pr. Hence, W(cil, c2 ) > W* implies R2 < R°, 
with |i?2 -  R°| > [1 +f(k(R°, i?0) ) ] ^ 1 -  R°\. Iterating the argument, W{c\, 
c2t+l) > W* implies I* * 1 - - £°| > [1 +f(k(R°, R0))], all t, and the
path violates the non-negativity of R1 in some finite
Theorem 1 states that although the maximin principle and CSE represent 
different restrictions on CLE, they coincide in the economy described, since 
at the solution to MP, agents have the same consumption - and welfare - 
allocation during their lives. 11 Thus, if the egalitarian social planner also 
adopts an intergenerational maximin criterion, Theorem 1 proves that the two 
objectives would not be in contradiction if CLE or CSE are adopted, while if 
SSEi (or SSE2) is chosen, a trade-off between the two concerns arises.
Moreover, since the maximin solution coincides with the allocation that 
maximises agents’ utility under a CLE constraint, the model allows us to 
introduce some utilitarian concern in the analysis. Consider, for instance, 
classical (average or total) utilitarianism. By Proposition 2, it is more difficult 
to reconcile a utilitarian concern with SSE2 than with CLE or CSE, since SSE2 
does not allow a constrained welfare-maximising allocation along agents’ 
lives. Instead, if SSE\ is adopted, in principle it is possible for infinitely many 
generations to reach a higher welfare level than at the maximin, with only a 
finite number of generations falling below it in order to start capital 
accumulation. Thus, due to the infinite gain in utility, a utilitarian would
11 It can be proved that with a finite horizon this is not true. However, the adoption of the 
infinite horizon hypothesis is implied by the very nature of the problem, as there is no reason 
to restrict the analysis of a normative principle to an arbitrary, finite number of generations.
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prefer the latter distribution to the maximin/GS'Zs solution. In general, such a 
distribution might be appealing (as opposed to CSE or CLE distributions) not 
because it is ^-egalitarian but because some CS, or even CL inequalities can 
be outweighed by an infinite gain in utility, all things considered. In this 
sense, SSE\ is the only intertemporal egalitarian principle compatible with 
sustained welfare growth and thus the principle that can best accommodate 
utilitarian concerns (although SS- equality could still imply some welfare loss 
with respect to unconstrained utility maximisation). However, this result 
derives from the exclusive focus of SSE\ on iTtfratemporal inequalities, and 
thus it should not be seen as a solution to the equality/growth dilemma, but 
rather as a way of escaping it.
The model presented is highly stylised and some caution is necessary in 
interpreting the results. While the analysis of SSE\ does not depend on any 
particular assumptions, in more general settings, CLE and CSE will not be 
equivalent as concerns their relations with other normative principles and the 
maximin solution will be neither CS- nor CZ-egalitarian. 12 However, despite 
its simplified structure, the model does captures in vitro some inherent 
features of the egalitarian views. As concerns utilitarianism, since CSE and 
SSE2 distributions are strict subsets of those with D\ = 0, the CLE welfare 
level will always be at least as high as the SSE2 and CSE levels. Moreover, 
from Proposition 2, it is legitimate to infer that even in more general settings
12 However, while Theorem 1 is more sensitive to changes in the assumptions, 
heterogeneous, non additive or non concave preferences, technical progress or more general 
production functions would leave Proposition 1 basically unchanged.
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the CLE welfare would be at least as high as the SSEi welfare, since SSEi 
does not allow agents to allocate consumption optimally along their lives. 
Similarly, as regards rawlsian concerns, the above results suggest that in a 
more general setting, if the maximin solution was not egalitarian, the CLE 
level would be at least as close to it as the CSE level, and the latter in turn 
would be at least as close to the maximin as the SSE2 level.
2.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter three egalitarian views are analysed in the intertemporal 
context. Once the static setting is abandoned, egalitarian principles - apart 
from differing in the analysis of existing inequalities, - also define different 
ideal egalitarian distributions. While it may be important to use the different 
information conveyed by every criterion in the analysis of existing 
inequalities, when the egalitarian distributions associated with them are 
analysed, CLE and SSE have undesirable features while CSE represents the 
appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
The relations between the three egalitarian principles and other moral 
ideals, namely maximin and utilitarianism, are also analysed. As regards the 
maximin principle, Propositions 1-2 and Theorem 1 show that, unlike with 
CLE and CSE, the adoption of SSE implies a trade off between egalitarianism 
and a concern for the worst off. As regards utility, the same conclusion holds 
if one interprets SSE as a restriction on CLE, since it yields a lower 
egalitarian welfare level. This is not true if SSE is analysed per se, but this is 
just because in this case the SSE is a strictly nzfratemporal principle.
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CHAPTER 3. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND 
TIME
(Based on joint work with John E. Roemer, Department of Political 
Science, Yale University, New Haven CT 06520-8301, U.S.A.)
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Egalitarians - and more specifically, socialists - have long cherished two 
ideals: that that society is best which promotes human development over time, 
and equality of condition among members of society. 1 More recently, since 
Rawls’s rejuvenation of egalitarian studies, several qualifications have been put 
forth as to what the equalisandum should be. Most, although not all, participants 
in the discussion have advocated what we call an objectivist view, that the 
equalisandum should be something which is measurable independently of the 
views of the individuals who have it - primary goods, functionings, or resources 
(Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1980; and Dworkin, 1981; respectively). The principal non- 
objectivist equalisandum is, of course, welfare or utility, which can only be 
measured knowing the utility function of the individual in question, and can only
1 Socialists have said (before consciousness about gender neutral language) that in the good 
society there will be ‘self-realisation of man’ and ‘self-realisation of men.’ The latter means that, 
over the course of a life, a person becomes self-realised, in the sense of developing her capacities. 
The former means that, over generations, human beings become more knowledgeable and 
developed. Here, we take human development to mean ‘self-realisation of man.’
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be compared interpersonally if an interpersonally comparable unit scale exists. 
None of the major writers advocates equality of welfare as an ethic.
Moreover, in recent years, various theories of equal opportunity have been 
proposed including Ameson (1989), Cohen (1989), and Roemer (1998), and we 
would say that Dworkin’s (1981) ‘equality of resources’ is indeed an ‘equal 
opportunity’ theory as well. So we might well say that egalitarians advocate, as 
well as human development, equality of opportunity for some condition. That 
condition could be something objective like functionings or primary goods, or 
the subjective welfare.
What we argue in this chapter is that the three desiderata
i. protracted human development,
ii. equality of opportunity for some condition, and
iii. the condition be an objective characteristic of the individual,
are inconsistent. Because the first desideratum makes sense only in a dynamic 
context, equality of condition, or equality of opportunity for some condition, 
becomes equality (of opportunity) among all adults who ever live. Our claim says 
that if the equalisandum is objective - something like functioning - then 
achieving such equality implies the absence of human development over time. It 
is only by taking the equalisandum to be welfare of a particular kind, a non- 
objectivist concept, that equality of opportunity is consistent with human 
development. If our claimed inconsistency is correct, then egalitarians are faced 
with a choice: either dropping their advocacy of equality (of opportunity), or of
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human development, or of objectivist equalisanda. We think that the most 
attractive choice is to drop the objectivist view.
In other words, we claim to show that, if we move away from the static 
thought experiments imagined by Rawls and the objectivist writers heretofore, 
then objectivism ceases to be attractive (if it ever was). We must say, however, 
that our inquiry does not show that justice requires that we endorse subjectivism 
(the view that welfare is what must count for an egalitarian). For we advocate 
dropping objectivism because of its inconsistency with equality of opportunity 
and human development, and while the ‘equality of opportunity’ part of that 
compound phrase refers to a state of justice, the ‘human development’ part does 
not. That is, we do not claim that justice requires human development, or even, 
more weakly, that justice requires human development in an environment where 
it is possible. Human development over time is, for us, an obvious good, but we 
do not know what to call the state of a society that has it, the way a society with 
equality of opportunity is in a state of justice.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the 
dynamic environment. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that if either an objectivist 
equalisandum or a paternalistic welfarist approach is adopted equality of 
opportunity is incompatible with human development. Section 3.5 proves that a 
non paternalistic welfarist approach is consistent with intra- and intergenerational 
equality and human development. Section 3.6 focuses on conclusions, while all 
lemmas and the induction step of the proof of Theorem 1 are in the Appendix.
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3.2. THE DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT
We model the problem in a stark way. There is a society that exists for an 
infinite number of generations. At each generation there are adults and children. 
Each adult has one child, and so the population size is constant. Adults, at least 
at the beginning date zero (0), have different wage rates - indeed, we shall seek 
simplicity by declaring that only two wage rates exist at date 0. We suppose that 
an adult’s wage is a measure of her family’s socio-economic status (SES), where 
SES has an impact on the docility -  in the classical sense, educability, -  of 
children. More specifically, the economic outcome of educating a child is the 
wage she will earn as an adult, and it takes more educational resources to bring a 
low SES child up to a given (adult) wage rate than it does a high SES child. We 
take the view that all children have identical inborn talent, and that the wage a 
child earns as an adult is a function of her talent, the educational resources 
invested in her, and the SES status of her parent, our summary of the 
environmental factor. To be specific, let i#+ denote the nonnegative real 
numbers: we suppose there are two functions h\ 91+ —» 91+ and g: 9t+ —» i??+, such 
that a child of a parent who has a wage of w will, as an adult, earn a wage of 
h(x)g(w), if x  is the fraction of GNP per capita that is invested in her through the 
educational process. In particular, we assume:
Aw: h and g  are continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, h(0) = g(0) = 0.
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Our economic environment dispenses with two important aspects of reality 
- that children are differentially talented, and that children expend differential 
effort2 - since we think they are unnecessary to expose the problem we want to 
concentrate upon.
At each generation, taxation of adult income is used to redistribute income 
among adults, as well as to finance education of that generation’s children, and 
tax revenues, in the form of educational finance, must be distributed between the 
two types of children, those from low wage parents and those from high wage 
parents. The result of that education will be adults at the next date who have 
(perhaps) two wage levels, and the problem repeats itself. All children of a given 
SES receive the same educational investment, and hence have the same wage as 
adults. To be specific, we suppose that taxation takes the following form. First, 
all adult incomes are pooled, and each adult receives the average income. Then 
each adult pays the same fraction of her income as a tax. At date 0, a fraction f i  
of the adults earn the low wage, w f,  and a fraction f y  earn the high wage, w h , 
with/ l +f i t = 1- We define mean income at date 0 as ju° = /lWl + / hWh '• If the 
tax rate is then the net income of every adult is (1 - r0)//0.
2 One is, of course, free to interpret the difficulty in educating low SES children as due to their 
lower talent. This is formally equivalent to our model, yet it might lead to different ethics. (Some 
would say that it is alright for low talent people to earn less than high talent people, although it is 
not alright for children from disadvantaged backgrounds to earn less than equally talented 
children from advantaged backgrounds.)
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We wish to abstract from incentive problems; in particular, taxation does 
not alter labour supply, nor does anticipation of their future net income affect 
how hard children work in school. These would be poor assumptions if we were 
interested in advising policymakers, but our investigation here is of a different 
kind. We are interested in exposing certain logical inconsistencies in a 
conception of ‘the good society,’ and it is appropriate for this inquiry to assume 
that citizens are almost perfectly cooperative. We limit their cooperative spirit 
only by assuming that private incentives would come into play if we redistributed 
adult income so that low wage earners ended up with more income than high 
wage earners. (The best we can do is to equalize all net incomes.)
In the theory of equal opportunity (see Roemer, 1998) it is assumed that 
individuals have different circumstances and exert different efforts. Here, we 
abstract away from differential effort. A person’s circumstances - those 
characteristics beyond her control that influence her outcome - are two in 
number, the SES (wage) of her parent, and the date at which she is bom. We take 
children as ‘adults in formation,’ and are concerned with equalizing 
opportunities among adults for some condition X, which we shall call ‘welfare.’ 
Since effort is nugatory, the theory of equal opportunity expounded in Roemer 
(1998) says that our objective is to maximize the minimal level of ‘welfare’ 
among all adults across types, where an adult’s type is a pair (w, t), w being her 
parent’s wage, and t being the date at which she is bom. Informally speaking, the 
SES of a child’s parents and the date at which she is bom are circumstances
beyond her control, and equality of opportunity requires that we equalize, so far 
as possible, the welfare of individuals with such different circumstances.
Thus, our problem is to maximize the least level of ‘welfare’ across all 
adults who ever live. At each date the instruments we have available are a tax 
rate of adult income, t, and, if there are adults with two wage levels (there are 
never more than two), an allocation of educational finance (ri, rH) among 
children of the two types, where / l  rL + fit ru = 1. A child from an L family 
receives educational investment in the amount t/jtl and a child from an H  family 
receives tjhth. Thus, if wi and wh were the parents’ wages, then the children will 
earn, as adults, h{zrf)g{wL) and h(rrH)g(wH).
Let x #+ and let S <= i#+2. We define an adult’s level of
functioning as a function F: S —> Vi of her wage, w, and consumption (net 
income), y. We attempt to capture Sen’s (1980) idea of functioning, which 
Cohen (1993) has characterized as ‘midfare,’ something midway between 
consumption and welfare. To wit, we imagine that a person’s wage is a measure 
of her level of human capital and individuals derive welfare directly from their 
human capital. Moreover, functioning involves a degree of self-esteem and self- 
realization, and these, we propose, depend positively on an individual’s level of 
human capital. In particular, we assume:
AF: Let F = inf F(w, y). F  is continuous and strictly increasing in both
w ,yeS
arguments. Moreover, limw_+0.F(w,iy) = F, ally, and lim 0F(w,y) = F , all w.
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We define human development as an increase in functioning level o f adults 
over time. We believe this is consistent with the standard concept of human 
development, which is not an increase in welfare as such, but rather an increase 
in human capacity. Capacity, in our stark model, is a function of consumption 
and the wage, or more directly, of consumption, self-esteem, and self-realization. 
The wage is important as the reflection of education; in addition, it can be argued 
that self-esteem is a capacity enhancer, and that, too, is captured by the wage. 
Children embody the knowledge of past generations, through the educational 
process, and we have attempted to capture this in our specification of the 
educational technology.
This model has similarities to Arrow (1973a) and Dasgupta (1974a), in 
which the maximin criterion was examined in a dynamic framework. The main 
substantive difference is that we posit two types of individual, at least at the early 
dates, while Arrow and Dasgupta worked with a representative agent. Thus, we 
are interested in what mtergenerational equality requires with respect to 
mfragenerational wage differentials, a question that neither Arrow nor Dasgupta 
posed.
3.3. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FUNCTIONING: MODEL I
Let w1 = (wf, wh), all t, and let {w'} “0 denote the infinite sequence (w°, w1,
...): for any given w° = {w l , w # 0) ,  by Aw wages are given recursively by
WjM =h(i?rJ)g(wJ), J = L , H .  (1)
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Therefore the set of wage sequences feasible from a given w° is I7(w0) = 
r=0: W +1 = h{i rJ)g(wj% J= L , H, t  e [0, 1], and r£ e [0, 1 lfL], all *}. Our
first exercise is to take the ‘welfare’ of an adult to be her functioning level. Thus, 
our problem is to
max min (FL°, FH°, FL\  F„ \ . . .), (2)
{w'}” 0e/7(w °) t
where F j  = F(wJ, (1 - i)/l)  is the functioning level of adults in the ‘/dynasty’ at 
date t. The Tow dynasty’ is the set of persons consisting of the low wage adults 
at date 0 and all their descendants; likewise for the ‘high dynasty.’ It is important 
to note that, at some date, the wages of the two adult types may be equalised, and 
if that is the case, then we stipulate that, thereafter, since there is only one type of 
child, there is no longer any decision concerning how to allocate educational 
finance - all children receive the same investment. We need not consider the 
possibility that a child in the H  dynasty has a wage lower than one in the L 
dynasty at a given date, for that will never be an aspect of an optimal solution. It 
thus follows that at any date, the functioning level of L adults will be less than or 
equal to the functioning level of H  adults (where L and H  refer to the dynasties, 
not to the wages of particular adults), because the two types have the same 
consumption. Hence, the equality of opportunity program takes the form:
3 In Sections 3.3 - 3.4, we assume that the value of the program is attained. Similar results can be 
proved in the general case, but at the cost of a substantial increase in technicalities, with no
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max min(^z,°j Fl ,...}, subject to W //+1 >  W +\  all t. (2')
{m/ } " 06 /7 (w0) /
Proposition 1: Under Aw and AF, at the solution to (2), Fl = F l, all t.
Proof. 1. By Aw and AF, 0 < 4 < 1, all t.
2. Let m be the value of program (2'). Suppose Fl > F f , some t \ By Part 
1, increase 4>, so that, by (1) and Aw, w / increases, for all t > 0. By AF, F f  
increases for all t > 0, and the change in f  can be small enough so that Fl 
is still above m, a contradiction. Hence, Fl — m.
3. Suppose Fl > Fl , some t \  Let t ’ = min {t\ Fl > Fl }. By Part 1, 
decrease 4 'l and increase 4 so that, by Aw, w j does not decrease, all t > t ’ 
and J — L, H. By AF, Fl A is increased above m, while changes in tax rates 
can be small enough so that Fl is still above m. Iterating backwards, the 
result follows from Part 2. |
Proposition 1 proves that equality of opportunity for functioning is 
inconsistent with human development, in the sense that a fraction^ of adults at 
every date remain at the level of functioning of date 0 L adults. If, as is 
reasonable, fa > .5, then the majority of all adults are held to a low level of 
human capacity. (H adults do not necessarily get reduced to Fl over time. If 
consumption is very important in functioning, it may pay to keep w f  above w f  
in order to bring about a relatively high mean income.)
further insights gained. In Section 3.5, where we adopt specific functional forms, we prove that
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The maximin social welfare function is sometimes criticized for spending 
huge amounts of resources to raise the level of welfare of a very small group of 
individuals who are very poor welfare producing machines. Let us note this 
criticism does not apply here. Nobody is extremely handicapped in our 
environment - there are no terribly inefficient ‘welfare’ creating individuals. It is 
true, however, that L adults at date 0 comprise an arbitrarily small fraction of the 
adults who have lived up to date T, as T  becomes large, and all L adults are held 
to their level of functioning. This is surely a form of ‘extremism’ of maximin, 
although it has a different character from the form of extremism we referred to in 
the first sentence of this paragraph. If we contemplate sacrificing the L adults at 
date 0, we are led to ask, why do they have less than an equal right to welfare 
than those at later dates? The answer ‘Because it is too costly to their 
descendants not to sacrifice them’ invites sacrificing the L adults, or indeed all 
adults, at any finite number of dates beginning at date 0. After all, this group, too, 
constitutes an arbitrarily small fraction of all adults who shall ever live.
3.4. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE: MODEL H
We now suppose that, at each t, J  adults, J  = L, H, care about the 
functioning levels of their children, F j+\  as well as their own, F j, so that a J  
adult’s utility depends on her own and her child’s wage (wj, w j+l), and 
consumption (y\ y*1). To be specific, we define a function u: S x S -» fH such
the supremum is attained.
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that the utility of a J  adult at date t can be written, as a shorthand notation, as u j 
= u{Fj\Fjt+\ j = L , H .
We let u = inf u(Fj, Fjt+\  J  = L, H, and assume u to be~ (wyy,wy1y +1)e5x1s’
continuous and strictly increasing in all arguments. Therefore, if lim^  u(Fj,
Fjt+l) is finite, we shall assume, without loss of generality, that u is defined at w j 
= 0; likewise fory, w/+1, ory**1. Finally, we rule out an extreme form of altruism 
by assuming:
A m: lim ,+1 u(X ,F j+I)>  iim r, u(Fj\ X), for all X, and J= L ,H . 4
j  ~*L J
Our ‘equality of opportunity’ program is now to
max min (ui°, u f , . .  .), subject to wh+1 ^ vv/+1, all t. (3)
{w'}?=0e n ( w ° )  t
P roposition  2: Under Aw, AF, and Au, at the solution to (3), (i) ul ^ ul, all t, 
and (ii) there are no two consecutive dates t and t + 1  such that ui > Ul and
t+i . o ul > ul .
Proof. 1. By AF, Aw, and m’s  monotonicity: (a) 4 > 0, all t, and at any adjacent 
periods either z* < 1, or t?+1 < 1, or both; (b) if lim , «(F/, Fl*1) — u then
fl ->f
i  < 1 all t.
2. Let m be the value of (3). Suppose ul > m. If £  < 1, increase £  a little. 
This raises u f, all t > 0, and does not lower ul to m. If £  = 1, by Part l.(b)
4  Au shortens the proof of Proposition 2 considerably, but the main result does not depend on Au.
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ul = u(F, F l1). Since My0 > m, then by Am, My1 > m, all z*, z2. Hence, by 
Part l.(a), increase J  a little: My0 and My1 remain above m, while m/ 
increases, all / > 2, a contradiction.
3. Suppose ul > ul and My2 > u l .  (The same argument holds, by iterating 
backward, for any consecutive m/ and m/+1, all t >  1.) By Part l.(a), 
decrease r1, which increases My0 above m. If z2 < 1, increase z2 so that wj, 
and My, J= L ,H , do not decrease, for all £ > 3. If z2 = 1, by Part l.(b) ul = 
m (f , Fy3) and since ul > m, by Am it follows that ul > m, all z3, r4. Hence, 
by Part l.(a), increase z3 so that vvy, and My, J=  L, H, do not decrease, all t 
> 4. In both cases, the changes in tax rates can be small enough so that ul
 ^ i  • nand My (and My in the latter case) remain above m, while My is now above 
m, and Proposition 2.(ii) follows by Part 2. |
If each adult cares about her child’s and her grandchild’s level of 
functioning, then the same argument shows that My0 < u l, all t, and no three 
consecutive utilities can be greater than My0. Thus, allowing parents to care about 
the functioning levels of a finite sequence of descendents does not enable us to 
escape the conclusion that protracted human development fails to occur. For it is 
clear that if the utility level of the L dynasty returns to My0 periodically, then the 
functioning level of one generation must return, periodically, to Fl or Fl or
fhlower. In this society, history repeats itself, condemning every n generation to 
the level of human development of the primeval ancestor.
116
It is worth noting that u can be any continuous monotonic utility function. 
In particular, an adult may well prefer that her child functions at a higher level 
than she, in the sense that, for all X  and small e > 0, u(X X  + s) > u(X, X). 
This is perhaps somewhat surprising: even if adults want their children to 
function at a higher level than themselves, there is no protracted human 
development in the optimum.
3.5. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE: MODEL m
We now suppose that adults care about their own level of functioning and 
their child’s utility. In particular, we suppose that there is a concept of utility 
such that
u j = F j + fiuJ+\  all t, <mdJ=L,H, (4)
where 0 < J3 < I. Thus, if lim ^^ is bounded above for all w° and
{w'} *0 e IJw°) - a condition that, as shown below, is satisfied in our model, - 
then we can set lim^oo {J3)N+xuN+x = 0 and write u j  recursively as
= s (py~'FJ > a11 m d J = L >H■ <5)
i=t
Thus, the utility of any adult bom in period t is the discounted sum of her 
dynasty’s levels of functioning. Caring about the welfare of your child forces 
you, implicitly, to care about the functioning of your descendents, all the way 
down. It is reasonable to suppose that this formulation is psychologically 
accurate. Are we parents content if our children are functioning well, or does our
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contentment depend upon their happiness, where their happiness derives from 
the happiness of their children?
Our ‘equal opportunity for welfare’ program is stated again as (3), where 
the notation now refers to the new concept of utility. In order to reach more 
definite results we add more structure to the model, replacing AF  and Aw by:
A F ’: F(w, y) = ylog w + (1 - y) logy, where 0 < y< l.
Aw. 1: h(x) = kxc' , g(w) = wCl, where k>0, and ci, C2 > 0.
In addition, as regards the educational technology, we assume:
Aw.2: Non-increasing returns to scale: cj + C2 <1.
Assumption Aw.2 is reasonable given our broad interpretation of human 
capital as reflecting self-esteem and self-realization (and not only productive 
human capital or knowledge), and given the role played by the SES status of the 
children’s parents in the educational technology. Furthermore, Aw.2 significantly 
enhances the tractability of the dynamic optimisation problem by guaranteeing 
some important regularity conditions.
Let W denote the state space with generic element w = (w ,^ wp). By Aw.l- 
Aw.2, we can define a vector w* = (wp, wh0, with w / > [k /(fj)Cl ]I/(1-C2> ,J = L ,
■j
H, and restrict the state space to W= {w e 91+ : w l< wl and wh ^ w#’} without 
loss of generality. Let P. W —> W denote the feasibility correspondence: /fw)
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describes the set of feasible values for the state next period, w, if the current 
state is w. By (1) and Aw.l, we have
/{w) = {wgW: q < . + - / 1 <1 , and w < wH},
k Uc' (wHy * l c 1 k U c 1 K ) c’/Cl
with 7"(w) ^ 0 , all w e W. Let A = {(w, w) e Wx W: w e / I w)} be the graph of 
F  By AF \  (1), and Aw. 1, we can write the one-period return function (jr. A -» 91
at t as:
<f>(W, w'+l) = y  log WL + ( 1  -  y) log 1- M < y /C> , A « T C‘
k]lc'(w‘H)c' ,c' ki/c'(w'L)c’/c'
+0 -  r) log [ / X +f HwH\
so that (j is bounded above by <j(w 0, 0), continuously differentiable, and under 
Aw.2, as shown in the Appendix, it is strictly concave. Then, noting that at the 
solution to (3) it must be ul ^ uf, all t, 5 program (3) is equivalent to the 
sequence problem
v*(w°) = max u°L = max </>(w',wM),  (6){^)7=0en(w°)f^
where /7[w°) = {{w'} : wt+x g  /(w r), all t) and v* denotes the supremum
function.
As a first step, consider the single wage problem, with w#0 = w/° and only 
one type of adult, so that all children receive an equal per capita share of
Since under A F ’, Aw.l, and Aw.2, the infinite sum is bounded above for every feasible wage 
sequence, at the solution to (3), it must be 4 < 1, all t. Hence, if uL° > uL‘, some t, then increase P 
a little.
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educational investment: the state space is W = {w e 5R+\ w < w ’}, where 
w' > , and at any t, the only control variable is i .  Hence, (6) becomes:
(6’)v * (w°) = max YSPV{w'}“0e/7(w0) " log wf + (1 -  y) log
' ___1 (w<+1)1/C| ^
k Vc' (w')C2/Cl ,
where Z^w0) = {{w*} *0: wt+l e [0,&(w')C2 ], all t}, given w°. Then:
Proposition  3: Let wL° = wH° = w°. Let f* =[pci/((l - Pc2)(l  - y) +fici)]- Under 
A F ’, Aw.l, and Aw.2, the function v*(w°) = a  + [1/(1 - pc2)]log w° solves (6 ), 
where
g - (1~y)ioE , p i / P°\ , P° ilog k + ------- — -------- log- -----a -p) °(\-y)(i-/k2)+pcl ( i - m - f a )  { \-m -P c 2) a-rxi-A ?a)+ifc.
(7)
and the optimal policy is
w *'+1 = k{r *)C| (w ** Y2, all t. (8)
Proof. The Euler equations and transversality condition deriving from (6') are:
,/+! \1/C! I f(1 - Y ) W +X) 
CikVc' (w,)C2/Cl
f+i-vl/cj
1- o o
kUc'(w‘Y2lc' ) ' kue'cl (wt+ly 2lc' /  { k',c'(w,+ly 2,c' )
= p +
f iO .-y )c2 (w,+2) ,/c>
r 1 / c , f+1 \ c 2 / c ,
7+2\1/c, 'N
1-
- 1 / C > / W + 1 \ C2 / c l
lim ( p y —  +  (1 - y ) ----------------------------------- —
kVc' (wf)C2/Cl
w
xv
1- xv1 = 0
(9)
(10)
Since 0 < p  < 1 and / <  1, then 0 < r* < 1, and it is easy to show that (8) 
satisfies (9) and (10). Therefore, by the strict concavity of the one-period 
return function, (8) is the optimal policy, with
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w * 1 =(k ) 1C2 (r*) 1 Cz (w0)(C2)(, all t > 1. Substituting the latter 
expression into (6'), v*(w°) is obtained. |
t. To be specific, we shall find an infinite sequence of intervals (p„,p„+i]> disjoint 
sets Wn= { w e W :p e  (pn,pn+]]} with \J° Wn = W ,  and functions v„: Wn-+ fH^n
> 0, such that the function v: W —> defined as v(w) = vn(w) if w e Wn, solves 
(11). By Proposition 3, we let p0 =1 and conjecture that there is a ~px > l such that
if p° g (1,/?,], then it is optimal to set (} -  1, and thus / /  = 1, all t > 1.
Consider the Euler Equations deriving from (6), in terms of the controls x 
and rL, and the wage ratio p. At time t, in an interior solution:6
Let p  = wh/wl. We can now analyse the general case with wl * w#0, i.e. /?°
2
> 1, and W a  9?+ . Our strategy to solve (6) is to find the function v: W -» 91 that
solves
v(w) = max [^(w, w) + J3v{w)\, (11)
then we shall prove that v = v* and verify that at the solution to (6), ui < u i, all
(12)
a - f s n -  (i3)
Notice that (12) is identical to (9) if the latter is expressed in terms of the controls i  and i+x.
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Let t = 0: substituting for ri and ri in (13) from (1), and noting that f}  = 1
9 1implies p  = 1, a necessary condition for p  =1 to be optimal is
—  ----------—------- + P c J + p c ,- ^ — f < 0 .  (13')
i - r "  L + fA P ° T  i ~ T
By Proposition 3, if p l = 1 then in the optimum r1 = r*= J3c\l[{\ - f)( 1 - /fo)
+ /fci]. Hence, by (12) we conjecture that £  = z* = r* and (131) becomes:
Sp1,A>l* (14)H i - ^ 2) ,+1nCl/C2
Thus, we let Wo= {w e W\ (wh/wl) e (1,/?, ]} and define vo: Wo -> # a s
Rc (w V'lc'(w y j/C| / 1
v0 (w) = <2 + /logu v  + ( l-y ) lo g ( / ,w i + f„w H)+  —log-------- — ------- --------- 7—> (*5)
oV r  & L K r j  h\JL L JH H) x _ ^  V i K ) C2 , + / y / K ) C2 ‘
where « is given by (7): Vo is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable 
in both variables;7 i f  wh = wl, it coincides with the single wage solution; and, 
under Aw.2, it is strictly concave. Thus, given the strict concavity o f  (j> and the 
convexity o f  /"(see Appendix 3.1), it is immediate to verify that vo solves ( l  l)  on 
Wo at the comer solution given by the control functions r0 : ( l,/?,]-»[0,1] and
r0 : (l, p j  —> i#+, defined as r0(p) = t* and r0(p) =  (p)C2,Ci/Uh br0(/?)]l/c' +
M p)C2,c' ], where 7to\ (l,/?J ->  itf+ gives the conjectured optimal p  i f  p  e ( l ,/? J ,
7  Differentiating v0  one obtains
^ 0(w)_ 7 l 0 - r ) A  , f a  1 A(Wtf)C;/C|
d»L [fLWL+fHWH] 1-^2 Wi / l K ) C!,C,+//fK )Cl/C'
^  L /> £  + 1 - ^ 2  f L(wH)C2lc' + f „ { w LY 1,c'
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and m{p) = 1 all p  e (1, p x ]. Given tq(jd)  and ro(p), the wage functions mop. Wq
->• 9U, and mo#: Wo -> can be derived, which provide the conjectured 
optimal w if w e  Wo.
Next, we conjecture that there exists a ~p2 such that if fp  e (px,p 2], it is 
optimal to set p l e (l, px ], and thus pf = 1, alW > 2. Assuming vo to be the value 
function on Wo, in order for w in the interior of Wo to solve (11), the following 
conditions are necessary:
0 - Y )  f i  ( ^ ) 1/C| 
wL cxk ' lc' (wL)c>lc'
(i - r )  f H (*„)1/Cl
cxkUc' (wH)c' lc'
1-
1-
/ h& h)1/c, 1/c, \
k 'lc'(wHy*lc' k Vc'(wLy*,c
kUc'(wHy*,c' k uc'(wLy*,c'1- 1 / Cl . \  c, / c,
=p
=p
^o( w)
dbL
^ o(h')
dwu
(16)
(17)
o
By substituting for dvo(w)/dwL and dvo(w)/dwH, and expressing (16) and 
(17) in terms of the controls and the wage ratio, it follows that r=  r* and
1 /*(A>1/C‘ -Q -r )f« P m+m fr i f„ M p ) ) 1/Cl
Note that the two derivatives in the previous footnote can also be expressed as:
r | 0 - r)fL , Q-y)c2 / i K , » l l/
d v L w l U l » l + ///w//] w l c i k U c ' ( w LY 2lc
1- ///K,//W]l/Cl , A K ,» J 1/Cl ^v kUc'(wH)Cilc' k',c'(wLY2lc' J
^ 0(w) _ (i -  y)fH + 0 -  r)ci K ( w ) I 1 /c ,
^  [ / i wi + / / / w//] w//ci k Vc' (Wh Y iIc'
1- ///K,//W]1/C| , AK,A^)]1/C1>1 
kUc'(wHYl/c' kvci(w j2/c'
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which implicitly defines a function Xx :(1,px) -» i#+, where p  -  M( p )  is the 
conjectured current wage ratio that makes it optimal to choose pe(l,p x). After
some algebra:
U l  +fHp][fL(P)C2,C' + fn M P )y /Cl] - fn
so that X\{p) > 0, all p e (l, p ,), and lim/l, (p) = p ,, while as proved in Lemma 3,
Appendix 3.2, X\ is differentiable with d^i(p)/dp > 1, all pe(l,p ,). Hence, we 
define p 2 = Hm^- A,(p), with p 2 -p , > p ,- \ , and = A;' :(p,,p2] ^ (1,p,], 
where n\(p) is the conjectured optimal p  if p  e (px, p 2 ]: n\ is strictly 
increasing, continuous, and differentiable with lim - nx (p) = 1 = x 0 (p,), so that
patching tiq and n\ one obtains an increasing and continuous function.
Thus, we let W\ = {w e W: (w#/wl) e (p,,p2] } and define the conjectured 
optimal control functions tx :(px,p 2\^>[0,1], as T\(p) = t*, and rx:(p ,, p 2]-> #V, 
as ri(p) = (p)C2'c'/\fH [^(p)]Vc' + fUp)C2>Cl ]» fr°m which the wage functions gt^: 
JTi —» and W\ -> i#+ can be derived. The function Vi: W\ -> iff, defined
as V i(w ) = flw, gju (w), + P v0(gju (w), gji^(w)) solves (11) on W\ by
construction: vi is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable,9 and as proved
With
M _ r  l ( i - y ) A  , 0 - r k 2 / > u ( w
w* + w£c, k Uc' ( w J
(1 ) c  AKA* Q] 1/Cl
■/
t f /»K »W l1/Cl , AKA^)]1/C|V
I *,/c'K ,)c’/c' kVc'(w J'u'
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in Lemma 4, Appendix 3.2, strictly concave, with lim ^- vi(w) = vo(w,) and 
lim ^- dv](w)/dwj = dvo( w, )/dwj, J= L ,H , where w, is any w e W\ such that p  =
P \ •
By iterating the latter procedure, it is possible to derive by induction (see 
Appendix 3.2) an infinite sequence of intervals {pn, pn+I ], disjoint sets Wn= {w e
W: (wH/wL) e (pn,pn+]]}, and fimctions W„ 9?+, mnyH: W„ 9?+, and v„:
Wn -» 91, such that (i) l im ^  pn = oo; (ii) the strictly increasing, continuously
differentiable, and strictly concave function v: W —> 9?defined as v(w) = v„(w), if 
w e  W„, n> 0, solves (11); and (iii) at the solution to (11), if p° e (pn, pn+1 ], then
(6), equality is reached in a finite number o f periods. Once equality is reached, 
wages grow according to (8) and eventually converge to
jcf+l e (pn_t_:,p n_t] ,0 < t< n , and//+1 = ! ,*>«. Then:
THEOREM 1: Consider an inegalitarian economy in which wi & w h . Let f$ = 
w f/w f. Under AF ’, Aw.l, and Aw.2, for any finite p°, at the solution to program
Proof We shall prove that v = v*.
L/>i+///wJ  ™hc\ i 1/ClK ) Cl/Cl ■/
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1. Let p° e (pn, pn+1 ] and let {w*'} * 0 be the path of the states in the 
proposed solution with if = t*, all t, rL = (p')C2/Cl V h  I>„-,(p')]l/Cl +fL{p‘)Cllc' L 
all t < n, and r£ = 1, all f > n. Let {w*} " 0 e IHw°) be a feasible path of the 
states and let D = limy.^  ^^ =o (ft) 1 y>(w *', w *'+1) -  </>{w', wt+l)]. Let (w‘,
w*+1) = , vv_1 ,J = L ,H  and i = t, t + 1. By the strict concavity of $
d w ‘j
+ lim£,r,0(> (w*',w*'+1)(w*'„ - < )  + ^ . , ( w *  w*'+1)(W*';‘ - < ) ]
By construction, ^ (w*‘, w*t+l) + ( w*t+], w*t+2) = 0, J  = L, H, all  ^< n,
and pP e (l,px ]. Next, it is easy to verify that w l* = w h \  all t > n, and i  = 
t*, all t, imply
for all t> n, given pP e (1, p] ]. Hence, given wL*° = wL°, and wH*° = w#0:
D > lira (w*'+> * ' * 2) ] «  - O
t=n
+ \im(/3)T<fiwT+i (w*T,w*T+l)(w*TL+l -w[+1) + lim(P)T<f>^  (w*T, w*T+l)(w*TH+l -w T„+1)
Since ^ r+1 (w *7’, w ) < o , and ^ r+1 (w*r,w*T+l)w *™ = - / ,  /?/( 1 - f ic 2) , J  =
L, H, it follows that D > 0 all w° e W and {w*} ®0 e I^w°). Convergence to 
w* along {w*?} " 0 follows from (8).
2. Since lim supz_>00(y^ )? v(wl) < lim sup^oo (fij v(w 0 = 0, for all w° e W and 
{w*}”o G A w°)» ar>d by Part 1, lim^oo (frf v(w*r) = 0, then by recursive 
dynamic optimisation theory (e.g., Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p.72-5), v =
v*.y
In other words, the optimal path involves equating the wages of the 
contemporaneous members of the two dynasties in a finite number of periods: if 
fp e (pn ,, pn], convergence occurs in n periods. Once equality is reached, 
human development continues forever.
3.6. CONCLUSION
Earlier, we remarked on the similarity between the present chapter, Arrow 
(1973a), and Dasgupta (1974a). The main differences between the latter models 
and ours are that in Arrow (1973a) and Dasgupta (1974a ): (i) there is a 
representative agent each period, and so the only issue is to maximin welfare of 
that agent’s descendents across time, whereas in our model there is an issue of 
intragenerational as well as intergenerational justice; (ii) agents care only about 
consumption, not about functioning (i.e., not about the wage per se); (iii) 
investment is modelled as capital, rather than educational, investment. Formally, 
the main difference is that the planner has only one instrument each period in 
Arrow and in Dasgupta, whereas in our model she has two instruments. (This is, 
of course, due to difference (i) above.) Nevertheless, Arrow’s and Dasgupta’s 
results are qualitatively similar to ours: an increase in consumption over time is
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compatible with maximin only if the equalisandum is welfare, in which case 
parents care about the consumption stream of their entire dynasty. Thus, the 
present chapter may be considered an intellectual descendent of Arrow (1973a) 
and Dasgupta (1974a).
Our concern with intragenerational inequality, not expressed in the earlier 
literature, led us to deduce that, as long as individuals value their human capital 
as well as their consumption, then the maximin program will eventually equalize 
the levels of human capital of all individuals. We remark, however, that this 
result may well depend on our assumption Aw.2, of nonincreasing returns in the 
educational technology.
Let us recapitulate. One of the major foci of discussion in egalitarian theory 
of the last thirty years has been the nature of the equalisandum. The main 
participants in the discussion have moved away from taking welfare as that 
equalisandum, although it is important to note that Ameson (1989) has argued 
for choosing opportunity for welfare as the equalisandum. (‘Opportunity for 
welfare’ is, in general, quite different from ‘welfare’ as an equalisandum. That 
difference is due to differential effort, which in the present chapter, does not 
appear.) However, this debate has been carried out within the confines of a static 
environment, a ‘model’ with a single generation. Here, we have maintained that 
equality of opportunity, for whatever kind of condition, is an ethically viable 
conception in a multi-generation world, and that in such a context, it calls for 
equalizing opportunities across all types of adult, where an adult’s type is
characterized by the date at which he is bom and the SES of the family in which 
he grew up. It is beyond this chapter’s scope to argue that justice requires that a 
person fare no better than another simply by virtue of being bom at a different 
date.10 An asymmetric version of this principle is familiar in discussions of 
sustainable development and environmental preservation: we should leave to 
future generations a world as bountiful as the one left to us by our ancestors. But 
the other part is, we believe, just as compelling: we are under no ethical mandate 
to leave our descendents a world more bountiful than our own, although we may 
decide to do so if  that increases our welfare by contemplating the happiness it 
will bring our children, and their children...
In studying the multi-generation world, we have learned that, if we choose 
what we call an objectivist equalisandum - we have taken ‘functioning’ as an 
appealing one - then equality of opportunity for that condition implies there is no 
protracted human development, where human development is conceived of not 
as an increase in human welfare, but rather in human capacities to function. 
Thus, two major characteristics of what comprises the good society, as it has 
been conceived of by egalitarians for several hundred years, are incompatible. 
We showed that if we equalize opportunities for welfare, where an adult’s 
welfare depends upon her own level of functioning and the functioning levels of
10 This is contestable. Some argue that equality of condition among living persons is all that an 
egalitarian ethic requires. One rationale is that self-esteem is affected by comparing one’s 
condition to those of contemporaries, not to the dead, or to those not yet bom.
129
a finite stream of her descendents, the unpleasant inconsistency continues to 
hold. If, however, we choose a thorough-going kind of welfare as the condition 
for which opportunities should be equalized - one which declares that an 
individual’s welfare depends not just on his capacities and the capacities of his 
children, but rather on his own capacities and his child’s welfare - then human 
development and equality of opportunity are mutually consistent.
The most appealing solution to the unpleasant inconsistency is, we believe, 
to drop the objectivist requirement.11 It is opportunities for welfare that we 
should advocate equalizing. This, incidentally, conforms to Ameson’s (1989) 
recommendation, although the reasons brought to bear here are entirely different 
from those he presents. But we must add that this escape from the inconsistency 
is predicated upon a psychological premise - that adults care about their own 
functioning, and the welfare of their children.
11 Before agreeing with us, however, the reader should consult Silvestre (2002), who works with a 
different economic environment from ours, in which, he shows, an increase in welfare over time 
and egalitarianism are consistent, even when adults do not care about the welfare of their 
children.
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APPENDIX 3.1. SOME PRELIMINARY LEMMAS 
Lem m a  1: Under Aw. 2, the one-period return function <j)is strictly concave.
S . .J+ I V'C,
Proof: Let K  =  I___The Hessian of K has entnes:
(w')C2/Cl
d 2K  1 -c , (w,+1)0_2Cl)/Cl d 2K  c2 (c2 + c ,) (w'+,) ,/Cl
d(w ,+')2 (c , ) 2 (w ')C2/c‘ d(w ‘)2 (c ,)2 (w ')(C2+2c,)/Cl
d 2K  _ d 2K  _ c2 ( V  ) ( 1 ) 1  Let D i  denote the principal 
(c , ) 2 (w ')(C2+Cl)/Cl
minor of order i: clearly D \  > 0, while, D 2  >  0 <=> (1 - ci)c2(ci + C2) -  
(C2 ) 2 > 0 <=> ci + C2 < 1. Hence, K  is convex and ^ is strictly concave. |
Remark: the same argument proves that in the single-wage problem
<f>{w‘ , w t+l) = log w ‘ + ( 1  -  y)  log
' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 (wf+1)1/C|>
k ]lc' (w ‘ ) c * / c 1
is strictly concave.
Lem m a 2: Under Aw. 2, r i s  convex in the sense that, for any w\ w* e W ,  and 
6 e  [0, 1], wt+I e r(W) and iv'+1 e r (w ‘) implies wt+1(6) e T(wt(6)), where 
for any 0 e  [0, 1], wl(6) = (wLl(0), wHl(0)) = 0 w l + (1 - 6)wl, i = t, t + 1.
Proof: Clearly, wh^1{0) > w l+1(0), and wHt+l(P), w f+l{6) > 0. Finally, 6 + (1 -
0) > L  M O ' 1*' 1 n m / / / « +1)1/Cl , n A « ) 1/C| , n m A K +1)1/Cl 
L kUc'(w‘Hy ilc' kUc'(w‘H)Cl,c' kVc'(WL)Cllc' /t1/Cl(w')C2/Cl
for any 0 e [0, 1], while, as in Lemma 1, it is easy to show that under 
Aw.2 the right hand side of the latter expression is greater or equal to
/ * « W /C' , A « +W /c'
131
APPENDIX 3.2. THE VALUE FUNCTION 
We now extend the analysis of (11) proceeding by induction. Let p0 = l. 
We assume that the functions An, rn, rn, nn, tunji and v„, n > I, can be 
defined as in Section 5.3. Let p  and p denote, respectively, the current value 
of the wage ratio and its value next period and let a similar notation hold for 
w. We define the function X, :(a„-,,aJ->(a„.A„,,]> n > 1, as
tk+up\uAf>y'“' +/»(*..,(a))'"'](p)Vci l ( p ) =  yp) . -/*
where p,>p,_„ and :(a„-,.A.]-»-(a,,-2>A,-,] is differentiable, with
*.-.(A„) = A.-,- Let , A.(a) = A,> d^»(/3)/dp > 0 and ^  >1.
dp X J p )
all pe(p„_,,p„], and p„,=4,(p„), so that p,„> p, and pU„(p) < 1, all 
Ae(A.-,.A„]- Therefore, dl„(p)/dp > 1, all p e ( f t .„ p ,]  and
A,. -  A > A. - P , - r Ltt X, = K' :(A -A„ A.i-
Let Wn = {w e W: p e  (p„,p„,]}. Define r „ :( A , , A.,,]->[0,1], r„(/>) =
r* . and r , : ( a .  , A „ , ] - >  # +, r„(p) =  (p y<u 'I\fH [7r,{p)fc' + f t ( PY ' u '], and the
wage functions tunJr. Wn itf+, mnj{w) = k(T*)c' [rn{p)f{wLp  , and mntH: Wn ->
#+, = %*)<■ . Let G7„(w) = (c7^(w), mnJiw)).
Definev„: Wn—> 9?as
VbO ) = r logWL + (1 -  /llogtAWi + f HWH] + (1 -  y ) log 
+ /*ViK,(w))
1-
kUc'(wHy*/c' kUc'(wL)c*,c
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where vn.y Wn-i -» i#, with Wn.\ -  {w e W: (wH/wL) e Let vn be
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable on Wn 
with
_ r . + (i -  r ) f L + 0 - y ) c 2 A K ,l(w)]
|1/C,
Wi [ f LWL + f H WH ] WiCl k UC' ( W L ) Cl>C'
= + 0 -y )g 2 /g [gy«.g(w)]l/Cl j
[/iwi + / ^ ]  V i  kllCl{wH)CllCi /
1- kUc'(wHy>/Ci kUc'(wj*lc'
l -
,  £ 1/Cl (wff)Cj/Cl k Uc' ( w Ly * /c'
Finally, let wn be any w e Wn such that wh/wl = pn and let lim ^- v„(w) 
= v„.{(wn), and lim ^- dvn(w)/dwj = dvnA(wn)/dwj, J  = L,H.
We conjecture that there is a p n+2 such that if p  e (pn+], p n+2 ], then /3 e 
(a. >Pn+11 • Assuming v„ to be the value function on Wn, in order for w in the 
interior of Wn to solve (11), the following conditions are necessary:
( i - r )  f L ( * J 1/Cl
W, c xk l,c» K ) c^ /c'
( i - r )  / „
l -
M e ,
■ +
/c, 1-
h ( \ f e' V
£1/c‘ (wl )C2/c' y
^
c<c|
n
^ 1/cik ) C2/ciJ
P
Manipulating the latter expressions as in Section 5.3, one obtains f  
r*, and it is possible to define a function /tw+i: {pn, p H+x) ->9t+ as
( p ) Vc*
( f j ' 1
[fL+f„p][Mprlc'+fHM p )r ci]AW/cr
(\-^ c2)(i-r)PifL(prlc' +fHwpWc')+Pc2[fL+fHp]WP)yAW/ci/c,
(A.l)
so that y^ +i is a continuous function with /in+\(p) > 0, for all p e (pn, p n+l),
^  lim K A p ) = P„+\ = K(P. )
P ^ P n
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Lem m a 3: Under AF’, Aw.l, and Aw.2, ^ n+x ^ — B—  > 1  and ^n+\{P)
dp K+x (P) dP
a l 1  P  e  ( P „ , P n + x ) -  T h U S ’ i f  Pn+2 = l i m ^ +1 K + A P ) >  t h e n  Pn+2 ~  Pn+X >  Pn+X ~ P n '
Proof. From (A.l) we have
dKj F) _{ py U l  + f „ P \ V A p Y 1'e' + f HM p ) ) Uc' 3
dp c2( fLr /c> U \ - p c 2) ( i - r ) p [ f L(p)C2/c' + / h M ) ) Vc ' ] +  Pc iU l +  f Hp ] ( * n ( p ) ) Ue'
/c, f n
x _______________________{-^ w+i Bn+i Cn+l}______________________
[(l -  fie,XI-  r ) f U d f > y + f n M ) ) ' 1" 1 +P J J l + f
(A.2)
where all terms but {An+\ -  Bn+\ -  Cn+1} are positive and
A„+l =
— + i d j t  ( P)\ — i
[(1 + c2)(fLy-(py>lc' + (1 + c1)(/„)2p K (p )) '/" + (1 + c, + c2) f J H(J>y' + f Lf Hp —^ l ^ p ) y  + f Lf Hnn(p))Vc'
dp
+ ( /„ )  W  ^ r i * A p ) ) r ']* [d -  Pc2)( i -  r W L(pyiU' + f H(n.{p))xu' ] + Pc2[fL + / wp ]K (p ) )1/c' ]dp
—   1 r j  j r  {  p y \
Bn+\ = [0 - Pc2){\ - /)(c, + c2)fL{p)c' + [(1 - >et2Xl - y )  + /3c2]cJH(xn(P))',C' +PcJ l& S p )T  —j f 1dp
+ [(1 -  /fc2)(l - y )  + Pc2\fHp{nn{p))c' ^ E A E l ] x
dp ( f Ly ( P ) c' + [ ( fHr p + f j M ] p ^ n ( p ) y c' + f Lf H( p ) c
c „ ,=/„ x [a -  -  r ) W  "■ + /»(^(p))''" ] + + f up \* s .p ) f‘' ]
Grouping all terms according to the exponents of p , after some algebra:
A+i — b„+i — c n+1 =
(\-pc2)(\-r)[\-(\-pc2)(i-r)](fL)fA p)^ 2+^-c^-Pc2)(i-r)(fL)3(p)^
+  2 [ ( 1  -  Cl)(l -  fic2)(l - r )  + ( 1 + c 2 ) J 3 c 2  -  J 3 c 2 ( \ -  fic2X  1  -  r ) ] / *  ( / j W 1 (*„(/>))
+ [2(1 -  /fc2)( 1 -  y)  -  2(1 -  /fc2)z(l -  ^ )z -  2/fc2(l -  y&2)(l -  r )  +  (1 +  c2)/&2 ] / , ( / * ) ( £ ) ' '  K ( p ) ) c'
+ [(1 -  C])(l -  fic2)(l -  X) + 2/fc2 -  2/fc2((l -  /5b2)(l -  r )  +  j&2) ] /A /* ) 2p K ( p ) )
2_
+[(1 -  /fc2)(i -  y ) + /fc2][i -  ((1 -  yfc2)(i -  r)+ ^ 2)](X,)3(p)2K ( p ) ) Cl 
+ Pc2( l - / k 2) ( fL)2f H(x„(p))c'
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/7 jr  (  A'V--------------- ---- 1 — +3
+ (\ + C2)J3c2(JL) \ p ) C'{7tn(p))C' - f ic J L(JHf - ^ { 7 t n{p)T  {p T Be, f  A f„Y —
dp
1 , C2
" 2  i3c2f H( f L?  ~\f>Y1 +2 -  y&2 (/z ) 3 ^ A i 7 t n{p)Y  ~\pY' +‘dp dp
Under Aw.l and Aw.2, all terms apart from the last three are strictly 
positive, for all p e (pn, pn+l), and in order for dA„+i(p)/d p > 0  to hold
for all p e (p n,pn+x), it is sufficient to have dnn{p) P all
dp nn{p)
p e{p n, pn+x ]. However, the latter condition holds, since nn = Z~l and by 
assumption the elasticity of A,n is greater than one over its entire domain. 
Hence, we define p„ . 2 = l im ^ u with pntl > ,  and p lK ^ (p )
< 1, all p e{p n , / ? n+1 ]. Next, notice that:
d*„+l(p) P
dp \ +Af>)
(p Y1 ..  [fL + fHP][fL(p)ClU' + / hM p ))Vc']_______________ f
c2( f j '/C2 1(1 -  Pc2){ i -  /c' + f „ W p ) ) Ue' ] + / W ,  + f Hp \ M p ) ) Vc'
X T-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------F x  ( A - * ■ - £ , }
[(1 -  /fc2xi -  y)p[fL{ p r /C| + / wK (p)),/C| ] + / W .  + /„£](* . (p))1/ei J
_____________[fL+ f Hw L( p r ,c' + f HM p ) ) Uc>]_______________ f V 2 >i
\ ( i - p c 2) ( i - r )p [ fL(py>u' + f „ M p ) ) Uc' ] + Bc2[fL + f Hp](xn(p))Uc' H\
is equivalent to
(l -  c2)(i -  / k 2)(\ -  r)[  1 -  (1 -  yfc2)( 1 -  r)]( fLy  h  {p Y : ‘ + 0  -  <* -  c2)(i -  /fc2)(i -  y)<Jl) \ p ) T ‘
£j-+i 1
+  2 [ ( 1  -  c ,  - c 2 ) ( l  -  y & 2 ) ( l  - r )  +  f i c 2  - ( 1  - c 2 ) J 3 c 2 ( \ - ^ 2 ) ( 1  -  y)]fH( / , )  W  « £ ) ) “
— +2  —
+ {2(i- cjX i-  yfit,)a - r ) + f a  - 2a  - c2) a - - ?-)[(i-  f c y x  - r ) + f c M ( f u)2( p r ' M p ))“
2_
+ [(1 ~ ci _ c2 )(1-  P°i )(1-  ^ ) + 2(1 -  c2 )Pc2 -  2(1 -  c2 )J3c2 ((1 - Pc2 )(1 — / )  + fic2 y\fL { f H )2 p{nn (p)Y'
+ (1 -  c2)[(l -  pc2){ 1 -  y)  + Pc2\  1 -  ((1 -  /fc2)(l -  Y) + A ) ] ( / w ) \ p f M ) Y '
1  -  1  ^  (o\ 1 - 1 - +:
+ (i- c2 )Pc2( i~ P°i)(/z,)2 /h(^n(p )Yx +Pc2V l) \ p T M p ) Y ' - ^ f L{fHY - j P - { n n{p)Y  ^ Cp Ydp
ap dp
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Thus, again, by Aw.l and Aw.2, and given the assumptions on the
elasticity of An, then ^ n+1 — E—  > 1  for all p e  (pn, pn+l ] . Hence,
dp An+J (p)
given p/An+\(p) < 1 , all p e {pn,pn+x], it follows that dAn+^py&p > 1 , 
all p e (p„, pn+, ], and thus pn+2 -  pn+] > pn+l -  pn
Remark: Since d;zo(y3 )/dyd = 0, all pe[l,p ,], then &A\(p)ldp > 1, all 
pe[l,p ,].
Thus, let %+i(/>) is the conjectured
optimal wage ratio next period, if the current value is p  e (pB+], /?n+2 ]; 7in+\ is 
strictly increasing, continuous, and differentiable, with lim  ^ ^+i(p) = 
K(p„,)- Let r„, :(/?„,,p„,2 ]-»[0,1], Tn+l(p) = r* and r„, : (A,.,, A„ 2 ]-> #+, 
r„+i(/0 ) = (p)1”"' /[/// [a.,(a)]‘'" + fK p)"”']- Let W„+l = {w  e W: (wH/wL) e 
(A,+i » Pn+2 1 } 311(1 define the wage functions mn+\j,'- Wn+\ -> vJn+\jiw) = 
k ( r * )c' K +i(/>)]ClK ) cs  311(1 o ^h -i^  0/n-i ->  %-> =
k(T*)c'[ { \- fLrn+i(p))/fH]c'(wHy 2- Let C7„+i(w) = (m+vAw), mn+UJ(w)), and 
define v„+i: Wn+\ -> 91, by
vn+10 )  = riogw^+o-^iogiy^ + ///w„]+o-r)iog 
+ fi'niVr.+li™)) ’
r
1-
so that v„+i is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on Wn+\ with 
^ n+i(w) _ r , 0-r)A , (i-y)g; /t[^d,t(w)]1/
wi U W  + A WJ  k Uc'(wL)C2,c'
l- kVc'(wHy*,c' kUc'(wLr /c'
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(i - r)f„ , 0- r)c2 /«[°w(*)r* /
^  [ / t wi + / » w//] w//ci k Uc'(w H)Cl'c' !
Let wn+x be any w g Wn+i such that w /^wz, = p n+1: limw^ - +i v„+i(w) = 
v„(wn+1), and lim ^ -+idvn+\{w)/dwj = dv*( wB+1 )/dw/, J= L ,H .
Lemma 4: Under AF’, Aw.l, and Aw.2, vn+i is strictly concave.
Proof. Consider any w°, w° e Wn+\. Let wl = (c7«+u(w0), tn„+\jfw0)) and w1 
= (G7„+u(vP°), tD-„+Wi{w0)). For any 0 e [0, 1], let w'(0) = 9 wl + (1 - 
0)w(, t = 0, 1, and notice that w°(0)e W„+1 and by Lemma 2, e 
I\w°(0)). Thus
vn+1 ( W° (0 ))  > ^(W° (0 ), w 1 (0 ))  +  yfrn (w 1 (0 ))
>  ^ ( w ° , w 1) +  (1 -  0 ) ^ ( w ° , vv') +  (w 1 (0 ) )
>  ^ ( w ° , w 1) +  (1 -  ^ ( w ° , iP1) +  y06Pn ( w 1) +  -  0 ) v n (vP1)
= ^ +i(w°) + ( l - 0 K +i(w°)
by the strict concavity of (j) and vn, and by the definition of w1 and w1. |  
Remark: Since Vo is strictly concave, by Lemma 4 Vi is strictly concave. 
Lemma4 completes the induction step for all n > 1. Since W in Wj = 0 ,  
all i * j ,  and, by Lemma 3, l i m = o o ,  it follows that \Jj°n=0Wn = W . 
Moreover, let wn denote any w e W„ such that wh/wl = pn; since 
limp^'Knip) = Kn-\(p„), then lim ^- &nj(w) = mnAf]{™n)> J  = L, H, 
limw^ - vn(w) = vn.i(wn), and lim ^- dvn(w)/dwj = dvn.\(wn)/dwj, J= L ,H .
1-
k Uc'(wH)c' lc' k Vc'(w Ly
A k tu(w)]'
Cj/C,
1/C, \
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Therefore, we define (i) the strictly increasing, continuously 
differentiable, and strictly concave function v: W -> iff, such that v(w) = 
vn(w), for w g Wn, n > 0; and (ii) the continuously differentiable wage 
functions me W —> #?+ and me W —> 9t+, such that mj(w) = mnJw), for w e 
Wn, n > 0, and J  = L, H. By substituting the function v into (11) and 
considering the first order conditions, it is not difficult to show that v is the 
value function, such that if p° e (/?„,/?„+,] then, in the optimum p l e
(pn ,pn], and and mn represent the corresponding optimal policies.
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APPENDIX 3.3. AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Recall that if wh = w l ,  at any date t 1 is the only control and the state 
space is W c: i#+, W = {w e W\ w < w \ w'>ku(1~°2)}. The feasibility 
correspondence is /(w) = [0,&(w)C2], so that given vv° g W, =
{ { w ' } * 0 : wt+1 g [0 ,A:(V) C2 ], all t}, and the one-period return function is
<tfw\ w*+1) — log w* + (1 — /)  log ' ______1 (wf+1)1/cl"
kVc' {W)C2'C'
. In this appendix we
provide an alternative proof of Proposition 3 based on Bellman’s functional 
equation:
v(w°) = max
w 1e [ 0 >* ( w ° ) ‘:2 ]
log w° + ( 1  -  y) log 1 - (w )
'N (A.4)
where v denotes the value function. To be specific, first, we prove that v(w) = 
a  + 8  log w solves (A.4), where a  and 8  are unknown constants to be 
determined. Then, we prove that v = v*.
Proof o f Proposition 3: 1. By substituting our postulated solution into (A.4)
v(w°) = max
w 1e [ 0 ,* ( w ° ) ‘:2 ]
logw 0 + ( 1  — y) log 1
(w1)lNl/C, 'N
k U c ' ( w ° ) Cj/Cl
+ j3a + P 8  log w 1
The first order condition for this problem is
w1 =* p8cx
(1 - y )  + pScx
Hence, v(w) = a+  £log w solves (A.5) if
a  + 8  log w° =
P a + (1 + pSc2)\ogw° + ( l -^ ) lo g ----- ———---- + p 8 \o g k  + P8cx log-
( 1  - y )  + p8cx ( \ - y )  + pScx
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for all w°, which holds if <5= 1/(1 - pci), and a  is given by (7).
2. We need to show that v(w°) = v*(w°). First, note that since v(w) < 
v(w'), all w g W, then lim,_).oo(/?/ v(w') < lim,-** (p f  v(w') = lim,^* 
(p f { a  + [1/(1 - Pci)]\ogw’} = 0, a llw° g  W and {w*}* 0 g  IJ’(w°).
Next, the optimal policy is w = k(r *)Cl (w)C2, all t. As in Proposition 3 it 
is not difficult to show that, for each w° g  W and {w*} ” 0 g  n \ w °),
^ X,"o(y0)V(w',w'+1), while lim^°°
= 0. Hence, by the theorems on dynamic optimization (see e.g. Stokey 
and Lucas, 1989, pp.72-5), v = v*. |
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CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITATION AND TIME
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Since A General Theory o f Exploitation and Class (1982a), John 
Roemer has developed an original interpretation of Marx’s economic theory 
(Roemer, 1982b , 1986a , 1988a). From a methodological point of view, 
Roemer’s main contribution concerns the possibility (and, indeed, the 
necessity) of providing microfoundations to Marxian economics. The 
concepts of class and exploitation are modelled as the product of individual 
optimisation, and the full class and exploitation structures of a society are 
derived from agents’ constrained rational choices. From a substantive point 
of view, Roemer rejects Marx’s definition of exploitation based on surplus 
value as a relevant normative concept. According to him, all relevant moral 
information is conveyed by the analysis of Differential Ownership of 
Productive Assets (DOPA) and the resulting welfare inequalities. Roemer 
develops an alternative game theoretical definition of exploitation based on 
DOPA which is meant to be a generalisation of Marx’s theory that captures 
its essential normative content.
Due to the scope and relevance of the issues analysed, Roemer’s theory 
has generated a vast literature. Several critiques have been expounded on his 
methodology and on his conclusions, mainly based on issues of interpretation 
of Marx’s theory (e.g., Reiman, 1987; Foley, 1989; Hodgson, 1989; Howard 
and King, 1992; Lebowitz, 1988, 1994), but surprisingly little attention has
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been devoted to his models. 1 In this chapter a priori problems of 
interpretation are left aside, while both methodological and substantive issues 
are discussed by means of an intertemporal generalisation of Roemer’s 
subsistence economies.
From a methodological viewpoint, a formal dynamic model is extremely 
useful in the analysis of the possibility of providing neoclassical (and more 
specifically, Walrasian) microfoundations to Marxian economics. In 
particular, a model that aims to provide microfoundations to Marx’s concepts 
of exploitation and class must be able to account for their persistence, since, 
according to Marx, they are inherent features of a capitalist economy.
Roemer himself acknowledges this; “The economic problem for Marx, 
in examining capitalism, was to explain the persistent accumulation of wealth 
by one class and the persistent impoverishment of another, in a system 
characterized by voluntary trade” (Roemer, 1982a , p.6 , italics added). 
However, his models (both subsistence and accumulating economies) are 
essentially static in that there are no intertemporal trade-offs; they can be 
interpreted as describing either a succession of one-period economies (ibid., 
p.45) or an infinitely lived generation, but in either case intertemporal credit 
markets are absent and savings are impossible. Thus, they do not seem 
suitable for analysing the persistence of exploitation and classes in a 
competitive economy. In particular, while the absence of intertemporal credit 
markets is consistent with the subsistence hypothesis, the impossibility of
1 Devine and Dymski’s (1991) article represents a partial exception. However, the lack of a 
formal model makes some of their arguments not entirely compelling (see fii. 2  below).
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savings seems very restrictive. Moreover, savings and the intertemporal 
allocation of labour are particularly relevant, both because of the positive and 
normative importance of inter-class mobility, and because the introduction of 
a savings decision enlarges the set of choices available to agents. Thus, a 
dynamic model with savings is more realistic and it offers a more general 
framework to evaluate the possibility of providing microfoundations to 
Marxian economics.
From a substantive viewpoint, a dynamic model allows one to assess the 
causal and moral relevance o f DOPA, focusing in particular on its role in 
generating exploitation and classes as persistent features of a competitive 
economy in which agents can save and the distribution of productive assets 
can change over time.
Given the importance of dynamics, the focus on Roemer’s subsistence 
economies (in which agents minimise labour expenditure, provided they 
reach a minimum amount of consumption), rather than accumulating 
economies (in which agents maximise revenues) might seem contradictory. 
However, first, despite the lack of an explicit analysis of capital scarcity, the 
results obtained in Roemer’s static economies depend on differential 
ownership of scarce productive assets (Skillman, 1995, 2001). Hence, it is 
not surprising per se that exploitation may disappear when accumulation is 
allowed (Devine and Dymski, 1991). Focusing on subsistence economies 
allows one to abstract from the issue of capital scarcity. 2
2  See Roemer’s (1992) reply to Devine and Dymski (1991), and the discussion in chapter 5 
below. For a brief discussion of capital scarcity, see Roemer (1982a, pp. 9-11; 1988a, p. 23).
143
Secondly, and more importantly, Roemer’s main theoretical conclusions 
do not depend on accumulation models. On the contrary, one of his most 
relevant results is precisely that “exploitation emerges logically prior to 
accumulation” (Roemer, 1982b , p.264). Thus, not only the analysis of 
subsistence economies gives the opportunity to examine the role of DOPA in 
a context where capital scarcity persists, it is also theoretically crucial in 
order to evaluate Roemer’s fundamental claim that “differential distribution 
of property and competitive markets are sufficient institutions to generate an 
exploitation phenomenon, under the simplest possible assumptions” 
(Roemer, 1982a , p.43).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, a 
dynamic extension of the subsistence economy with a labour market is set up. 
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, it is shown that in a dynamic framework two criteria 
to define exploitation and class emerge: one focuses on the agent’s status in 
each period of her life, the other on the agent’s whole life. It is proved that 
the two criteria are equivalent in an interior equilibrium (in which agents do 
not save) and, more generally, that Roemer’s model can be interpreted as a 
special case of the intertemporal model with no savings. In Section 4.5, a 
dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s theory is provided. It is proved that in an 
economy with a strictly positive rate of time preference, exploitation and 
classes persist. However, the normative relevance of time preference is put 
into question, both in general and in the context of Marx’s theory, and it is
3 For a discussion of single periods and whole lives definitions o f normative concepts in the 
context of egalitarian theories (McKerlie, 1989; Temkin, 1993), see chapter 2.
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proved that, with no time preference, asset inequalities and classes persist in 
an interior equilibrium, while exploitation disappears in the long run. Hence, 
asset inequalities are normatively secondary, though causally primary in 
explaining exploitation, Roemer’s definition of class based on the net amount 
of labour performed is questioned, and several doubts are raised on the 
possibility of providing robust microfoundations to Marx’s concepts by 
means of Walrasian general equilibrium models. Section 4.6 focuses on 
conclusions. The existence of an equilibrium is proved in Appendix 1, and 
Roemer’s game-theoretic model of exploitation is analysed in Appendix 2.
4.2. THE INTERTEMPORAL MODEL 
The economy consists of a sequence of nonoverlapping generations, 
each with v= 1, ..., N, identical producers, living for T periods, and indexed 
by the date of birth kT, k = 0, 1,2, ... In every period t, each agent v requires 
a n x 1 vector of commodities b for subsistence, where b »  0 , 4 0  = (0 , ..., 
0)', and can operate any activity of a given fixed coefficient technology (A, 
L), where A is a productive n x n input matrix and L is a 1 x n vector of direct 
labour coefficients. As concerns A and L, the following assumption is made 
for the sake of simplicity.
A ssu m pt io n  1: A is indecomposable and L »  O' . 5
4  Given two vectors x, y  in 91n, the following notation holds: x > y  if xt > y h all 1 < i < n; x > y
if x > y  and x ^ y ;  and x »  y  if x, > yh all i.
5 A matrix A is decomposable if there is a permutation matrix P  such that P ’AP is upper
block triangular with square matrices on the main diagonal. If A is indecomposable then it 
has at least one non-zero off-diagonal entry in every row and column.
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In every period t, (pt, wt) denotes the 1 x (n + 1) price vector, where wt 
is the nominal wage; xtv denotes the n x 1 vector of activity levels that v 
operates as a self-employed producer; ytv denotes the n x 1 vector of activity 
levels that v hires others to operate; ztv e 9?+ denotes v’s labour supply; oof 
denotes v’s n x 1 vector of perfectly storable productive endowments, where 
oovkT is the vector of endowments inherited by v, bom in kT. The market value
of v’s endowments, v’s wealth, in t is W f = p tcotv. Finally, s f  denotes v’s n x 
1 vector of net savings. As concerns credit markets and savings, the 
following assumption holds.
A ssu m pt io n  2: No credit market. Productive assets must be bought with 
current wealth, while consumption and savings must be financed out of 
current revenue.
First, as in Roemer (1982a, 1988a),6 Assumption 2 mles out fully 
developed intertemporal credit markets and thus the possibility of 
intertemporal trade between agents, consistently with the subsistence 
hypothesis. Second, due to the possibility of saving, Assumption 2 allows for 
intertemporal trade-offs in the allocation of labour during an agent’s life. 
Thus, it is consistent with a dynamic setting in which agents’ lives are 
divided into more than one period and it represents a genuine dynamic 
extension of Roemer’s models, in which agents cannot save.
Let x v = {xtv}t=kT,..., (*+i)r-i denote producer v’s lifetime plan of activity 
levels operated as a self-employed producer, and let a similar notation hold
6  In “capital market island” (Roemer, 1982a, pp.87ff) credit markets operate within periods.
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fory1', z v, s v, and cov. Let (p, w) = {pt, w t }t=kT,.. .,(k+i)T-i denote the intertemporal
y v, z v, s') denote a generic intertemporal plan for v. Let Atv = Lxtv + ztv\ Atv 
denotes total labour expenditure by agent v in period t. Let 0 < p  < 1 be the 
time preference factor. Given initial endowments (ovkT, each v is assumed to
Thus, agent v is assumed to minimise lifetime labour, both when self 
employed and when working for somebody else, subject to the constraints 
that in every t: (1 ) net revenues are sufficient to reach subsistence and for 
savings plans; (2) wealth is sufficient for productive plans; (3) labour 
performed cannot exceed the working day, normalised to one; (4) the 
dynamic path of productive endowments is determined by net savings.
7 The index k is not included in x y, y y, z v, s v, and (p, w) in order to simplify the notation and 
because, as shown below, the equilibrium will be interpreted as a stationary state.
8 As shown below, there are price vectors such that the value o f MP is indeed attained.
path of the price vector during the lifetime of a generation. 7 Thus, let £  ~ (*v>
choose t; to solve the minimisation programme MP, whose value is V( covkT ) . 8
MP: V(co;T) = m jn X " ;r " /? '4
subject to: p t(I - A)xtv +\pt(I - A ) -  wtL]ytv + wtztv > p tb + ptS,t >V (1)
p tA{x,v+ytv)<p,aiv, (2)
L x " ^ z ,v< 1 , (3)
= co? + s ,\ (4)
V N*. v
6 V+l)r — (5)
x*, y t\  Gh ^ 0 , and ztv > 0 .
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Finally, agents are required not to deplete their resources at the end of their 
lives and, in particular, (5) they are constrained to bequeath to the following 
generation at least as many resources as they inherited.
Let Ov(p, w) = {% solves MP} denote the set of individually optimal £v. 
Let OkT- •••> M/tr)’ *et or as a shorthand notation
E{DkT), denote the economy described by technology (A, L), subsistence
jcrv ; and likewise
for yt, zt, st, cot.
D e f in i t io n  1. A  reproducible solution (RS) for E(T2ki) is an intertemporal 
profile ip, w) of the price vector and an associated set of actions such that
(i) %v = (xv, y v, z v, s') e Ov(p, w), for all v,
(ii) (xt + y t) > A(xt + yt) + Nb + st, for all t = kT, ..., (k+\)T-l;
(iii) A(xt + yt) < cot, for all t = kT, ..., (k+1 )T-1;
(iv) Lyt = zt, for all t = kT ,..., (k+l)T-l;
(v) CO(k+\)T> (OkT-
Condition (i) requires that every agent be optimising; (ii) and (iii) 
require that in every period, there are enough resources for consumption and 
saving plans, and for production plans, respectively; (iv) requires the labour 
market to be in equilibrium in every period; (v) is the intertemporal 
reproducibility condition: every generation must leave to the following at 
least as many resources as they have inherited. By (ii) and (v), Roemer’s one- 
period reproducibility condition (Roemer, 1982a, Definition 2.1 .(ii), P-64) is
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significantly relaxed. In order to simplify the notation, let “for all f ' stand for 
“for all t, t = kT, . . (k + 1)7-1”.
D efinition  2. An interior reproducible solution (IRS) for E(f2ki) is a RS 
such that stv = 0 , for all v, t.
Let A v = 1 Avt . As in Roemer (1982a , 1988a ), in order to avoid
an excess of uninteresting technicalities, it is assumed that agents who are 
able to reproduce themselves without working use just the amount of wealth 
strictly necessary to reach subsistence and to satisfy the reproducibility 
constraint (v). In a subsistence economy, wealthy agents have no reason to 
accumulate or to consume more than b\ hence, by stating that they do not 
“waste” their capital, Assumption 3 endows them “with embryonic capitalist 
behavior” (Roemer, 1982a , p.65).
A ssu m pt io n  3: Let (p, w) be a RS for E{Qki)- If there is a tf' e  Ov(p, w) such 
that A v= 0, then agent v chooses y v, s vto minimise capital outlay.
In the remainder of this section some preliminary results of the static 
model are extended to the dynamic setting. First, at a RS the net revenues 
constraint (1 ) binds, for all agents, in every period t.
Lem m a  1. Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Qkj)- Then p t(I - A)xtv + \pt(I - A) —wt L]ytv 
+ wt z f  - p t b+p t s f  all t, v.
Proof Suppose p t(I - A)xtv +[pt(I - A ) -  wtL]ytv + wtztv > p tb + pp f ,  some t, v. 
If A v = 0, then it is possible to reduce capital outlay without destroying 
feasibility, thus contradicting Assumption 3. If A v > 0, two cases may
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occur. Case 1: Atv > 0. It is feasible to decrease either xtv or ztv, 
contradicting optimality. Case 2\ Atv = 0. Let r  = min {/| A /  > 0, (k + 
1 )T -  1 >j > t}. It is feasible to increase stv, with x f  = 0 and z f  = 0, all j, 
t  -  1 > j > t ,  making the net revenue constraint slack in r, and Case 1 
obtains. The proof of Case 2 with A /  >0 ,t>  t>  JcT, is similar. |
Next, wealth constraints (2) bind at all t, for all vwho work at a RS.
Lemma 2. Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Dkr) such that p t > ptA + wtL, all t. I f  A v > 
0 for all e  Ov(p, w), then ptA(xtv + y f)  = p tC0tV, all t.
Proof Suppose p tA(xty + yt < p tcof-, some t. Let A{ denote the z-th column of 
A and let Lt be the z'-th component of L. Then it is possible to choose a 
sector i  with p u  >  p tA i  +  w tL i  and increase y u  making the net revenue 
constraint slack in t. By Lemma 1, given that A v> 0, <£ Ov(p, w). |
The next results characterise RS’s with Nb + st > 0, all t. This condition 
is imposed only for analytical convenience and it implies no significant loss 
of generality: it can be interpreted as a condition on capital scarcity and at an 
IRS, it reduces to Nb > 0, which is true by assumption. Lemma 3 proves that 
in equilibrium, profits are nonnegative and the price vector is strictly positive 
at all t.
Lemma 3. Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Qif) such that Nb + st > 0, all t. Then, for 
all t, (i) p t >ptA + wtL, and (ii) wt >0 andpt »  O'.
Proof Part (i). As in (Roemer, 1982a , Lemma 2.2, p.6 6 ), for every period t.
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Part (ii). At every t, if wt = 0 then ztv = 0, all v, while by Lemma 1, at 
the solution to (MP), ytv > 0, for all v withp tGhv > 0, so that Lyt > zt = 0. 
Hence wt > 0 and the result follows since p t > wtL {I-A )'x »  O'. |
The profit rate of sector i at time t is defined as /zj* = \pt{I -  A) -  
wtL]i/ptAi, where \pt(I -A )  -  wtL\i is the i-th component of the vector \pt(I -  
A) -  wtL\ and At is the z-th column of A. In every t, let /z* = max, Tin be the 
maximal profit rate. The next result proves that at a RS, the profit rate is 
equalised across sectors, in all t.
P r o p o s it io n  1. Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Dkr) such that Nb +  st >  0, all t. 
Then Jtn = Tit, all U t, and p t = (1 + 7it)ptA + wtL, all t.
Proof First, notice that if (xv, y y, z y, s f  e Oy(p, w) then ( x y, y y , z y e 
Ov(p, w), whenever x y + y] =xty + yty and z y + Lx* = z f  + Lxty, all t. 
Thus, consider solutions of the form (0, y v , z v , s 1), and suppose that tcu 
< Tit, some z, t: for all t; e Oy(p, w), it must be y vit = 0 , all v, and thus 
y it = 0 , or else it would be possible to increase revenues, or to reduce 
capital outlay, by reducing y vit and increasing y vjt, where Tiit < %. 
However, by Assumption 1, if y it = 0 there can be no RS. Hence nit = 
Tit, all i, t, and the price equations follow from the definition of nit. |
Let X denote the 1 x n vector of labour values, X = L( I -  A)'1 »  O'. The 
next result derives aggregate activity levels and aggregate labour performed, 
both in every period t and during the lifetime of generation k.
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Propositio n  2. Let (p, w) be a RS for E(f2kr)- Then:
(i) xt +yt = ( I -A) '1 (Nb + st), all t;
(ii) At = Lxt + zt = N ib  + Ast, all t;
(Hi) E !!lr r"‘ (*. +y,) = ( I - A Y '  NTb ;
(iv) A = ' £ Ny_] A V = NTM>.
Proof Part (i)-(ii). See Roemer (1982a, Theorem 2.1, p.67). Part (iii)-(iv). 
Given Assumption 3, by optimality, cov{k+l)T = co[T and thus
Z( * + i ) r - i  v  n  11 ■„kT s, = 0 , a l l v . |
Two properties of a RS should be noted, which allow one to simplify 
the notation considerably. First, since at the solution to MP, cov{k+x)T = covkT, all
v, then if (p, w) is a RS for E(Dkif it is also a RS for £(/2^+i)r). Hence, (p, w)
can be interpreted as a stationary solution and in what follows the case k = 0
is considered without loss of generality. Second, let 1 = (1, ..., 1)': since at a 
RS wt > 0, all t, by Proposition 1, prices can be normalised choosing labour as 
the numeraire, setting wt = 1 , all t, and in what follows reproducible solutions 
of the form (p, 1 ) are considered without loss of generality.
4.3. EXPLOITATION
In order to analyse exploitation in the intertemporal context, first of all, 
it is necessary to extend the concept of Socially Necessary Labour Time.
Definition 3. Socially Necessary Labour Time in t is the amount o f  labour 
time that is needed by an agent to reproduce herself in t: SNLTt = Xb.
152
Aggregate Socially Necessary Labour Time in t is the amount of time that is 
needed by society to reproduce itself in t: ASNLTt = NAb. Similarly, 
considering whole lives, Socially Necessary Labour Time and Aggregate 
Socially Necessary Labour Time are defined, respectively, as SNLT = TAb 
and ASNLT= TNAb.
Thus, unlike in the static model, there are two different criteria to define 
an agent’s exploitation status, focusing on the amount of labour performed 
either in each period of her life, or during her whole life. Let
D efinition  4. Agent vis exploited within period t, or WPt exploited, if Atv > 
Ab; a WPt exploiter if Atv < Ab; and WPt exploitation-neutral if Atv = Ab. 
Similarly, agent vis exploited during her whole life, or WL exploited, if Av >
The WP and the WL definitions (as shown below, a similar distinction 
holds for classes) incorporate different normative concerns. An analysis 
based on the WL definition reflects the intuition that, from an individual's 
viewpoint, to be exploited in every period is certainly worse than being 
exploited only in some periods. However, the WL criterion leads to the rather 
counterintuitive conclusion that there would be no Marxist objection to 
“changing places capitalism,” i.e. to a capitalist economy in which 
exploitation, - no matter how significant and widespread, - existed in every
9  The WL definition encompasses the case with T infinite.. If T is finite, agent v  is WL 
exploited, if A v > TXb; a WL exploiter if A v < Tib; and WL exploitation-neutral if A v = TXb.
0; a WL exploiter if Av < 0; and WL exploitation-neutral if Ay = 0 .9
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period, but the agents’ status changed over time so as to equalise the amount 
of exploitation suffered by every individual. 10
Instead, the WP definition captures Marx’s idea that the existence of 
exploitation in the economy is morally relevant per se, and even a society 
with significant upward and downward social mobility is not necessarily just. 
Indeed, from a Marxian perspective, “we might want to consider exploitation 
as a property of the economy as a whole, not just of individuals” (Elster, 
1985, p. 176), and as a qualitative as well as a quantitative condition, so that 
society should not want anyone to be in a relationship of exploiter or 
exploited with respect to anyone else. Therefore, although both criteria 
convey normatively relevant information, and both are discussed below, the 
main conclusions of this chapter focus on the WP definition, 11 which seems 
also more natural in an intertemporal setting, since it gives the opportunity to 
analyse the dynamics of exploitation.
Proposition 3 derives labour expended by each vin every t.
Proposition 3. Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(Qq). Then Atv = max {0, \ptb + p ts f - 
KtPtGH*]}, all t, v.
Proof. Case 1: A v> 0 for all e Ov(p, 1). By Lemma 1, constraint (1) holds 
as an equality: by Proposition 1, it can be written as ntp tA{xf + y f)  +
10 A similar problem emerges in the context of intertemporal egalitarianism (see chapter 2).
11 These arguments apply to Roemer’s concept of exploitation as “a property of individuals 
or of whole economies, not primarily as a relation between individuals” (Elster, 1985, 
p. 173). If a “relational” definition is adopted, the theoretical importance o f WP exploitation 
is even clearer.
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(Lxtv + z f)  =ptb + ptStv, and by constraint (2), A f  - p tb + p ts f - ikPtGh > 
0, all t. Case 2\ there is a e Ov(p, 1) such that A y = 0. Then Atv = 0 
and, by Lemma 1, p tb + ptstv - Ttptcof < 0, all t. 1
12From Proposition 3, the following corollary is immediately derived.
C o r o l l a r y  1. Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E (I2q). Then Atv =  max{0, p t[b - 
Kt&oVi, aU U v.
Thus, if agents save, Roemer’s theory of exploitation based on asset 
inequalities does not seem immediately generalisable to the dynamic context.
In fact, given the linearity of MP and the optimality of = 0, all v, an
agent can be a WPt exploiter while being WPt+j exploited, j  * 0, depending on 
the dynamic paths of savings and wealth (and thus only indirectly on 
However, such changes in WP exploitation status do not necessarily convey 
any morally relevant information: the fact that in a non-interior RS a 
relatively wealthy agent might optimally work more than Xb in t, in order to 
accumulate more assets and minimise labour in future periods, does not seem 
to raise serious moral concerns. This point is more evident if one notes that
12 From Corollary 1 it follows thatp tb < 1, all t, is a sufficient condition for Lx,v + ztv < 1, for 
all v, t, to hold in an IRS. It is also necessary if there are agents with co^ v = 0.
13 Consider, as an illustration, a two-period economy. Take agent vwith W0y= (p0b -  Ab)/nb, 
who is exploitation-neutral in the static model: by Proposition 3 A0y = pos0y + Ab and A\ = 
p xb + p isxv - K\p\(D\v. Then, since s0 = - Si in the optimum, in a non-interior RS v’s WP 
exploitation status may change in the two periods. Indeed, there is a continuum of wealth 
values around WQy = (p0b -  Ab)/no, such that an agent’s WP exploitation status may change.
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by Proposition 2.(ii), if st * 0 then At * ASNLTt and there is no conceptual 
equivalence between WP exploitative and inegalitarian solutions: only in an 
IRS, if an agent works less than Ab, there must be another agent working 
more than Ab.14
As concerns interior RS’s, the next proposition proves a necessary 
condition for s f  = 0 , to be optimal, for all vand t.
P roposition  4. Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E(I2o)- Then p t = fK\ + ftt+\)Pt+i, all t.
Proof By Proposition 2, consider vsuch that A v > 0 for all t f  e O v( p ,  1), and 
take j  such that Aj+\v > 0. By Corollary 1, A f  = pjb - njpjcof > 0 and A f  
+ /3Aj+\v = pjb + fpj+\b - TijPjGxf - j37Tj+\pj+\OX)V. A necessary condition 
for cof = cof, all t, to be optimal is that there exists no £,v such that 
a)j+\v * cof', 0 <j < T - 2, o f v = cof, all t + 1, and A f v + j3Aj+\’v < 
AjV + PAj+\v. In particular, consider a one-period perturbation (s /y, 
Sj+iiV) of the putatively optimal o f  such that cq+ f v = ojqv + s f v, (Dj+fv = 
cof = 0Oj+\’v + sj+i ’v, and thus s f v = - sj+\’ Supposep y  + 7ij+\)py+u  
for some sector i. By Proposition 1:
A f v + fAj+x,v=(pj + /3pj+\)b + pjsf v- njPjCof' - fiq+ipj+i<9 + 1  ’v + Ppj+\Sj+\’v. 
or, A f v + fiAj+fv= A f  + PAj+f  + [pj - J3( 1 + nj+i)pj+i]sfv. Hence Sifv> 
0 yields A f v + pAj+\v < A f  + fiAj+f. And likewise if p y  > J3(l + 
Hj+\)Pij+\- |
14 This argument does not apply to the WL definition of exploitation: the existence of a 
general monotonic relationship between initial wealth and WL exploitation at a RS where 
agents save is an interesting issue for further research.
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In other words, if p it < /3(l + 7rt+\)pit+u some i, then by setting s tf  > 0 
and sit+\v = - sitv, A f  increases by PitStf, but At+ f decreases by a larger 
amount given by 7Zt+\pit+\Sif, due to the possibility of hiring more people, and 
by Pn+\Sit+\y, due to the decumulation of the additional resources. The 
opposite holds ifpu > 1 + 7Vt+\)pit+\ and in general, ifp t * f%l + 7Ct+\)pt+\ it is
not optimal to set s f  = 0 .
Let Wf = (ptb - Xb)lnt\ by Corollary 1, it is immediate to verify that at 
an IRS, W* is the level of wealth at t, associated with a working time of Atv = 
Xb for its possessor. The next result proves that at an IRS, the WL and WP 
definitions of exploitation are equivalent and it extends Roemer’s theory of 
exploitation based on the agents’ initial wealth Wov to the dynamic context. 
This suggests that the static model can be interpreted as a special case of the 
intertemporal model under the assumption that stv = 0 , all v.
P roposition  5. Let (p, 1 ) be an IR S  for E (Q o) with Jto > 0 .  Then Av >  0  and 
Atv > Xb, all t, i f  and only ifWov <Wo*;Av = 0  and Atv = Ab, all t, i f  and only 
i f  Wov = Wo*; and Av < 0  and A f  <Xb, all t, i f  and only i f  Wo > Wo.
Proof 1. For all t > 0, W f = W* is equivalent to jcJWf -  \pt(I -A )  - L](I-A)~ 
lb, or by Proposition 1, to p tayf = PtA(I -  A)'lb. By Proposition 4, the 
latter expression implies p t+\axf = p t+\A(I-  A)'lb, and therefore W f = 
Wt* implies Wt+\v = Wt+\ *, for all t. Similarly, by Proposition 4, W f > 
W f implies Wt+\v > Wt+f, for any v, p, and all t> 0.
2. By Corollary 1 and the strict monotonicity ofp t[b - T^ayf] in wealth, 
it follows that, for all t > 0, A f  > Xb if and only if W f < Wt*, A f  = Xb if
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and only if Wtv = W*, and Atv < Ab if and only if Wtv > Wt . Hence, by 
part 1 A qv > Ab implies Atv > Ab, all t > 0, and thus Av > 0. Conversely, 
if Av > 0, it must be Atv > Ab, for at least some t > 0. However, as just 
shown, WP exploitation status cannot change over time, and thus Atv > 
Ab, all t > 0. The other two cases are proved similarly.^
4.4. CLASSES
L e t j r ^  ; let r r ’ zV)\ ?
g Ov(p, w)} and rtv = {(x/v, ytv, z?)\ g  e Ov(p, w)}; and let (a\, a2, a3) be a 
vector where = {+, 0 }, i = 1 , 2 , and a3 = {+, 0 }, and "+" means a non-zero 
vector in the appropriate place. Since agents live for more than one period, 
there are two possible dynamic extensions of Roemer’s definition of class.
D e f in i t io n  5. Let (p, w) be a RS for E (Q ^ -  Agent v  is said to be a member 
of WP class (a.\, a2, a3) in t, if there is a £v e Ov(p, w) such that (xt 
has the form (a\, a2, a3) in t. Similarly, agent vis said to be a member of WL 
class (a\, a2, a3), if there is a % G Ov(p, w) such that QC, Yv, Z1) has the form 
(fli, a2, a3).
Although there are seven possible classes (a\, a2, a3) for each definition, 
the theoretical relevance of classes (+, +, +) and (0 , +, +) is rather unclear 
from a Marxian viewpoint. Instead, a more specific definition of the 
remaining five classes can be provided. According to the WL definition:
C1 = {v | r '  contains a solution (0, +,0)},
C2 = {v 11* contains a solution (+, +, 0), but not one of form (+, 0, 0)},
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C3 = { v 11* contains a solution (+, 0 , 0 )},
C4 = { v 11* contains a solution (+, 0, +), but not one of form (+, 0, 0)},
C5 = {v 1V ' contains a solution (0 , 0 , +)}•
WP classes C} to Ct5 are specified similarly, by replacing V ' with r tv.
As in Roemer (1982a, 1988a), agents belonging to classes C1 to C5 (C/ to 
C/5) are defined, respectively, WL (WP) big capitalists, small capitalists, petty 
bourgeois, semiproletarians, and proletarians. As a first step in the analysis 
of classes, Lemmas 4 and 5 extend a result of the static model.
Lem m a 4. Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(Qo). Let (xf, ytv, z f)  e rtv be such that v is 
a WP member o f (+, +, +) or (0, +, +) in t: i f  L y f > ztv then v e (+, +, 0), in t; 
i f  L y f  = ztv then v e (+, 0, 0), in t; and if  L y f  < z f  then v e (+, 0, +), in t.
Proof Let v’s solution be t; with (xtv, y tv, z f , s f)  in t. The rest of the proof is 
as in Roemer (1982a, Lemma 2.4, p.75), for every t, given sv. |
In other words, every WP member of (+, +, +) or (0, +, +) in t is also a 
WP member of either (+, 0, +), or (+, 0, 0), or (+, +, 0), in t. Therefore Ct to 
C,5 are sufficient to fully describe the WP class structure of the economy in t.
Lemma 5. Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(Qq). Then (i) i f  v is a WL member o f (+, +, 
0) then v is a WP member o f either (+, +, 0), or (+, 0, 0), or (0, +, 0), all t;
(ii) i f  v is a WL member o f (+, 0, +) then v is a WP member o f (+, 0, +) or (+, 
0, 0) or (0, 0, +), all t; (iii) v e C1 i f  and only i f  v e C/, all t, v e C3 i f  and 
only i f  v g  C,3, all t, and v e  C5 if  and only i f  v e  Ct5, all t.
Proof Straightforward, given Lemma 4, x f, y f  > 0, and z f  > 0. |
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Lemmas 4 and 5 highlight some limitations of Roemer’s definition of 
classes based on the net amount of labour performed by an agent. Consider, 
for instance, v such that A v > 0. By Lemma 1 and rearranging v’s net 
revenues constraint in t, it is not difficult to show, as in Section 4.3, that,
given the linearity of MP and the optimality of ~ 0, in a non-interior
RS, the sign of ztv -  L y f  and thus, by Lemma 4, WP class status can change 
over time, depending on dynamic paths of the price vector, optimal savings, 
and wealth. However, again, such change in WP class status does not 
necessarily reflect genuine inter-class mobility and may simply be the 
product of intertemporal labour trade-offs with little normative content.
As for the WL criterion, Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that in general the five 
WL classes are not exhaustive: agents whose WP class status switches, e.g., 
from Ct2 to C4 t+j, j  > 0, do not belong to any of C1 to C5 and form instead a 
WL class whose members have a solution (+, +, +), or (0, +, +) in I*. 
However, as already noted, the interpretation of the latter classes (a 
potentially large portion of the society) in Marxian terms is unclear, raising 
doubts on the WL criterion and, a fortiori, on Roemer’s definition of classes 
based on the net amount of labour performed.
Moreover, due to the crucial role of savings, there is no general relation 
between WP and WL classes and initial wealth. Thus, for instance, cof = 0 
does not necessarily imply xtv = y tv = 0, all t: agents remain WP proletarians
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after t = 0 only if p t > J3pt+i(l + nt+\)}5 If time is added, the element of lack of 
freedom (intended as a severely limited set of available options) that is 
important in Marx’s definition of a proletarian is lost. While in the static 
economy this element is incorporated by the initial conditions, in the 
intertemporal setting, o)qv represents a much weaker constraint on the agents’ 
sets of options and ty^is a choice variable.
As concerns IRS’s, Lemma 6  proves that the set of optimal activity 
levels xty + ytv does not change over time, for all v who work at the optimum.
Lem m a 6 . Let Aty(p, w) =  f(xtv + y y) s  9T\ t; e  Ov(p, w)}. Let (p, 1) be an 
IRS for E (Q q) . I f  A v > 0 for all t; e  Ov(p, 1), then Aty(p, 1) = At+ y(p, 1), all t.
Proof Consider constraint (2) in t and t + 1. By Proposition 4, the set of 
feasible x y + y f  is identical in / = t, t + 1. Moreover, since Ku = all i, 
t, every vector xty + y f  that exhausts Wty is part of an optimal solution, 
and the set of such vectors is identical in j  = t , t+  1 . 1
Given Lemma 6 , Proposition 6  can be derived, which generalises 
Roemer’s theory of classes to the dynamic context: at an IRS, WL and WP 
class structures coincide, both WP classes C/-C ,5 and WL classes Cl-C? are 
pairwise disjoint and exhaustive, and the correspondence between class and 
exploitation status (based on the agents’ initial wealth) holds for both the WL 
and the WP definitions of classes and exploitation.
15 Actually, they may be unable to save if p tb =  1, i.e. if the real wage is set at the subsistence 
level (this is a common interpretation of Marx’s theory of real wage determination).
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Proposition 6 . Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E(Qo) with no >0. Then (i) for all 1 < 
i <j < 5, Ct n  Ct = {0} and if  v e  Ct and p  e  Cj, then A f  > A f, all t; (ii) 
For all j, i f  v e  CJ then v e  Cj, all t, and v e  C; conversely, i f  v e  C  then v 
e  CJt all t; (iii) (Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle) I f  v e  Co1 u  
Co2, and thus v e  C1 u C 2, then Ay <0 and A f  <Xb, all t while i f  v e  Co4 u  
Co5, and thus v e C 4 u C 5, then Av >0 and A f  > Xb, all t.
Proof Part (i). As in Roemer (1982a, Theorem 2.5, p.74). In particular, in 
every t: if L y f > z f  all (xf, y f , zf )  e rf, then v e C 2\ if there is a (xf, 
y f ,  z f )  e rf such that L y f  — z f , then v e C,3; if L y f  < z f  all (xf, y f ,  zf)  
e rf, then v e  C f  Exactly one of these holds for every v £ C} u  Ct5. 
Part (ii). First, at an IRS, if v e  C 5 then v e Ct+\, all t, and therefore v 
e  C5. Conversely, v e  C5 implies v e  Ct5, all t. Next, ifp^oyf > (pob)/^ 
but p tayf < (ptb)l7Ct, some t, clearly stf = 0 cannot be optimal. Hence, if 
v e  Co1 then v e  Ct\  all t, and v e  C1. Conversely, v e C 1 implies v e  
Ctl, all t. Finally, consider v e  C{, j  = 2, 3, 4. By Lemma 1 and 
Proposition 4, in any two adjacent periods: 
z f - L y f = p t[b - ( I -A ) (x f  + yf)],
Zt+f - Lyt+\v=p t [b - (I-A)(xt+f + y t +f)]ip(l +
By Lemma 6 , if L y f  > z f  for all (xf, y f ,  z f)  e  rf then Lyt+\y > zt+\y for 
all (xt+ i y t+1y, z(+i 0 e F+\y. Similar arguments hold if L y f < z f  for all 
(xf, y f ,  zf)  e  rf, or if there is a (xf, y f ,  z f )  e rf such that L y f  = zf. 
Hence, by part (i), v e C{ implies v e Ct+\j, all t, and thus v e C.
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Conversely, suppose that v e C: since v e C{ implies v e Ct+\J, all t, 
and by Lemma 5, part (ii) is proved.
Part (Hi). By Proposition 5, A f  = Ab, all t, and Av = 0 if and only if W<f 
=  Wo*, while i f  Wov =  Wo*, by settingy o v =  ( I -  A)'lb, it is easy to verify 
that r o v contains a solution with Lyo — z f  so that by part (i), v e Co3. 
Next, since by part (i) Atv is monotonic in WPt class status, if v e Co1 u  
Co2 then Aqv < Ab, while if v e Co4 u  Co5 then Aqv > Ab. Then the result 
follows from part (ii) and Proposition 5. |
4.5. EXPLOITATION, ASSET INEQUALITY, AND TIME
Given Propositions 2, 5, and 6 , it is natural to focus on IRS’s in order to 
analyse the links between exploitation, class, and wealth in the intertemporal 
context. The next results characterise the conditions under which Roemer’s 
(1982a, 1988a) theory of exploitation can be extended to the intertemporal 
context, and at the same time highlight the conceptual links and differences 
between his definition of exploitation and neoclassical welfare inequalities.
Let 1/(1 + %) be the Frobenius eigenvalue of A: by Assumption 1 and 
the productivity of A, n > 0.
THEOREM 1. Assume 1 > p  >1/(1 + n ). Let n ’ = (1 - P)/P and let p  ’ denote 
the associated price vector. I fp t — p \ all t, and p ’b < 1 then for all v, s f  = 0 
all t, is optimal and ifT  is finite, then V(coov) = max {0, (1 - p r)[p ’bp/(l - P) - 
Wo]/p}t while ifT  —>co, then V(coov) = max {0 ,p’b/(l - p) - Wo/p}.
Proof 1. Suppose Wov>p ’bpi(\ - p). The vector such that s f  = 0, all t, and 
y t ~ y ’ all t, with n ’p ’A y’ =p ’b is optimal and A f  = 0, all t.
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2. Suppose W0v< p ’bp/( 1 - p), so that A v> 0 for all ^  e  Ov(p, 1). First, 
let us write MP using recursive dynamic optimisation theory. Let W c; 
Ftf be the state space with generic element a>. Let F. W —> Wbe the 
feasibility correspondence: ^cof)  describes the set of feasible values 
for the state next period, covt+x, if the current state is cof. Thus, =
{covt+x e  W: covt+1 > 0 andptcovt+x < 1 -p tb + p tcotv + ntp tcof\. Let IJ^oxf) = 
{of: covt+x e ^cof), all t, c o f  >  c o q \ and anf given} be the set of feasible 
sequences of. Let & = {(o)y, covt+x) e W  x W: covt+l e  ^cof)} be the 
graph of W. The one-period return function F : 0  —> $R+ at t is F(cofi 
covt+x) =ptb + pt(a>t+i " °^)  ■ fttPtGhv'- Then, MP can be written as
MP V(to>') = min 0\p,b +p,(co^ - eot') - n,p,o0\.
<wKen(fl>5)“ , ~u
If ptb - 7ttp tcof < 1, all t, then ^cof) * 0 ,  all cof e W. Then, since F  is 
continuous and bounded, MP is well defined for all T.16
2. Ifp t =p \  all t, thenp tb - ntp tcof < 1, all t, v, and MP becomes:
V M =  min Y '" ' f ip ’b + l f - ' p W - V + ^ p W .
fi /en (<0o) f-u
Therefore, for all T, any feasible o f  such that o f  = cof (or limr-**,^ = 
cof, if r ->• oo) is optimal and F(<aO immediately follows.
3. The last part of the statement is straightforward. |
Given Theorem 1, the next result characterises welfare inequalities and 
exploitation at an IRS, if agents discount future labour.
16 If T -> oo, then appropriate terminal condition is limj-^ oo cof > cof.
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THEOREM 2. Let 1 >p  Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E(Q0) with nt = (1 - P)/p, all 
t. Then (i) for all v and p, i f  WoM < p’bp/(l - p) then V(coov) < V(ayf) i f  and 
only i fW o >  WoM. Moreover, (ii) for all v, there is a constant number kv such 
that A f  - Xb = kv, all t.
Proof Part (i). The result follows from Theorem 1, since F ^ 1) = 0 if and 
only i f  W0v>p ’b/n\ while if V(<a>y) > 0 then V(ax>') - VfoxP) = (1 - f )  
[W,/  - lfo7A  if T  is finite, while = [WoA - WoVP, if T
—> OO.
Part (ii). Straightforward, given Corollary l . |
Theorems 1 and 2 complete the intertemporal generalisation of
17 * •Roemer* s theory of exploitation: the dynamic economy with discountmg 
displays exactly the same pattern of WP and WL exploitation as the T-fold 
repetition of the static economy, and both WP and WL exploitation are 
persistent. Furthermore, unlike in the static model, the introduction of time 
preference clarifies - at the WL level - the difference between Roemer’s 
interpretation of Marxian exploitation as an objectivist measure of 
inequalities -  “the exploitation-welfare criterion” (Roemer, 1982a , p.75) -  
and subjectivist neoclassical welfare inequalities, which instead depend on p. 
Theorems 1 and 2 prove that the two perspectives coincide at an IRS; yet, 
they show that in principle they are conceptually distinct.
However, the previous results crucially depend on the assumption that P 
< 1. By Propositions 1 and 4, if p  = 1, the only constant price vector that
17 Together with Theorem A.l in the appendix, which proves the existence of the IRS.
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satisfies the condition in Proposition 4 is the labour values vector, leading to 
an egalitarian and non-exploitative -  according to Roemer*s definition -  IRS. 
This is quite unsatisfactory: first, the moral relevance of pure time preference 
is far from being widely accepted, even in non-Marxian approaches (e.g., 
Sidgwick, 1907; Ramsey, 1928; Rawls, 1971), and a theory of persistent 
inequalities that crucially depends on time preference seems objectionable. 
This is particularly relevant in this model since, by Theorems 1 and 2 not 
only the persistence of exploitation and inequalities, but also, ceteris paribus, 
their magnitude depend on time preference. Given the positive ceteris 
paribus relation between the profit rate and inequalities-exploitation, the 
higher /?, the lower the profit rate in the RS with constant prices, and thus the 
lower exploitation, ceteris paribus.
Second, and more important, although the above results highlight the 
conceptual links with the neoclassical analysis of welfare inequalities, 
Roemer’s theory is intended to be an interpretation and generalisation of 
Marx’s theory of exploitation. Arguably, time preference plays no essential 
role in the latter and thus an explanation of persistent exploitation based on 
exogenous time preference is far from Marx’s.
Theorem 3 describes the dynamics of profits, labour performed, and the 
net labour supply at an IRS of an economy with no discounting.
THEOREM 3. Let f i —1. Let (p, 1) be an LRS for E(Qq)  with tzq >0. Then (i) 
Tit > ftt+u cdl t. Moreover, for all vsuch that A f > 0, all e Ov(p, 1), at all t:
(ii) i f  Wtv < Wf then A f  > A ^  v, i f  W f = W* then A f  = At+X \  and if  W f > Wf 
then A f  < At+\v;
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(iii) for all x vt + y vt e  Atv(p, 1) and all x vt+x + y vt+x = x( + y f  at the solution to
MP: i f z f  - L y f  > 0 then z f  - L y f >zt+iv- Lyt+;v; i f  z f  - L y f  = 0 then z f  - L y f  
= zt+1y - Lyt+1v; i f  z f  - L y f < 0 then z f  - L y f  < zt+\v - Lyt+\v.
Proof Part (i). The result follows since by Proposition \ , p t is a continuous, 
strictly increasing function of nt, all t, while by Proposition 4,pt »  p t+\. 
Part (ii). By Proposition 5, if W f = Wf then A f  = At+\ -  Ab, all t. By 
Corollary 1, At+\v- A f =  (pt+i -p t)b + {npt - ^ p ^ a x f , or, At+\v- A f  = 
(pt+ i - Pt)b + [nt - 7Tt+\l{l + ftt+fflptoyf- Therefore the result follows from 
part (/) and the monotonicity of the right hand side of the latter 
expression in Wf.
Part (iii). Straightforward from Lemma 6  and Proposition 4. |
Theorem 3 is rather counterintuitive, at least in a Marxian framework. 
In the equilibrium that preserves the class and exploitation structure of the 
competitive economy, profits (Theorem 3.(z')) and WP exploitation (Theorem
3.(zz')) decrease over time: WP exploiters work more, while WP exploited 
agents work less, even if neither accumulates. The simple possibility of 
saving implies a decrease in the dispersion of agents’ labour times around Ab, 
due to the decrease in profits. Similarly, given Roemer’s definition of class in 
terms of the net amount of labour performed, and given that the result holds 
for every {xf + y f)  e Af(p, w), Theorem 3 .{iii) can be interpreted as showing 
a tendential decrease in the dispersion around the WP middle classes, 
regardless of the specific intertemporal path {x f + y f } t = o,..., r - 1- The next
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result analyses the long-run behaviour of prices and profits, and the 
persistence of exploitation, classes, and asset inequalities.
THEOREM 4. Let T -> oo. Let (p, 1) be an LRS for E(Qq)  with 7to> 0. I f  P  = 1:
(i) p t —> X and 7% —> 0, as t —> oo;
(ii) C1 = {0} and Ct} — {0}, all t. Furthermore, for all 2 <j < 5, i f  v e  C j 
then v e  C{, as t —> oo;
(iii) A f  -> Xb and W f —> Xoyf, all v, as t —> oo.
Proof Part (i). By Propositions 1 and 4, it follows that p t+\ =ptA + L, which 
implies p t = \po- L[ I -  AY^A* + L [I -  A]'1 so that by Assumption 1 and 
the productivity of A, p t —> A, and by Proposition 1, 7tt -> 0 , as t —» oo. 
Part (ii). First, at an IRS if A f =  0  then p tQxf >  (ptb)/7%, all t. Hence, by 
part (0, C1 = {0} and by Proposition 6 , C/ = {0}, all t. Second, if v e 
Co5 then v e Ct5, as t —> oo. Third, consider v e Co2: if zqv < Lyo all (jco^  
+ y f )  g  Aoip , 1 ), then, as t -> oo, by Lemma 6 , lim^oo z f  - L y f  < 0 , all 
(x f  + y f )  e Af(p , 1) and v e C 2, as t -» oo. A similar argument holds if 
zo > Lyo , all (xov + yo*) e Aov(p, 1), or if there is a solution in To*' such 
that Lyo — zo> Hence, the result follows as in Proposition 6.(i).
Part (iii). Straightforward, from part (i), part (ii), and Corollary l . |
Thus, at an IRS, if T  -> oo, profits and WP exploitation decrease over 
time and disappear in the long run. The WP class structure tends to become, 
loosely speaking, more just, due to the decrease in the dispersion of WP 
classes around the petty bourgeois (Theorem 3.(iii)) and to the absence of big 
capitalists (Theorem 4.(//))• However, there is no full convergence and wealth
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inequalities and classes persist. Thus, in the limit, the Class-Exploitation 
Correspondence Principle, the “most important analytical result” (Roemer, 
1982a , p. 15) of the subsistence economy ceases to hold within periods.
These results have several methodological implications. In the static 
models two assumptions hold: (a) incomplete markets (namely, the 
impossibility of intertemporal trade between agents), as in Assumption 2; and 
(b) the impossibility of savings, unlike in Assumption 2. By proving that it is 
sufficient to drop (b) to make WP exploitation transitory (thus suggesting a 
sort of paradoxical Marxist justification for laissez-faire policies), Theorem 4 
shows that Roemer’s models do not provide robust microfoundations to 
persistent exploitation and thus they may be unsuitable to formalise Marx’s 
concept of exploitation as an inherent feature of a capitalist economy.
More generally, the results presented suggest that Roemer’s claim that 
“the neoclassical model of a competitive economy is not a bad place for 
Marxists to start their study of idealized capitalism” (Roemer, 1986c, p. 192) 
should at least be qualified. In particular, although the model does not 
exhaust the possibilities for modelling Marxian concepts in a Walrasian 
framework, it seems legitimate to say that the results raise the methodological 
issue of the possibility of providing robust and theoretically convincing 
microfoundations by means of “standard general equilibrium models” (ibid., 
p. 193). Theorems 3 and 4 imply that Roemer’s static models do not provide 
convincing support to this claim, since the main results depend crucially on 
both (a) and (b), which represent substantial departures from a Walrasian 
framework. Moreover, (b) is extremely restrictive and does not seem
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theoretically salient, since it is not implied by the subsistence hypothesis and 
it captures no feature of Marx’s theory. On the contrary, in a subsistence 
economy, too, savings are essential to analyse the persistence of exploitation 
and classes and the dynamics of inter-class mobility. Theorem 4 proves that it 
is sufficient to drop (b), the most restrictive assumption, to make WP 
exploitation transitory, even though the economy is still far from the 
Walrasian benchmark, due to the significant market incompleteness 
incorporated in Assumption 2.
From a substantive viewpoint, Theorem 4 shows that WP exploitation 
tends to disappear even if wealth inequalities remain an inherent equilibrium 
feature of the economy and, unlike in accumulation models (Devine and 
Dymsky, 1991), capital scarcity, - whether defined in physical or in economic 
terms (e.g., as the requirement that “the total supply of productive assets is 
limited, relative to current demand” (Skillman, 2001, p.l, fii.l)) - persists. At 
a RS where no agent accumulates and capital scarcity persists, DOPA is 
necessary to generate exploitation, but it is not sufficient for the latter to 
persist. This provides a formal proof of Cohen’s claim that “the asset 
distribution is unjust because it enables or makes possible an unjust flow” 
(Cohen, 1995, p.207), but it does not necessitate such flow. Thus, the 
persistence of inequalities in the ownership of productive assets is not a 
sufficient statistic of the unfairness of the labour/capital relations (and more 
generally, of the society) from a Marxist perspective.
Theorem 4 provides strong support to the argument that asset 
inequalities are “a normatively secondary (though causally primary) wrong”
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(Cohen, 1995, p. 199). In fact, if, as in Roemer’s theory, productive assets are 
important only because of their role in production (e.g., no satisfaction results 
from ownership per se), in order to maintain that DOPA is normatively 
primary it must be proved that DOPA and exploitation are equivalent. 
However, even adopting Roemer’s arguably narrow interpretation of Marxian
1R ■exploitation as reflecting a specific kind of welfare inequalities, DOPA is 
not necessary and sufficient to generate persistent exploitation, even if capital 
scarcity persists, and thus an emphasis on inequalities in the ownership of 
productive assets while exploitation disappears seems misplaced.
It should be noted, however, that even if p=  1, WL exploitation does not 
disappear, which may be a sufficient reason for policies aimed at removing 
DOPA. If the condition in Proposition 4 holds, the monotonic relationship 
between initial wealth and WL exploitation status is preserved. Thus, from a 
mathematical viewpoint, the model might be interpreted as providing a 
generalisation of Roemer’s theory of exploitation under the WL definition.
However, this does not affect the main conclusions of the chapter. First, 
given the theoretical relevance of the WP definition discussed above, 
Marxian exploitation should arguably be microfounded as a persistent WP 
phenomenon. Second, the tendential disappearance of WP exploitation is not 
only disturbing per se for a model that aims to provide microfoundations to 
Marx’s theory; it also implies that - due to the simple possibility of savings 
and as a result of the inherent mechanisms of the competitive economy, -
18 See, e.g. Cohen (1995, chapter 8) for a broader definition and a thorough discussion.
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ceteris paribus, WL exploitation, too, is lower in the dynamic model with 
agents living for T periods than in the 7-fold iteration of the static model.
Let Es(L2o) be the static counterpart of E(I2q), with the same technology, 
agents, subsistence vector, and asset distribution. Let p s, and the associated 
ns, be a RS for Es(Qf)\ let Asv(ps) be the labour expended by v in EfQf)  at 
(pSy 1). Theorem 1 (together with Theorem A.l in Appendix A.1) can be read 
as identifying the value of p  that makes p t = ps, all t, an IRS of the dynamic 
economy such that E{Dq) corresponds to the 7-fold iteration of Es(I2q), 
whereby nt = (1 - p)tp  = ns and Atv = Asv(ps), all t. However, if p  -  1 this is 
no longer true: WL exploitation is lower in E(I2f) than in the 7-fold iteration 
of Es(f2o), as shown by Corollary 2, which directly follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. Let p  — 1. Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E(Qq) with no = ns. I f  Wo < 
Wo then A f  <Af(ps), all t; ifW0v = W f  then A f  = A f(ps), all t; i f  W f > Wf 
then A f  >Af(ps), all t. I f  ns > 0, the inequalities are strict for all t >0.
Finally, it is worth noting that the model is still far from the Walrasian 
benchmark and, e.g., the introduction of intertemporal credit markets would 
likely strengthen the results. Skillman (1995, 2001) suggests that a Walrasian 
model including exogenous growth in the labour force, heterogeneous saving 
preferences (e.g. different time preferences), and/or labour-saving technical 
progress might provide microfoundations to persistent exploitation. Although 
this is an interesting line for further research, the main conclusions of this 
chapter would not change. It would remain true that DOPA and competitive 
markets are not sufficient to yield persistent WP exploitation, while arguably,
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as noted by Roemer himself (e.g., Roemer, 1988a , p.6 ), an explanation of 
persistent exploitation critically relying on such exogenous factors (whose 
analytical and theoretical relevance in a subsistence economy is not obvious) 
would be hardly distinguishable from the neoclassical account of inequalities, 
and its normative relevance in a Marxian perspective would be unclear.
4.6. CONCLUSION
In this chapter an intertemporal model of a subsistence economy is set 
up to analyse exploitation and class formation in a dynamic context, to 
evaluate the causal and moral relevance of Differential Ownership o f 
(Scarce) Productive Assets, and to assess the possibility of providing 
neoclassical microfoundations to Marxian models. It is proved that if agents 
save in equilibrium, Roemer’s (1982a , 1986a , 1988a) definitions of 
exploitation and class do not necessarily convey morally relevant 
information, and there is no clear-cut relation between agents’ initial wealth 
and their class and exploitation status.
In the equilibrium in which agents do not save, Roemer’s theory of 
exploitation and classes can be extended to the intertemporal setting and in an 
economy with positive time preference, exploitation and classes are proved to 
be persistent. However, the normative and theoretical relevance of time 
preference is questioned and, absent time preference, it is proved that while 
asset inequalities and classes are persistent features of the economy, WP 
exploitation decreases over time and disappears in the long run. Hence, asset 
inequalities are proved to be normatively secondary, though causally primary 
in explaining exploitation and the normative relevance of asset inequalities
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per se is put into question. Moreover, Roemer’s definition of class based on 
the net amount of labour performed is questioned, and several doubts are 
raised on the possibility of providing robust microfoundations to Marx’s 
concepts by means of Walrasian models.
These results suggest two main lines for further research. One concerns 
the appropriate interpretation of exploitation and in particular the choice 
between a surplus value definition and Roemer’s property rights definition. 
“The legitimacy of Roemer’s reformulation depends in large part on the 
validity of his claims concerning the role of DOPA in capitalist exploitation” 
(Skillman, 1995, p.311). However, since DOPA is proved to be necessary but 
not sufficient to generate persistent Marxian exploitation, even if no agent 
accumulates, Roemer’s game-theoretic definition should be seen as 
incorporating a different moral concern, rather than as a generalisation of 
Marx’s definition based on surplus value. More generally, the question arises 
whether DOPA should be a basic moral concern, both in itself and in a theory 
of exploitation, or rather a different role of DOPA should be stressed as a 
causally primary, but normatively secondary wrong.
Secondly, given the limitations general equilibrium models, it might be 
opportune to explore alternative approaches to model exploitation and classes 
in a Marxian perspective. The above analysis suggests that the property 
rights theory o f the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) 
may provide a promising analytical and theoretical framework to analyse 
Marxian exploitation, given its concern with power and the emphasis on the 
role of physical assets in explaining hierarchical relations and the existence of
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firms. Thus, although the dynamic implications of these models are yet to be 
fully explored, especially as concerns capital accumulation, the property 
rights approach might provide a framework to model exploitation consistent 
with the idea that asset inequalities are causally primary, but normatively 
secondary, in the explanation of exploitative relations and low wages, given 
various sources of contractual incompleteness (e.g., Marx’s labour/labour- 
power distinction).
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APPENDIX 4.1: EXISTENCE OF A REPRODUCIBLE SOLUTION
Due to the linearity of MP, it is difficult to derive general conditions for 
the existence of a RS if p t * 1 + ftt+i)Pt+i, some t, since all agents (except,
possibly, big capitalists and proletarians) tend to change their labour supply 
in the same direction, so that the existence of a RS may depend on ad hoc 
restrictions on S2q. This appendix proves the existence of RS’s with p t = fK\ + 
7Tt+\)pt+\i all t. Although only IRS’s are considered, given their theoretical 
relevance, similar arguments hold for RS’s with stv * 0, some t, v.
With regard to IRS’s, let co* = A(I -  A)'lNb: co* is the minimum 
aggregate amount of initial endowments necessary for a RS to exist. In the 
static subsistence economy, if coo ~ &>*; a continuum of equilibria exist, while 
if coq > co* only isolated solutions emerge (Roemer, 1982a , Corollary 3.8 and 
Theorem 3.9, pp. 100-1). Roemer argues that the former is a singular case 
arising from a particular combination of parameter values. However, in the 
intertemporal context, coo = co* is arguably the theoretically relevant case: if 
the RS is interpreted as a steady state, as in Roemer (1982a , 1988a), then 
given the subsistence assumption, it is natural to assume that total capital in 
the economy has converged to the amount just necessary for reproduction. 
Furthermore, the assumption coo = co* incorporates the strongest form of 
capital scarcity. Hence, although Theorem A.l can be extended to the case coo 
> co*, if p  < 1, the existence of an IRS is here analysed assuming coo = co*.
Let 1/(1 + if ) be the Frobenius eigenvalue of A. Lemma A.l states that 
if parts (/), (ii), and (v) of Definition 1 are satisfied, so are parts (iii) and (zv).
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Lemma A .l: Let coo = co*. Let (p, 1) be such that 7% £ D = [0, n), all t. Let 
^  e  Ov(p, 1) be such that stv = 0, all t, v, and xt + yt = (I - A^Nb, all t. Then 
(p, 1) is an IRS for E(Qq).
Proof First, xt + y t = (I - A)~]Nb, all t, implies A(xt + yt) = A(I - A)'1^  = co*, 
all t, and p t(I- A)(xt +yt) = Nptb, all t. Moreover, given g  Ov(p, 1), all 
v, by summing the agents’ constraints (1), it follows that zt - Lyt = 0. |
Lemma A.2 identifies a relevant interval of profit rate values.
Lemma A.2: Let Xb < 1. There is a n m >0 such that for all n  e  [0, n m]  cD , 
0 <pb - 7q)COov <1, all v.
Proof Let p v(rt) = pb - Tipcof. By Proposition 1, p v{7i) is a continuous 
function and p v(0) = Zb, all v. Since 0 < Zb < 1, there is a largest 
interval [0 , n m\ such that if n  g [0 , n m] then 0  < p\ri) < 1 , all
Let Osy(p, 1) = {g  > 0| stv = 0, L x f  + ztv=ptb - nptcyf, andp tA(xtv + yt1) 
= p tcoov, all t}. Let J3< 1. By Theorem 1, if ^  = n ’ = (1 - all t, and 0 < 
p ’b - u p ’coov< 1, all v, then Osy(p, 1) c  Oy(p, 1), all v. Lemma A.3 proves a 
similar result under the assumption p  = 1 .
Lemma A.3: Let p  = 1. Let (p, 1) be such that 0 <p tb - nptcof < 1, all t, v, 
andpt = (1 + 7it+])pt+j, all t. Then Osv(p, 1) ciO v(p, 1), all v.
Proof 1. If nt = 0, all t, both premises of the Lemma are satisfied and the 
result immediately follows.
2. Let /zo > 0. Since 0 < p tb - 7rtptCOov < 1, all t, then A f  = p tb + p ts f - 
7ttptc o fand p tA{xtv + y f)  =ptcotv all t. Hence, as in Theorem 1, MP can
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be written as Viojo1)  = min 1 p tb + Pt-\Q>t - (1 +nb)poa>ov, and s f
a veU(a^ ) ^ lt=0
= 0 , all t, is indeed feasible and optimal.^
Let n m be defined as in Lemma A.2. Theorem A.1 proves the existence 
of the IRS’s analysed in this chapter.
THEOREM A.l: Let coo = co* andXb <1.
1. I f  1 > P > 1/(1 + n m), then the vector (p, 1) with 7% = n ’ = (1 - P)/p, all t, is 
an IRS for E(I2q).
2. I f  p  = 1, then for all po such that no e  [0, tF], the vector (p, 1) determined 
by p t — (1 + Xt+i)Pt+i, all t, is an IRS for E(Qo).
Proof Part (i). Since both premises of Lemma A.3 hold, consider £  e Osv(p, 
1), all v. summing over v, p tA(xt +yt) = p to f  = pA{I - A)'1 Nb, all t. Then 
consider £ 'v, constructed as follows: at all t, partition (7 - A)'lNb into 
{x’f  + y \ v} such that L x’f  + z \ v = ptb - 7%ptcoov, x \ v + y \ v > 0, and 
p tA (x\v + y  ’t*) =ptA (I- A)']Nb, all v. Since £,v e Osv(p, 1) andx \ + y \ =  
(7- A J lNb, all t, the result follows from Lemma A.l.
Part (ii). Consider any po such that no e [0, tF \  If no e [0, tF\ and pt = 
p t+ i(l + nt+i) then by Proposition 1 and Theorem 3.(0 it follows that ^  
e [0, /F], all t. Then, by Lemma A.3, consider e Osv(p, 1), all v. the 
rest of the proof is as in part (i). |
178
APPENDIX 4.2. GAME THEORY AND EXPLOITATION
This Appendix analyses Roemer’s (1982a) game-theoretical approach 
to exploitation. According to Roemer (1982a, pp. 194-195), a coalition /  
which is part of a larger society N  is exploited if and only if three conditions 
hold: (1 ) there is an hypothetically feasible alternative in which /  would be 
better off than in its present situation; (2 ) under this alternative, the 
complement to J, the coalition N -  / =  / ' ,  would be worse than at present; (3) 
J ’ is in a relation of dominance to /.
Conditions (l)-(3) are fairly general and are meant to capture various 
kinds of exploitation, including Marxian exploitation, by specifying different 
hypothetically feasible alternatives - more precisely, different withdrawal 
rules. Let {F1, ..., F^} describe the agents’ payoffs at the existing allocation: 
in Roemer’s game-theoretical framework, it is natural to consider {F1, ..., 
F^} as WL values. Thus, for instance, at an RS for F1 = - F ^ 1), ...,
F^= - F(<£t>N). Next, let P(N) denote the power set of A and let K : P(N) -» $R+ 
be a characteristic function which assigns to every coalition /  of agents in the 
economy an aggregate payoff K(J) in the case it withdraws.
D efinition  A.l. Coalition /  is exploited at allocation {F1, ..., F^} with 
respect to alternative K  if and only if / '  is in a relation of dominance to /  and
2 L ,  r<K{J) ,  (A.l)
VV>K{J’). (A.2)
Three points should be noted about Definition A.l. First, by (A.l) it 
implicitly requires that it be possible for /  to distribute K(J) to all its
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members so that Vv < K v, all v e J. Second, formally, there is a relation 
between Definition A.l and the core of an economy: under fairly general 
conditions, the set of nonexploitative allocations coincides with the core of 
the game described by AT (ibid., Theorem 7.1, p.198).
Third, the precise definition of exploitation depends on the specific 
function K  chosen to identify the hypothetical alternative to the existing 
allocation: different functions K  define different concepts of exploitation. 
Thus, a coalition is feudally exploited at a given allocation if it can improve 
by withdrawing from society with its own endowments and arranging 
production on its own. If E{Dq) is considered - no explicit model of a feudal 
economy is provided here, - feudally nonexploitative allocations coincide 
with the private ownership core, which can be formally defined as follows 
(ibid., pp.45-49). First of all, a coalition J  is viable if it has enough assets to 
reproduce itself if it secedes from the parent economy. 19
D efinitio n  A.2. Let N  be the set of producers. Let J c z N  be any subset of N. 
Coalition/is viable if o -  JA(I-  A)'1 b.
A reproducible allocation is a set of (not necessarily optimal) actions of 
all agents in E{£2q), that satisfy the feasibility and reproducibility constraints.
D efin itio n  A.3. A reproducible allocation (RA) for E(Qq) is a set of actions 
= (xv, y v, z v, s*), for all v, such that
(i) L x f  + ztv < 1 , all v, t\
19 With a slight abuse of notation, the same symbols are used here to denote both the sets J  
and N  and their cardinalities J  and N.
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(ii) A(xt + yt) < cch, all t\
(iii) (xt + yt) > A(xt +yt) + Nb + st, all t;
(iv) (Dt+\ = ah + st, all t;
(v) a>r > coq.
Let v=i . . .be a RA. A viable coalition J  can block {%v} v=\,...y if
there is a reproducible allocation {g’\  ..., <^Jj for the smaller economy that 
yields higher welfare to its members.
D efinition  A.4. A viable coalition J  can block a RA {£v} if there is a
vector {£a, ..., gJ} such that
ft) . for all v s  J;
(iii) (I  - A) Y ,v,j x,v = Jb+ Y jviJ S‘V’ 111
(™)
<v> ^
The private ownership core of E(E2q) is the set of RA’s which no 
coalition can block.
D efinition  A.5. A RA is in the private ownership core of E(Qq) if and only if 
no coalition can block it.
The characteristic function K  that defines feudal exploitation is the one 
associated to the private ownership core, “which defines the payoff to the 
coalition J  as what it could achieve by cooperative arrangements on its own,
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availing itself of the private endowments of its members” (ibid., p.219). The 
next theorem proves the absence of feudal exploitation in E(T2q).
THEOREM A.2: Let p  < 1. The IRS’s o f E(f2o) He in its private ownership 
core and thus display no feudal exploitation.
Proof 1. If nt = 0, all t, then the result is trivial. Hence, assume tiq > 0.
2. Suppose that there is a coalition J  that can block the IRS. By 
Definition A.4.(z), no pure capitalist can be part of J ; thus, by Lemmas 1 
- 2 and Corollary 1, at an IRS ntp tGxf = ptb - Atv, all t and all v e J.
Summing over v e J  and t, ^ T~1q = 2T=o P tjPJ> '  
P'Yuvzj A‘V> where by Proposition 4, 0XtPtYuv,j  =
[(1 + 7lo)po — P^^PT-l] °*>V-
3. If J  can block the IRS, pre-multiplying Definition A A.(iii), by 0X 
and summing over t, = S=o' +
ELo P XL y , j  S,V- By Definition A.4.(i) and part 2: -
4. If J  can block the IRS, by Definition A.4.(ii)-(iu), A (I - A)A(Jb + 
^  s f)  < cof, all t; pre-multiplying both sides of the latter
expression by P ^p t  and using Proposition 1, p l(pt - X)Jb - 0 X ^  stv
< P m 'L v . j  80 - 0 P t ^  j  stv-> all t. Summing over t and using
Definition A.4.(zv), the latter expression becomes 0  (pt - X)Jb -
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Z£ f a 'L *  ^  K-o +
Then, using f t  1 + 7rt+i)pt+i = p h all t, ^ =‘! 0(p t - X)Jb -
r :  sr^o+^poEve, ^
5. The latter inequality and the inequality in part 3 can both hold only if
Z„ej Mr < j °X)V' However, this is impossible,
givenp T-\ »  O' and Definition A.4.(v). |
In the context of Roemer’s interpretation of historical materialism, 
which predicts the progressive disappearance of various forms of exploitation 
(see Section 1.2.4), Theorem A.2 proves that capitalist relations of production 
eliminate feudal exploitation in E(I2o). However, a different specification of 
K is necessary to define capitalist exploitation. Let coq = (J/N)coo; coq is 
coalition J ’s per-capita share of aggregate initial assets. Clearly, given the 
assumptions on the technology all coalitions are viable if they withdraw with 
(OqE. Then, a coalition can communally block a RA if it can increase the 
welfare of its members by withdrawing with cooE.
D e f i n i t i o n  A.6 . A c o a l it io n  J  c a n  communally block a RA t; i f  th e re  is  a  
v e c to r  { g ’1, . . . ,  g J } su c h  that
(i) . for all v s  J;
A Y .v.j  X‘V^  ^  all t\
20 It also clarifies the neoclassical claim concerning the absence of exploitation in a 
competitive economy: there is no feudal exploitation (Roemer, 1982a, pp.205-8).
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(iii) x,v = Jb+ •»<’'»a llt;
(”) I„X.=2L®r+L.X>a11';
m  Zv«/ °>t' '-  ^ £-
The communal core of E(I2q) consists of the set of reproducible 
allocations which no coalition can communally block.
D efinitio n  A.7. A reproducible allocation t; is in the communal core of 
E{jQj) if and only if no coalition can communally block it.
A coalition is capitalistically exploited if it can communally block the 
allocation and an allocation is capitalist nonexploitative if it lies in the 
communal core of the economy. The next theorem proves that Marxian 
exploitation and capitalist exploitation coincide in E(£2q) at an IRS.
THEOREM A.3: Let p  <1. At an IRS, a coalition is WL Marxian exploited if  
and only i f  it is capitalistically exploited.
Proof If a coalition J  is Marxian exploited, e ;;: c l , a ; - JXb) > 0. But
then by Proposition 5, at an IRS 0C ^JveJ^ vt ~ J^b) > 0> and /  can 
communally block the allocation. The converse is proved similarly. |
184
CHAPTER 5. ACCUMULATION, INEQUALITY, 
AND EXPLOITATION
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter 4, a dynamic extension of Roemer’s (1982a) subsistence 
economy with labour-minimising agents is set up to analyse the substantive 
claim that DOPA “and competitive markets are sufficient institutions to 
generate an exploitation phenomenon, under the simplest possible 
assumptions” (Roemer, 1982a , p.43); and the methodological claim that 
robust microfoundations to Marxian economics can be provided by means of 
Walrasian general equilibrium models. The main results raise doubts on both 
claims by proving that it is sufficient to allow agents to save to make 
exploitation transitory, while asset inequalities persist in equilibrium.
This chapter extends the analysis of the dynamics of exploitation, 
inequality, and classes to economies with maximising agents and capital 
accumulation. Although the logical core of Roemer’s theory is properly 
evaluated in subsistence economies, the study of accumulation economies 
strengthens the main methodological and substantive conclusions of chapter 
4: by assuming a more simplified class structure, the tendential disappearance 
of exploitation, together with the persistence of DOPA and classes, is proved 
to be a general equilibrium feature of a larger class of economies.
More importantly, a thorough analysis of the dynamics of exploitation 
and inequalities in capitalist economies arguably requires a proper treatment 
of accumulation. Indeed, despite the lack of a formal analysis of capital
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scarcity, Roemer’s results depend on differential ownership of scarce 
productive assets. In the accumulating economy with a Leontief technology 
(Roemer, 1982a , chapter 4), exploitation persists only if agents consume all 
net revenues: even if the economy is in equilibrium with positive profits in a 
period, accumulation would drive profits to zero in the next period. This 
knife-edge property derives “from the stark specification of the model” (ibid., 
p. 1 2 0 ), but it is unclear whether labour-constrained equilibria, with profits 
falling to zero, are a general property of Roemer’s accumulating economies. 
Devine and Dymski (1991) show that if the “static model is allowed to run 
for many periods, the accumulation of capital will eventually drive the profits 
to zero” (Roemer, 1992, p. 150). However, as noted by Roemer, “this hardly 
requires a response. Constructing a model of capitalism that would reveal its 
essentially dynamic features is a different task from what mine was” (ibid.). 
The T-fold iteration of a static model is not necessarily a satisfactory way of 
modelling a dynamic economy with intertemporal decisions.
In this chapter, a fully specified dynamic framework with optimising 
agents is set up. The model generalises Roemer’s (1981, 1982a) economies 
with profit or revenue-maximising agents, since agents face a consumption- 
savings trade-off, while revenue and profit maximisation and capital 
accumulation are the outcome of optimal choices. Thus, first, it allows us to 
evaluate the robustness of Roemer’s substantive and methodological claims, 
and the role of DOSPA in generating persistent exploitation, from another 
perspective. Second, unlike in static and subsistence economies, the model 
can also be extended to include technical progress and disequilibrium in the
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labour market, two key issues in the analysis of the mechanisms that 
guarantee the persistent abundance of labour in a capitalist economy and, in 
general, of the relation between economic inequality, growth, and relative 
factor scarcity, a crucial and long-debated issue in economics.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, a dynamic economy 
with maximising agents is set up. A dynamic Fundamental Marxian Theorem 
is proved, which states that exploitation is synonymous with positive profits. 1 
It is then shown that without technical progress, there is no equilibrium with 
persistent accumulation and persistent exploitation. Section 5.3 confirms the 
conclusions of chapter 4: if revenues are entirely consumed at all t, in 
equilibrium the economy displays persistent exploitation and, possibly, 
unemployment. However, the persistence of exploitation crucially depends 
on a strictly positive rate of time preference. Section 5.4 analyses equilibria 
with accumulation. First, labour-constrained equilibria are ruled out if agents 
discount the future. Next, balanced growth paths are characterised, in which 
the economy grows at a uniform rate and reaches a steady state, and again, 
the persistence of exploitation is proved to depend on time preference. 
Section 5.5 proves that labour-saving technical progress may yield persistent 
exploitation by ensuring persistent abundance of labour. However, this result 
depends on technical progress being unbounded, which suggests that further 
departures from the Walrasian framework, in addition to disequilibrium in
1 See, e.g., Okishio (1963) and Morishima (1973). A microfounded version of the theorem is 
proved by Roemer (1981, Theorems 1.1 and 2.11). The result is interesting given its 
“prominent place in the modem formulation of Marxian economics” (Roemer, 1981, p. 16).
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the labour market, may be necessary to provide a satisfactory model of 
exploitation. Section 5.6 is devoted to the conclusions.
5.2. THE INTERTEMPORAL MODEL
The economy consists of a sequence of nonoverlapping generations, 
with v= 1, ...,N C, capitalists, and rj = 1 ,..., Nw, workers, living for T periods 
and indexed by the date of birth kT, k = 0, 1, 2,... In every period t, each 
capitalist v can operate any activity of the Leontief technology (A, L) 
described in section 4.2, satisfying:
A ssumption 1: A is indecomposable and L »  O'.
Let (pt, wt) denote the 1 x (n + 1 ) price vector in t, where wt is the 
nominal wage. As concerns capitalist v. ytv is the n x 1 vector of activity 
levels that v hires workers to operate at t; o vkT is the n x 1 vector of perfectly
storable productive endowments inherited, when bom in kT, and a?  is the 
vector of endowments at t\ stv is the n x 1 vector of net savings at t\ ctv = 6tvb 
is the « x  1 consumption vector at t, where b »  0 is a given subsistence 
vector. As for worker tj: z?  is rf s labour supply at t, while Q*1 = %?b is rf s 
consumption vector at t. Without significant loss of generality, it is assumed 
that 6tv > 0  and Zt*1 -  L all t: this assumption incorporates the idea that 
capitalists are not essential and, together with the assumption that ox? = 0, all 
77, it starkly outlines class differences. Thus, as in von Neumann-Morishima 
models, “workers are like farm animals, and capitalists are simply the self- 
service stands for capital” (Morishima, 1969, p.95), whose main role is to
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drive accumulation.2 As shown below, this assumption allows us to introduce 
disequilibrium in the labour market.
The assumption that consumption vectors move along rays reflects the 
theoretical focus on class-related consumption possibilities, rather than 
individual consumer choice. Indeed, it is assumed that there is a continuous, 
increasing, and homogeneous of degree one function (jr. $H+ -> i#+, such that 
KzPb) = Xt14(b) ^  4(^tvb) = 0tv4(b) describe, respectively, worker rf s and 
capitalist v’s consumption possibilities in t.A
As in chapter 4, intertemporal trade between agents is ruled out, 
consistently with the lack of a pure accumulation motive -  that is, the desire 
to maximise capital accumulation per se, which is often assumed in standard 
Marxist models (e.g., Morishima, 1969; Roemer, 1981). However, Roemer’s 
(1981, 1982a) static models are generalised by allowing intertemporal trade­
offs during an agent’s life.
A ssumption 2: No credit market. Productive assets are bought with current 
wealth, while consumption and savings are financed with current revenue.
Let (p, w) = {ph wt}t=kT,..., ot+i)r-i denote the path of the price vector 
during the lifetime of a generation; let y v = {ytv}t=kT,..., (*+i)r-i denote p’s
2 In a less schematic model, if profits fall below some level, capitalists would start to work.
3 Similar assumptions are made in Sraffian models (e.g. Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, p. 102).
4  Silvestre (2005) makes similar assumptions in the construction of an index of primary 
goods. Actually, given Roemer’s normative interpretation of exploitation theory, the n 
produced goods analysed in this model can be naturally interpreted as primary goods. The 
function $ might also be interpreted as a neoclassical homothetic utility function.
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lifetime plan of activity levels; let z77 = {ztT}}t=kT,..., (k+i)T-i be 7 ’ s lifetime 
labour supply; and let the same notation hold for 6V, s v, and ^ . 5 As a 
shorthand notation, let “all /” stand for “all t , t  = kT, ..., (k+ \)T-\” Let 0 < ft 
< 1 be the agents’ subjective time preference factor.
Capitalist v chooses = (yv, 6V, s') to maximise lifetime consumption 
opportunities subject to the constraint that (i) net revenues are sufficient for 
consumption and savings, all t; (ii) wealth is sufficient for production plans, 
all t\ (iii) the evolution of productive assets is determined by net savings, all 
t\ (iv) v’s descendants receive at least as many resources as she inherited. Let 
C( a>vkT) be the value of the optimisation program. Formally, v solves:
MPv C « )  =
subject to: [pt(I - A ) -  wtL]ytv > 6tvp tb + ptStv, all t, (0
p tAytv < p to)tV, all t, (ii)
covt+l = G>tv + stv, all t, (iii)
— 0 3  k t > 0 V)
yt \ co? > 0 , and 6? > 0 , all t. (v)
Worker 7  chooses ^  -  (z*1, to maximise lifetime consumption 
opportunities subject to the constraint that at all t, revenues are sufficient for 
77’s consumption, subsistence is reached, and working time does not exceed 
the length of the working period (normalised to one). Formally, 7  solves:
5 T h e  in d e x  k i s  n o t  in c lu d e d  i n y v, s y, e t c .  in  o r d e r  to  a v o id  n o ta t io n a l  c o n f u s io n .
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MP rj C” =ma
subject to: wtz?  > x^Ptb, all t, (0
1 >z?>  0, and j / 7 > 1, all t. 00
Given the absence of capital markets and bequests, MPV is a natural 
dynamic generalisation of the static profit or revenue maximisation program 
(Roemer, 1981, 1982a). Thus, let Oa(p, w) = {%* solves MPa}, a -  v, 77, be 
the set of individually optimal plans for a. Let Qkr = ( • • • »  )•
Let E(A, L, Nc, Nw, b, f k i , or as a shorthand notation E(Okr), denote the 
economy described by technology (A, L), population (Nc, Nw), subsistence 
vector b, distribution of endowments OkT, ^ d  index function </). Let
y, = T,Z<y ' ’ z' = 311(1 let 0'< st, CDt, and Xt be similarly defined.
D efin ition  1: An unconstrained reproducible solution (RS) for E(Qki) is an
intertemporal profile (p, w) of the price vector such that
(i) e Oa(p, w), for all a= v, rj\
(ii) y t > Ayt + 6tb + %tb + st, all t;
(iii) Ayt < cot, all t;
(iv) Lyt = zt, all t;
(v) (Reproducibility) 6\k+\)T^ ®icT-
Condition (i) requires individual optimisation; (ii) and (iii) require that 
there are enough resources for consumption and saving plans, and for 
production plans, respectively, at all t; (iv) states that the labour market clears 
at all t, (v) states that resources should not be depleted.
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Let zf be worker rfs effective labour supply at t and let zt = z 7) .
Although Definition 1 is an important benchmark, in this chapter RS’s with 
* zt\  some t, 77, and unemployment are not excluded. 6
D efinition 2: The vector (p, w) is a constrained RS at t' for E(£2jct) if
(i) e Ov(p, w), for all v,
(ii) y t > Ayt + 6tb + %tb + st, all t,
(iii) Ayt < a)t, all t\
(iv) Lyt < zh all t, with zt- > zt, = Lyt-, some t'\
(v) (Reproducibility) o\k+\)r^ ®kT-
Since workers are identical, if a RS is constrained at t, it is assumed that 
they work an equal amount of time and they are all able to reach subsistence. 
Given the absence of a subsistence sector and of the public sector, this seems 
an appropriate way to capture unemployment in this model.
A ssumption 3: If a RS is constrained at t, zf = Lyt/Nw and x ?  = 1> ah 7 -
Next, an interior reproducible solution (IRS) is defined.
D efinition 3: An IRS for E(f2ki) is a RS such that stv = 0, all v and t.
Finally, the next definition captures the idea of capital scarcity as 
requiring that “the total supply of productive assets is limited, relative to 
current demand” (Skillman, 2000, p.l, fii.l) . 7
6  Since 0tv > 0, the case with excess labour demand need not be considered.
71 am indebted to Gil Skillman for Definition 4.
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Definition 4: Let (p, w) be a RS for E{Oki)- The economy E(Qki) is said to 
exhibit capital scarcity at (p, w), in period t, ifp tAytv = p tcof, all v. IfPtAyf < 
Ptcof* some v,, then capital is said to be abundant at (p, w), in period t.
Since at the solution to MP„ ^ k+l)T — covkT, all v, if (p, w) is a RS for
E({2kr), then it is also a RS for E(D^+\)t). Hence, it is possible to interpret (p, 
w) as a steady state solution and to focus on E(Qq) without loss of generality.
It is immediate to show that at a RS for E(f2o), in every period, revenue 
constraints are binding for all agents, workers work and consume as much as 
possible, and the wealth constraints of all capitalists are binding.
Lemma 1: Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Qq). Then, for all t,
(i) [pt(I - A) - w t L]ytv = Ofptb + ptsf, all v;
(ii) z f  = 1, all ij;
(iii) wtz * = x fp f ,  all rj, where z 7) = min [Lyt/Nw, 1];
(iv) i f  pt >ptA + wtL, then p tA y f  = p tcof, all v.
The following result proves that at a RS, wages and prices are positive, 
and profits are non-negative at all t.
Lemma 2: Let (p, w) be a RS for E(L2o). Then wt > 0, p t »  O', and p t >ptA + 
wtL, all t.
Proof 1. At a RS p t > O’ or else yt «  Ayt + 0tb + Xtb + st. Hence, wt > 0, all t, 
or else workers could not reach subsistence.
2. If pu = 0, some z, t, then y itv = 0, all v, for all £  e  Ov(p, w), and thus 
yit = 0. However, A yt + Otbi + Xth + sit > 0, contradicting feasibility.
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3. Ifpu < p tAi + wtLi, all i, then y f  = 0, all i, v, for all t; e Ov{p, w), and 
yt = 0, which is not possible at a RS since workers would not reach 
subsistence. Then, the possibility that pu < p tAi + wtLh some i, t, is ruled 
out as in part 2 of the proof, noting that capitalists’ wealth will be used 
only to activate maximum profit rate processes. |
As in chapter 4, the profit rate of sector i at t is mt — [pt(I — A) -  
wtL]i/ptAi. Lemma 3 proves that at a RS, profit rates are equalised in all i.
Lemma 3: Let (p, w) be a RS for E(Qq). Then nu = Tit, all i, t, and p t = (1 + 
nt)ptA + wtL, all t.
Proof. By Lemma 2, nt > 0, all t. Hence, if nit < some i, t, then y ,/=  0, for 
all £  e Ov(p, w), all v, and yu = 0. Thus, since capitalists’ wealth will 
be used only to activate maximum profit rate processes, A yt + Otbi + Xtbi 
+ sit > 0, which contradicts feasibility. The second part of the Lemma 
follows from the definition of the profit rate. |
By Lemmas 2 and 3 labour can be chosen as the numeraire, setting wt = 
1, all t, and RS’s of the form (p, 1) can be considered. Then, capitalists’ 
consumption expenditure at all t can be derived.
Proposition 1: Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(Qo): 0tvp tb = Tqptcof - ptStv, all t, v.
Proof By Lemma 3 and Lemma l.(/), ntp tA y f  = 0tvp tb + ptsf, all v, t. By 
Lemma 2, ^  > 0: if ^  = 0 the result follows immediately. If nt > 0 it 
follows from Lemma l.(/v). |
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Let A be the 1 x n vector of labour values. Let y  -  2^t_oy t and likewise 
for 9 and %. Roemer’s (1981, 1982a) definitions of Socially Necessary
o
Labour Time and exploitation can be extended to the intertemporal context.
Definition 5 : Socially Necessary Labour Time at t is the amount of labour 
embodied in the worker’s consumption bundle, X%tb. Similarly, considering 
the whole life of a generation, Socially Necessary Labour Time is Jl%b.
D efinition 6: The within-period (WP) exploitation rate at t is et = (Lyt - 
XXtb)/^ Xtb> while the whole-life (WL) exploitation rate is e = (Ly - X%b)/X%b.
As argued in chapter 4, both definitions convey morally relevant 
information, but the WP definition is more pertinent in a Marxian approach 
and it is more interesting in a dynamic context.
The Dynamic Fundamental Marxian Theorem can now be proved.
THEOREM 1 (Dynamic FMT): Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(Qq). Then, (i) at all t, 
et >0 i f  and only i f  7% >0. Furthermore, (ii) e >0 i f  and only i f  nt > 0, some t.
Proof Part (i). Consider any t. By Lemma 1 .(zf), at a RS Lyt = zt <zt = Nw.
Thus, by Lemma I.(iii), summing over 77, Lyt = z, = ZtPtb- Then, by
Lemmas 2 and 3, Lyt > XtXb if and only if nt > 0.
Part (ii). The result follows from part (z), since Lyt - Xxtb > 0, all 1. 1
Theorem 1 suggests that there is no RS with persistent accumulation 
and persistent exploitation. In fact, note that if et > 0, all t, by Theorem 1,
8 For a discussion of various definitions o f the exploitation rate, see Desai (1979, p.48).
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Lemma l.(/v), and Lemma 2, at a RS Lyt = LA'1 a>t, all t. Since zt = Nw, all t, 
then et > 0, all t, is possible only if LA’1 cot < Nw, all t. Hence, if cot+\ »  cot, all 
t, T -  1 > t > 0, then LA'16) < Nw, all t, T -  1 > t > 0, which implies by (A3) 
xP -  1, all rj, andp tb = LA'lG>t/Nw, all t, T -  1 > t > 0. By Lemma l.(z)-(z7) and 
Lemma 2, at a RS (I -  A)yt = st + 6tb + Xtb, all t, which implies st = (I -  A)A' 
xcot-etb - Xtb, all t, or using the previous results, cot+ \ =A'lcot - 0tb - Nwb, all t, 
T - l > t > 0 .
Given the linearity of MPV, there is at most one period in which at the 
solution to MPy, both savings and consumption are positive at a constrained 
RS with accumulation.9 Hence, given that capitalists are identical there is a r  
such that Ot = 0 all t > t  and Gh+\ = A'1 cot - Nwb, all t > t, which implies cot = 
(A^y^lcOr -  of] + of, all t > r, where of = N„A(I -  A)'lb. Thus, by (A.l) and 
the productivity of A, given that workers’ subsistence requires (%> of , all t, 
if T is sufficiently big, labour demand exceeds supply after a finite number of 
periods, driving nt and et to zero. This can be summarised as follows.
PROPOSITION 2: For all T e  there is a T ’ > T such that there is no RS 
with Ot+j »  an, all T ’ - 1  >t > 0, and et > 0, all t.
5.3. INEQUALITIES, EXPLOITATION, AND TIME PREFERENCE
This section analyses the dynamic foundations of exploitation in the 
economy with maximising agents, focusing on interior RS’s. This is not only 
due to their theoretical relevance, discussed in chapter 4, but also because in
9 This is proved rigorously below; see e.g. the analysis of MP„ in the proof of Theorem 4.
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this economy IRS’s represent a benchmark solution whereby the labour 
market clears at all t. Let p t = J3{ 1 + ftt+i)(Pt+\/pt+\b) - {pjptb). Lemma 4 
provides a necessary condition for the existence of an IRS.
Lemma 4: Let (p, 1) be an IRS for E(Qq) with 7% >0, all t. Then p t = O', all t.
Proof. 1. Suppose that s f  = 0, all t, v, but p tj > 0, some z, j , j < T -  1. By 
Proposition 1, if s f  = Sj+ \v= 0, then 0j > 0, 0 vj+x > 0, and 0V. + p 0 vj+x =
[XjP/Pjb + p7Zj+\Pj+\lpj+\b\(#)V.
2. Consider a one-period perturbation s f  y, sj+ \ ’v such that (Dj+\ ’v = oxf + 
s f v\ CDt'v = a x f all t * j  + 1. In the perturbed path 0'Vj + P0'vj+l = 0] +
P@j+1 + Pj sf  there is a sufficiently small s f  v > 0 such that 0'*. > 0
and 0}Vj + P0 'vj+j > 0j + P0]+1 , a contradiction. A similar argument
holds if py < 0, some
Intuitively, if p it > 0, some i, t, capitalists optimise by saving at t and 
producing good i at t + 1, while if p t = 0* they are indifferent. This result can
be extended to an economy where workers can save, forming a class of petty 
bourgeois, who own capital but also work for a wage, with a revenue 
constraint equal to [pt( I -A )  -  L]yP + z f  =ptXt1b + Ptsf, all t.
Let 1/(1 + ft)  be the Frobenius eigenvalue of A: by (A. 1) and the 
productivity of A, n  >0. Theorem 2 analyses program MPV.
THEOREM 2. (z) Let 1 > p  > 1/(1 + n ). I f  m = n ’ = (1 - P)/p all t, then for 
all v and all e  Ov(p \ 1), stv = 0, all t, solves MPy. Moreover, i fT  is finite,
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C(coov)  =  <Kb)(l - f t ) p ’coov/p p 'b , while ifT->oo, C(wqv)  =  (p(b)p’(Dov/ p p ’b .
(ii) Let p  < 1. I f  7tt — 0, all t, then for all vand all e  O v(p 1), stv = 0, all t, 
solves MPy, and C(coq) = 0.
Proof Part (i). 1. Write MPV using dynamic recursive optimisation theory. 
Let W c; 91/ be the state space with generic element co. Let P . W ^ W  
be the feasibility correspondence: 9 fa /)  = {covt+x e W: a>vt+x > 0 and
p tcovt+l < (1 + n^ptdaTS. Let Ffaxf) = {of: o vt+x g  ' f iaf),  all t, o f  > 
coqv, and gjov given}. Let O — { ( a ) v, covt+x) g  W x  W: covt+x g  P^a/)} be 
the graph of P. The one-period return function F: 9?+ at t is F (a /i
a>vt+j )  = <PJb)[( 1 + nI)ptcof -Pt&M Vptb. Then, MPV can be written as
MPV C(ay/) = max Y "  (Hb)0[(\ + it^pttof-p toyvM]lptb.
<BKe F I(a )o )
Since ^oyf)  * 0 , all a /  e W, and F  is continuous, concave, and 
bounded below by 0, the program MP^ is well defined.
2. Since n  g  [0, n) ,  let p ’ = (1 + n ^p 'A + L. By construction, the 
condition in Lemma 4 is satisfied at all t, and MP^ reduces to
(MP^ QrfzO = max (/>(b)
eoven (o>o)
(l + 7r')p’a>o _ j.., p'm vT
p'b p'b
Therefore, for any T, any feasible o f  such that ay/ — (o f is optimal and 
C(ayf) follows by noting that p<  1.
Part (ii). The result follows from MP„ given oy/> gj/ .  |
Let H = {a> e 9 ln \a> = yNwA(I-  A)'lb, y>  1}; in what follows, it is 
assumed that ojq g  H. This restriction is imposed mainly for analytical
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convenience, given the linearity of MPj, and MP^ and the assumptions on 
consumption patterns. No theoretical conclusion depends on this restriction, 
which in any case -  given y  > 1 -  allows us to consider a rather large set of 
economies. The existence of an IRS can now be proved.
THEOREM 3: Let wo = yoN^Afl-A/'b, y0 >l. Let Xb <1.
(i) I f  Yo = 1, the only RS for E(I2q) requires 7% = 0 and st = 0, all t;
(ii) Let yo > 1 and yoXb <1. Let n  be defined by yoXb = L[I -  (1 + 7u)A]'1b. I f  
P(1 + n )  = 1, there is an IRS for E(Qq) with lit = n , all t;
(iii) Let yo > 1 and yoXb = 1. Let n ’ be defined by 1 = L[I -  (1 + For 
all P e  [1/(1 + n )  , 1) there is an IRS for E(Qo) with 7tt = (1 - P)/p, all t;
(iv) Let yo > 1 and yo%b < 1. I f  p  = 1, there is an IRS for E(Qq)  with nt = 0, all 
t. Moreover, i f  p  = 1, at any IRS there is at most one period t with 7%>0.
Proof Part (i). 1. Existence. Since = 0, all t, given the terminal condition 
6>rv >  G bv, any g  such that stv = 0, XAyf  = Acoov, and Of = 0, all t, is an 
optimal solution for all v. Hence, assign actions {yf} to all vsuch that yt 
= A'1 coo at all t: the capital goods market clears at all t. Then Lyt = LA*
1 ab = NwXb < Nw and zt = NwXb, all t. Then assign actions z/j = Hb, all
77, t, which implies Xt1 = 1, all 77, t, consistently with (A.3). Finally, the 
market for final goods clears at all t since (I -  A)yt = Nwb, all t.
2. Uniqueness. Consider t = 0. First, since, z0 = Lyo = NwAb, it follows
that 7Vq = 0 or else Xb < pob and workers could not reach subsistence. 
Next, at an RS, (I -  A)yo > Oob + xob + so and yo ^ A'1 coo. By (A. 1), by
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pre-multiplying the latter expression by (I -  A), at a RS (I -  A)A'1 coo > 
6ob + Nwb + so, or Nwb > Oob + Nwb + s0. The latter inequality implies 0 
> dob + so, which in turn implies 0 > so by the nonnegativity of 6q. 
However, since co = A^4(I -  A)'lb is the minimum sustainable amount 
of capital that guarantees workers’ subsistence at all t, then so > 0. 
Therefore at a RS, so = 0, and the reasoning can be iterated.
Part (ii). 1. (Optimal f v.) By the Perron-Frobenius theorem n  exists and 
7t’ e  (0, n ). Let p ’ be the price vector associated with k \  If p  = 1/(1 + 
it*) and 7tt = n \  all t, by Theorem 2, any t; such that stv = 0, p  \Aytv = 
p  W ,  9tvp  b = n>P >c°ov> all U solves MPW for all v.
2. (Capital market.) Hence, by Lemma 3, at all t, it is possible to assign 
a vectory tvto all v such thatp 'Aytv = p ’coov, all v, andyt = A'1 coo.
3. (Labour market and constrained g1.) Since Lyt = y0XbNw < Nw, all t, 
by (A. 3) assign actions z?  = yoXb, all t, rj\ then by construction yoXb = 
p  ’b, and thus x?  = 1 > all t, rj, and %t = Nw, all t.
4. (Final goods market.) The goods market clears at all t since (7 -  A)yt = 
YoNwb while %tb = Nwb and 6tp'b  = n ’p  ’coo, or Op'b = ftNw\p’ -  A]b, 
which implies 0tb = Nw{yo -  1 )b.
Part (iii). 1. (Optimal d;v.) By the Perron-Frobenius theorem n  exists 
and n  e  (0, n ). Thus np = (1 - p)lp e  (0, n ). Letpp be the price vector 
associated with np. If ^  = np, all t, by Theorem 2, any ^  such that stv = 
0,ppAytv=ppcoov, and 0tvppb = npppcoo, all t, solves MP^ for all v.
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2. (Capital market.) Hence, by Lemma 3, at all t, it is possible to assign 
a vector y tv to all vsuch thatppAytv=ppcoov, all v, andy, = A'1coo.
3. (Labour market and optimal Since Lyt = Nw, all t, assign actions 
z?  = 1 and Xt1 ~ l/ppb, all t, to all 7 , so that %t = NJppb, all t. Since np 
e (0, n ’] then 1 /Xb > Xt1 ^ 1, all t, rj. Hence, these actions satisfy the 
subsistence requirement and are optimal for all 7 , with Lyt = z,, all t.
4. (Final goods market.) By the previous arguments the goods market 
clears at all t since (7 -  A)yt = /oNwb while Xtb = Nwb/ppb and 0tppb = 
xpppGk, or Qpfjb = yoNw[pp- X]b.
Part (iv). 1. If yoXb = 1, existence is proved as in part (iii) with z /1 = 1 
and x ?  = VXbt all 7 , t. If yoXb < 1, existence is proved as in part (ii) 
withy, = (l/yoK1^  and Lyt = XbNw, all t, z?  = Xb and Xt1 = 1, all 7 , t.
2. By Lemma 4, there can be no two adjacent periods with ^  > 0 and 
7it+\ > 0. A similar argument rules out ^  > 0 and n^j > 0, for / > 1. |
Remarks: From Lemma 4, it follows that Theorem 2>.{ii)-(iii) identifies the 
only IRS with ^  > 0 all t. Note that in Theorem 3 there is no restriction on T.
Theorem 3 provides another dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s theory 
of exploitation and strengthens the results in chapter 4. Unless assets are just 
sufficient to guarantee workers’ subsistence (Theorem 3.(0), the dynamic 
economy with maximising agents displays persistent exploitation -  and 
possibly persistent unemployment, -  if revenues are consumed at all t and 
capitalists discount future consumption (Theorem 3 However, as in
chapter 4, the persistence of exploitation at an IRS crucially depends on a
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strictly positive rate of time preference, rather than on unemployment or 
capital scarcity (Theorem 3.(/v)). Moreover, if yoXb = 1, the magnitude of 
inequalities and exploitation will depend on p 10
Interestingly, Theorems 2-3 also characterise inter-capitalist inequalities 
as a different phenomenon from exploitation. In fact, at an IRS with ^  = (1 - 
p)!p > 0, all t, by Theorem 2 for any two capitalists v and //, C(ojov) > C{axP) 
if and only \ i p ’a)QV>p ’axP. Instead, if nt = 0, all t, Q & O  = 0, all v.
5.4. BALANCED GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 show that persistent growth and exploitation are 
inconsistent and that, even if the economy does not grow, persistent 
exploitation is possible only if p  < 1. This section explores further the 
relation between exploitation, time preference, and growth, by focusing on 
balanced growth paths in which all sectors grow at the same rate and the 
economy eventually reaches a steady state.
D efin ition  7: A  balanced growth path (BGP) for E{jQq) is a RS such that 
a>t+\ = (1 + gt)cot, for all t < t ', and cch+i = ah, all t , T -  1 > t > t \
In order to analyse BGP’s, a technically convenient restriction on b is 
imposed which implies no significant loss of generality, given the theoretical 
focus on consumption opportunities, rather than consumer choice.
A ssumption 4: There is a positive scalar K  such that b = KA(I-  A)'xb.
10 As noted in chapter 4, these results raise doubts on Roemer’s property rights definition of 
exploitation as a generalisation of Marx’s surplus value definition. It is worth noting that,
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By (A.4), b is uniquely determined up to a positive scalar. Lemma 5 
characterises the dynamics of capital under (A.4).
Lem m a  5: Let (p, 1) be a RS for E(L2o) such that the economy exhibits capital 
scarcity at t. Under (A. 4), i f  cot e H  then (Ot+i eH.
Proof Assume that cot e H. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 1 .(i)-(iii), given capital 
scarcity, at a RS (/ -  A)yt = 0tb + %tb + st and y t = A'1 cot. Hence at a RS, 
ytNwb = 6tb + %tb + su or st = (ytNw - 0t - %t)b, and by (A A), (Ot+i e
Given Lemma 5, the next result confirms the relevance of IRS’s as a 
theoretical benchmark: only at an IRS can equilibrium in the labour market 
and exploitation exist at all t.
Lem m a 6 : Let coo eH . Let (p, 1) be an unconstrained RS for E(Qq) such that 
the economy exhibits capital scarcity at all t. Under (A. 4), ytXb = 1, all t. 
Proof By Lemma 2, at a RS with capital scarcity at all t, yt = A'1 cot, all t. 
Hence, by Lemma 5, Lyt = ytNwAL>, all t, and by Lemma l.(iz), Lyt — zt — 
Nw, all t, if and only if ytAb = 1 , all
In general, by Lemma 6 if a RS is unconstrained from t \  then ytXb = 1, 
all t > t \  and thus IRS’s are a benchmark for all accumulation paths with 
persistent capital scarcity, which lead to a stationary state with equilibrium in 
the labour market. Instead, if ah g H  and ytXb < 1, the economy is constrained 
at t. Given the focus on accumulation, we assume y^Xb < 1. The next result 
rules out paths where capital becomes abundant.
trivially, no coalition of capitalists or workers alone can block a RS (see Appendix 4.2).
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Proposition 3: Assume (A.4). Let coo eH , with yo > 1 and yoXb < 1. I f  p  < 1, 
there is no RS with capital scarcity at all periods until t but LA'1 CQt+i >NW.
Proof. 1. Suppose not, so that LA'xcch < Nw but LA~xcot+\ > Nw, some t. By 
Lemma 5, nt > 0; instead, nt+\ = 0 since capital is abundant at t + 1.
2. For all v, 0] = ntp t(of/ptb - ptstv/ptb and 0J+l = - Ast+\v/Xb, and thus
Ast+\v < 0. If Ast+iv <0, some v, then since p it < 0 at least some i (given
P<  1), there is a feasible perturbation of the savings path with ds,/ = - 
ds/v+iv < 0 , which increases v’s consumption, contradicting optimality.
3. Let Ast+\v = 0, all v, so that the reasoning in part 2 does not hold. 
Since Asi+1 = 0 then Aa)+ 2 = Acot+1, so that fy+2 — 0 and p t+l«  0*. Again,
if JLst+2 V< 0 , there is a feasible perturbation of the savings path with dsitv 
< 0 , some 1, which yields an increase in v’s consumption opportunities. 
Therefore Ast+2 V-  0, all v, and 7%+3 = 0; and so on.
4. By assumption and by Lemma 5, cc>t+\ »  coo. Hence, individual
optimality implies «  0, and thus by (A. 1),
which contradicts A sf = 0, for all v and all T -1 > / > t + 1
Thus, overaccumulation is not an equilibrium because the fall of the 
profit rate to zero would rather lead capitalists to anticipate consumption, if P  
< 1. Indeed, Proposition 3 confirms the importance of time preference for the 
persistence of exploitation in Roemer’s theory: if p  = 1, overaccumulation 
and profits falling to zero are not ruled out.
Given Proposition 3, Theorem 4 characterises balanced growth paths.
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THEOREM 4: Assume (A.4). Let coo e H  with yo > 1. Let (p, 1) be a BGP for 
E(Qo) such that LA'1 cot <NW, all t. Define g \ = [(yt -  I)NW - OJ n /ytNw.
(i) cot+i = (I + g ’jcot, all t < t’ -  1, andpt+ib = (1 + g ’)p tb, all t < t’ -  1. 
Furthermore, i f  p  < 1 then g ’t = 7%, all 0 <t < t’ -  1, while i f  fi = 1 then g \  = 
nt, allt  < t’—l.
(ii) I f  P < 1 and 7tt >0 all t, T - 2 >t > t\ then p t = O', all t, T -  2 > t > t ’. I f
P= 1, there is no BGP with 7% >0 and 7Tt+j > 0, any t, T -  2 >t > t’ andj > 0. 
Proof. Part (ii). 1. Consider capitalist i/s program MPV recursively: at all t,
Bellman’s functional equation is = max F{cof, co(+l) +
® / + | 6 ^ K j
pC(covt+x). At T — 1, since C(co^) = 0, optimality requires ayf = gjqv and 
C(a>r-\v) — <Kb)[{ 1 + 7TT-\)PT-\G>r-\v - PT-\COvQ]lpT-\b. Therefore at T -  2, 
Cicor-i) = max . (Kb)[{\ + 7Tt-i)Pt-2 ott-2 v~Pt-2 G>t-\ /^pr-ib + pC{o>r.\*)•
2. Suppose p  < 1: given tct-i > 0, if p T 0* then, since all capitalists 
are alike, (Dt-\ * o>r-2 V, all v, and a>r-i -*■ g>t-2 - Hence, p T_2= O’ and C{ct>r- 
2 )  = 1 + 7iT-i)PT-2G>r-2lpT-2b - ppr-xoof lpr-\b\ Iterating backwards, 
if a)t+ 1 = 6)t, all /, T -  2 > t > t \ then p t = O’, all t, T -  2 > t > t \  which 
implies Qg*-1) = (f(b)[{\ + 7tt)pt>(Dt’Vlpt’b - f f ' ^ ’ipT-x K / p T-\b)].
3. Suppose p — 1. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that at a BGP nt > 
0 and 7rt+j > 0, for some t, T —2 > t > t \  and j  > 0. Since nt > 0, then Of 
= 0, all v, is not possible, or else (Ot+\ * a), and since 7tt+j > 0 then (1 + 
Tfy+ppit+j!Pt+jb > piJptb, at least some i. Hence, as in Lemma 4, there is a
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feasible perturbation 6sit = -dsu+j > 0, with cL/ = 0 all I * t, t + j , that 
increases v’s consumption opportunities, contradicting optimality.
Part (i). 4. By Proposition 1, at a BGP 0tptb = (^  - gt)ptC0t, all t. Since 
g H, all t, by (A A) the latter expression implies 6t = (7%- gi)ytNwln  , all 
t, or gt = [xt - ( 0 tx  /ytNw)], all t.
5. By Lemma 3, (pt - X) = 7Ttp tA(l -  A)'1, all t. Post-multiplying the latter 
expression by b and using (A A), 7% = n (pt - X)blptb, all t. Hence, given 
cot g H, all t, by (A3) at a BGP with ytXb < 1, all t, p tb — ytXb < 1, all t < 
t ’ -  1. Then, the expression for g ’t follows from 7% = n (yt - 1 )/yh all t < 
t ’-  1, andpt+\b = (1 + g ’t)Ptb, all t<t*— 1.
6. Suppose 3< \. At t = t ’ — 1, C(cot-.i*) = max ,<jib)[( 1 + 7tt'.\)pt'-\(Ot'.
iv -p t'.\GJt,v]lpt'-\b + yffQc**1), where Qc**1) is as in part 2 above. Hence, 
at a BGP p t,_, = u\pt-.\lpt'.\b, some u\ > 0, or else <%*v = 0, some i, all v.
If mi > 0, thenp t’.\COt’V = (1 + flr'-O/V-ifflp-i"* all v, andg>.i = 7Tt’.\. If mi =
0, then P(\ + 7rt) =  1, and gt'.\ is undetermined. In either case, C(6V-11) 
= <Hb)[( 1 + mi)(1 + nf.\)Pf-\COf.\lpt’-\b - /?'* (Pt-i o)qlpT-\b)\, all v.
7. Consider t = t ’-  2. Again, at a BGP, it must be [p{\ + mi)(1 +
\/pt‘-\b - pr-ilpf-ib] = u2p t>.2/pt’.2b, some u2 > 0, and C(o)t-.2v) = (fcb)[( 1 + 
m2)(1 + 7tf.2)pf.2(Df.2 lpf.2b - /f'* +l(pr-i collpr-\b)\, all v. If u2 = 0, then
fi{ 1 + 7Tf.i) < 1: but then since by part (7) at a BGPp t+\b >p tb, all t < t ’ -
1, by Lemma 3 it follows that f%\ + 7%-.2) < 1. However, if t ’ > 2, by 
considering Bellman’s functional equation at t ’ -  3 this cannot be a BGP
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since it violates p t,_2 > O’. Therefore, it must be U2 > 0,p t -2 COt’-\v = (1 +
X f-2 )p t '-2 0 Lh'-2 V, all v, and g r -2  = flp-2 . This argument can be iterated 
backwards for all t, 0 <  t < t ’ -  1, showing that p t(Ot+\v  = (1 +  7 t^p tco^^ all 
v, and all 0 < / < / ' — 1, and thus gt = all t, 0 < t < t ’-  1.
8. Suppose p  — 1. A similar argument as in parts 6 and 7 applies noting 
that % > 0, all £ < t ’ -  1, implies ut > 0, all i > 2, given part (ii). |
Remark: if ft < 1, by Proposition 3 the assumption L A 1 clh < Nw is redundant.
Theorem 4 shows some interesting links between the present model and 
the literature on inequalities, classes, and growth. On the one hand, the model 
may be interpreted as providing microfoundations to traditional Sraffa/von 
Neumann models, which derive a negative relationship between capitalists’ 
consumption and growth, given workers’ subsistence. In fact, the balanced 
growth rate g \  can be shown to coincide with the uniform growth rate of 
Sraffian models (see, e.g., Kurz and Salvadori, 1994, p.l02ff). On the other 
hand, Theorem 4 proves that the growth rate coincides with the profit rate - at 
least in some periods - as in the so-called Cambridge equation. However, 
these results are derived as equilibrium features of an accumulating economy 
with agents who explicitly solve a dynamic optimisation problem.
The previous results confirm the main theoretical and methodological 
conclusions of chapter 4 and section 5.3. Only if p  < 1 can overaccumulation 
-  leading to labour scarcity and the disappearance of exploitation -  be ruled 
out in equilibrium (Proposition 3).11 Moreover, if ft  = 1, exploitation and
11 Thus, Devine and Dymsky’s (1991) result can only be an equilibrium if f i=  1.
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profits may well disappear after a finite number of periods, both at an IRS 
(Theorem 3) and at a BGP (Theorem 4), even if capital remains scarce. 
Instead, if agents discount the future, exploitation can be persistent even in 
paths with capital accumulation (Theorem 4). The crucial role of time 
preference, as opposed, e.g., to capital scarcity, is further confirmed by the 
fact that if J3 < 1, the steady state value of the profit rate (and thus the rate of 
exploitation) is a positive function of p  (Theorem 4.(h)).
As noted in chapter 4, Skillman (2000) suggests that exogenous growth 
in the labour force, heterogeneous preferences, and/or labour-saving technical 
progress might make WP exploitation persistent. Although, as argued in 
chapter 4, the main methodological and substantive conclusions on Roemer’s 
theory of exploitation would not change, the relation between inequalities, 
exploitation, and growth is theoretically crucial and the model presented here 
provides a promising analytical framework to analyse it. The next section 
takes on Skillman’s suggestion, focusing on technical progress.
5.5. THE ONE-GOOD ECONOMY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS
The previous sections complete the analysis of the relationship between 
exploitation, time preference, and growth in the w-good economy. This 
section modifies the basic model by introducing exogenous labour-saving 
technical progress. However, for the sake of simplicity a one-good economy 
is considered. In fact, the linearity of MP„ and MP^ makes it difficult to 
analyse the equilibria of the w-good model, - especially because it would be 
more realistic to assume different rates of technical progress in different
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sectors. Given the theoretical focus of this chapter, this simplification implies 
no significant loss of generality.
Thus, let c />  0 be capitalist v’s consumption, all t\ let > b be worker 
rf s consumption, all t\ and let ^be the identity function. As a first step in the 
analysis of the one-good economy, capitalists’ optimal saving paths with 
accumulation are characterised and the existence of a BGP is proved, in the 
economy with no technical progress. Let np = (1 - p)lfi.
P r o p o s i t io n 4: Let (p, 1) be such that 7tt>np, all t < r ,  and 7% =  np, all T - 1 
>t > t  +  1, for some r, T -  1 >  r>0. The path (Dt+Z =  (1 +  7tt)cdf, all t < t - 
1, &t+Z = (1 + gt)a>tv, gt e  [0, np], all t, T -  2 >t > z, and a>f = (Oo, solves
MP„ all v, andCfo*/) = O ',o '0 + " P™ R ■ aI1 K
Proof. 1. Since the state space is W c  i#+, the feasibility correspondence is 
L^ayf) = {covt+l e W: 0 < covM < (1 + n^cof) and the one-period return
function isF(g) v, ay/ ) = [(1 + n^cof - ay/]. Then, MPVbecomes 
MPV C(oo/) = max ff[(l + n^cof - ay/].
m v e Y l ( ( D Q )
2. Consider MP„ recursively. At T — 1, since C(ayf) = 0, then ay/ = ay/ 
is optimal and C{a>r./) — [(1 + izt-\)g>t-\ - &>/]• At T  -  2, C^ tDr-i*) 
= max J(1 +nT-2)oyr-2 V - a>r-/  + pC(a>r-1*)]. Hence, if nr-i = np\he,n
cot-/ = Or-/ is optimal and C{a>r-/) = [(1 +nT-?)G>r-2 V - fox/]. Iterating 
backwards, if 7% = np, alH, T -  1 > t > r + 1, then cch+x v = co/, all t , T -  2 
> t > r, is optimal and C(ay/) = [(1 +nT)ayTv - fZ'*'1 oy/]. If t =  0, the 
result is proved.
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3. If x> 0, consider x- 1. Since C(a>x.i*) = max J(1 +nT.\)cox.\v - +
J3C(g)/)\ and nx > np, at the solution to MPV, a>f = (1 + nx.\)(ox.\ and 
C(cox. i1) = [fi{\ +;rr)(l + nx.\)cox.\ - 0-~raxf). Iterating backwards, if ^  > 
np„ all t < r, at the solution to MPV, cot+\v= (1 + n^at/, all t < x- 1, and 
the expression for C(<oO follows.^
Let n  be defined as in Theorem 3.(Hi). Let the sequence {yT} Tll be 
defined by y0 = 1 !Ab and yT+1 = (y T + n)/(  1 + n) .  The sequence is 
decreasing and finite, if T is finite. By (A. I) and the productivity of A, the 
size of the intervals [ yT, yT_x) decreases with x and tends to zero, with yr ->
1 as oo. Theorem 5 proves the existence of a BGP.
THEOREM 5: (Existence o f a BGP). Let Ab <1. Let fi e  [1/(1 + n ) , 1]. Let 
coo = yoNwA(I-  A)'1 b, with y0 >l. I f  y0 £ [ y T+x, f T) and yT > fin  /[fi(l + n )
-  1], i f  x > 1, the path (p, 1) with 7% = ft (y -  l)/yt, all t, x> t >0, and 7% = ftp 
all t, T -1 >t > x+ 1, is a BGP for E(Qo) such that C0t+i = (1 + 7x)cOt, all t <x
-  1, CDr+i -  (1 + gx)cox, with g x e  (0, 7Xx] ,  and cp = (Or+i, all t, T -1 >t > x+ 1. 
Proof 1. Suppose y0 e [ yT+x, yr ). First, at all t < x, if yt e [ yT+1_t , yT_t ) and
7Tt = n  (yt - 1  )/yh then by construction yt+\ = ( 1  + n[)yt implies yt+\ e 
[yT-t ,yr-t-1); moreover if yt e [yx, yQ) and ftt = n(y t - 1  )/yt, there is a
g \  e (0, nt] such that yt+\ = (1 + g ’t)y implies yt+\ = HAb. Second, 
suppose x> 1 : if yo e [yT+x, y t ) and yT > fin  /[fi(l + n) -  1 ] then n\ =
ft (n - i  Vn > np> f o r  a11 n e  [ rT > rT~i )•
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2. (Optimal reproducibility.) By part 2 and Proposition 4, a)t+\v -  (1 
+ 7Zt)CL>tv, all t< r - \ ,  g>t+iv=( 1 +g\)coTy, w ithg’r e (0, n^, 6)tv= co^\, 
all t, T- 1 > t > r+ 1, <»rv= coqv, and y tv = A '16)tv, all t, solves MPV, all v.
3. (Capital market) At the proposed path, yt = A~lcot and the capital 
market clears at all t. (Labour market) At all t < r, Lyt = LA'1 <x>t < Nw. 
Hence, assign actions z?  = ytXb, all 77, consistently with (A.3), all t < r. 
At all * > t + \, Lyt = LA'1cch = Nw, while z?  = 1, all 77, and the labour 
market clears. (Final goods market) At all t < r, by construction = 
p tb, and thus ^  = 6 , all 77, consistently with (.4.3), while c /  + s /  = 
ntGk, all v. Thus, aggregate demand is ct + st + Q = and
substituting for ^  and <^ , c, + st + Q = aggregate supply is ( 1  —
A)yt = (1 -  A)A'X cot = ytNwb. At all t > r+  1, by individual optimisation 
PtQ11 = 1, all 77, while crv + j,*'= all k Thus, aggregate demand is ct 
+ st + Q = 7rt(0t + N Jpt, all t > t + 1: substituting for the proposed values 
of nt andp t, and noting that at the proposed path yt = \!Xb, all t >T +l ,  
it follows that ct + st + Q = Nwb!Xb, all t > t + 1. Aggregate supply is (1 
-  A)yt = (1 -  A)A'xcot = ytNwb = Nwb!Xb, a\\ t > r + 1. Therefore, the 
goods market clears at all
Remarks: If ft —» 1 then fin  +k ) -  1] —» 1 and the higher ft, the larger 
the set of yT such that the BGP described in Theorem 5 exists. However, 
Theorem 5 only provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a BGP.
In the BGP described in Theorem 5, given an initial level of capital, the 
economy accumulates at the maximum rate and reaches the steady state in a
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finite number of periods. In the first r periods, profits and labour expended 
increase over time and workers’ consumption remains at the subsistence 
level. At the steady state, full employment prevails, profits remain constant, 
and workers’ consumption exceeds subsistence. If /? < 1, exploitation is a 
persistent phenomenon; if /? = 1, it disappears.
As in Proposition 2, this pattern is due to an initial excess supply of 
labour which is then rapidly absorbed due to accumulation. As noted above, 
this raises the issue of the factors that may generate a persistent excess supply 
of labour: in what follows, labour-saving technical progress is analysed. The 
intuition is that by substituting capital for labour, technical progress may 
allow labour supply to be persistently higher than labour demand. Formally, 
the labour input coefficient is assumed to decline geometrically over time.
A ssu m pt io n  5: For all t, Lt+\ =  SLU S< 1, with Zo > 0  given.
Under (A.5), all the results in Section 5.2 (plus Lemmas 4-6 and the 
FMT) and Proposition 4 hold, once Lt is substituted for L at all t. Then, 
Theorem 6 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a RS with 
persistent exploitation in the economy with technical progress.
THEOREM 6: Assume (A.5). Let coo = y o N ^ l  - A ^ b ,  with yo > 1 and yo^ob 
< 1. I f  5(1 + n )  <1 and p[l + n (y0-  l)/yo] > 1. The path (p, 1) with tzo — 
n (yo -  l)/yo and 7Zt+i = 7rt(l + n )/(l + tzJ, all t, T -  2 > t > 0, is a RS for 
E(Do) with Ljyt <NW, all t >0, and cot+i = (1 + n^ cdt, all t, T - 2 >t >0.
Proof 1. (Optimal £v; reproducibility.) By construction, Tit > np, all t > 0, and 
thus by Proposition 4 y f  = A'1 C0tv, all t, C0 t+\ y= (1 + all f, T -  2 > t
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> 0, and 0 /  = g)qv-> solves MP^ all v. Hence, ah+ \ = (1 + 7Zt)cth, all t, T -  
2>t>Q,  which in turn implies 7% = n (yt -  1)///, all t, by construction.
2. (Capital market) The capital market clears at all t, since yt = A'1 a), all 
t. (Labour market) By parts 1 and 2, and (A.5), at all t, L y t -  LtA'xcch = 
d{\ + nt-\)Lt-\yt-\. Hence, given Zqyo ^ Nw, <^ 1 + tt) < 1, and ^  < n  , all 
U at the proposed path L yt < Nw, all t. Then, zt = ytXbNw, all t, and by 
(A.3) assign actions ztn = ytAb, all 77, t.
3. (Final goods market) At the proposed path, p tb = ytAb, all t, and thus 
Q71 = b, all 7 , t, and Q = Nwb, all /, consistently with (^ 4.3). Moreover, ctv 
+ stv = 7ttcotv, all v, t, and thus ct + st = z^ cot, all t. Therefore aggregate 
demand is Q + ct + st = + Nwb, all t. Substituting for ah and ^  in the 
latter expression Q + ct + st = ytNwb, all t. Aggregate supply is (1 -  A)yt 
= (1 -  A)A'1 cot = ytNwb, all t, and thus the goods market clears at all 1.1
Theorem 6 is encouraging: with labour-saving technical progress, the 
economy settles on a “golden rule” growth path with persistent exploitation 
even if ft = 1. The increase in productivity ensures that labour remains in 
excess supply even along a path with maximal accumulation. However, there 
are at least two features of the result that seem doubtful. Firstly, Theorem 6 
relies on the arguably strong assumption of unbounded technical progress: if 
there is a lower bound to the labour input requirement, the result does not 
hold. More importantly, in the RS with persistent exploitation, both prices 
and labour expended by workers decrease over time and tend to zero, due to 
the increase in productivity, a rather unappealing feature in a model of
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exploitation, especially given that there is no disutility of labour. This 
suggests that Theorem 6 is but a first step in the analysis of the relation 
between exploitation, inequalities, and growth.
5.6. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, an intertemporal model of an economy with maximising 
agents is set up to analyse the relation between exploitation, inequality, and 
growth. A dynamic generalisation of the Fundamental Marxian Theorem is 
proved, then it is shown that there is no equilibrium with persistent 
accumulation and exploitation. It is also proved that both at a stationary 
equilibrium with no savings and along a balanced growth path (along which 
the economy eventually settles on a steady state), capital scarcity and 
DOSPA persist, but exploitation disappears after a finite number of periods, 
if agents do not discount the future. For exploitation to be persistent, the 
agents’ rate of time preference must be positive. This confirms the main 
theoretical conclusions reached in chapter 4. Actually, the analysis of the 
economy with technical progress shows that persistent exploitation can 
emerge if there is a mechanism that yields persistent unemployment, a non- 
Walrasian feature. Although the model with technical progress is not entirely 
convincing, it indicates a promising line for further research, which, as 
argued in chapter 4, should incorporate further departures from the traditional 
Walrasian framework in order to model persistent exploitation.
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CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation analyses the dynamics of inequality and classes, from a 
positive and a normative viewpoint. In particular, two distinct, but -  as 
shown in chapter 1 -  related theoretical approaches to equality and classes 
are analysed from a dynamic perspective; namely, Analytical Marxism (AM) 
and the theory of equality of opportunity (EOp). Methodologically, this 
dissertation shows the importance of a dynamic analysis in the evaluation of 
egalitarian (more generally, normative) theories, as an essential tool in the 
process of theoretical construction. Indeed, the main results presented can be 
thought of as illustrating some anomalies of egalitarian and Marxian theories, 
which arise in the dynamic context and which suggest the need to reconsider 
some established views on inequality, exploitation, and classes.
Chapter 2 analyses various intertemporal egalitarian principles, based 
on different temporal units of concern -  whole lives or selected portions of 
them -  which incorporate different normative views and yield different 
policy implications. The principles provide different insights in the analysis 
of inequalities and in this context no principle seems entirely satisfactory. 
However, unlike in the static setting, they also define different egalitarian 
states to reach. From this viewpoint, corresponding segments egalitarianism 
(CSE) -  which focuses on the corresponding stages of agents’ lives -  
arguably defines the appropriate egalitarian benchmark.1
1 In an overlapping generations model, CSE seems more convincing than other intertemporal 
egalitarian principles in the context of all things considered judgements, too, since it has 
desirable properties in relation to both Rawlsian and utilitarian concerns.
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Chapters 4 and 5 show that similar issues arise in the context of 
exploitation theory: two criteria to define exploitation and class in a dynamic 
context are discussed, one focusing on the agent’s status in each period of her 
life, the other on the agent’s whole life. Although both criteria convey 
morally relevant information, the within-period definition is arguably more 
interesting in a dynamic context and more in line with a Marxian approach. 
However, the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 is based on the rather strong 
simplifying assumption that all agents living in the same period belong to the 
same age cohort, so that the distinction between CS and simultaneous 
segments (SS) views can be set aside: the WP definition of exploitation 
captures both.
This assumption obscures some interesting issues for further research. 
Consider Roemer’s definition of Marxian exploitation as unequal exchange 
of labour, analysed in chapter 4. As noted by Elster (1985), the definition is 
non-relational: it states that agent A is either exploiting or exploited (or 
neither), but not that agent A exploits another agent B (or viceversa). Under 
this interpretation, exploitation is an objectivist measure of inequality; thus, 
the CS/SS distinction and the analysis in chapter 2 are relevant, which would 
suggest to generalise the model in chapters 4 and 5 by adopting an 
overlapping generations framework.
However, if exploitation cannot be reduced to a form of inequality, the 
relevance of the CS view, as opposed to the SS view, is less evident within
2 Apart from the trivial observation that, at an equilibrium with no savings, if A works more 
than is socially necessary, there is some agent B who works less.
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exploitation theory: it is unclear why different amounts of exploitation 
suffered by, e.g., adults belonging to different generations, and whose lives 
never overlap, should be of primary normative concern. If exploitation is a 
relational concept, according to which an agent (or group of agents) exploits 
another agent (or group of agents), it seems natural to restrict its application 
to contemporaneous agents. If correct, on the one hand, this casts further 
doubts on Roemer’s interpretation of Marxian exploitation and it raises the 
issue of the proper definition of exploitation (see below). On the other hand, 
it suggests to extend the analysis in chapter 2 to the difference between 
relational and non-relational egalitarian approaches in the dynamic context.
Chapter 2 also proves that in an overlapping generations economy, the 
intertemporal maximin path tends to be incompatible with growth, a well- 
known property of Rawls’s difference principle. This conclusion is confirmed 
and strengthened in chapter 3 which extends the analysis of the dynamic 
implications of egalitarian approaches, focusing on the EOp view. In chapter 
3, agents are assumed to live for one period, but the economic environment is 
enriched by considering heterogeneous agents in each generation, by 
allowing them to care about functionings (and not only consumption), and by 
analysing educational investment. If an objectivist equalisandum (e.g., 
functionings) is adopted, the intergenerational EOp path is inconsistent with 
sustained human development, even with altruistic agents. This 
incompatibility can be resolved by equalising opportunities for welfare, 
which suggests that ‘subjectivism’ may be necessary if we are to hope for a
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society which can both equalise opportunities and support the development of 
human capacity.
The results presented in chapters 2 and 3 are quite general and in line 
with most of the literature, but no general impossibility result is proved. 
Given the relevance of the difference principle in contemporary egalitarian 
approaches, it is crucial to investigate the robustness of the inconsistency 
result. Silvestre (2002) provides a counterexample to show that “the conflict 
between ... maximin and progress is not universal” (ibid., p.2). As argued in 
chapter 1, the actual relevance of the example is unclear, but given the results 
in chapter 3, it suggests some interesting lines for further research.
First, it would be interesting to provide a general, rigorous 
characterisation of the existence of intertemporal maximin paths, and of their 
properties, in a recursive optimisation framework. In the models analysed in 
chapters 2 and 3, the maximin path exists, thanks to the assumptions on the 
productivity of the economy which allows for welfare growth. However, the 
issue of existence is not trivial and it is quite important from an egalitarian 
perspective, as shown by the analysis of Rawls’s principle in economies with 
non-renewable resources (Solow, 1974a , 1974b).
The analysis of the relation between growth and the maximin is the 
object of work in progress (joint with John Roemer), which extends the 
intergenerational EOp approach to deal with international justice and 
environmental issues. We model an intergenerational society, with two 
countries, called the North and the South, who must deplete a renewable 
resource, a forest, from which they derive utility, to produce consumption
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goods. In each country, there is a representative agent at each date, although 
these two agents may be of different sizes (capturing different populations in 
the North and South). The South has a technology for producing goods out of 
trees that is inferior to the North’s. The forest is a global commons, which 
each country can freely harvest: it is a global public good, since the citizens 
of both countries enjoy without congestion what is not harvested.
We postulate that each country is concerned with implementing a just 
intergenerational allocation for its citizens. Three solutions to the problem of 
international relations are studied: the non-cooperative Nash solution, where 
the North and South play strategically against each other; a bargaining 
solution, where the North and South enter into cooperative relations, but 
where each country remains interested only injustice for its own citizens; and 
the cosmopolitan solution, which implements the maximin solution for the 
world, ignoring national boundaries. We are, in particular, interested in the 
intertemporal path of forest and welfare growth at these three solutions. The 
preliminary results obtained are encouraging: in all three frameworks, it is 
possible to have welfare growth along the intertemporal maximin path 
(although this is more likely to happen in the cosmopolitan solution). This is 
due to the presence of the state variable -  the stock of the forest -  in the 
objective function, a result that seems liable of further generalisation.
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the dynamics of inequality and classes, 
focusing on Roemer’s (1982a , 1988a) theory of exploitation and classes. In 
chapter 4 an dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s subsistence economy with 
labour-minimising agents is set up to evaluate the causal and normative
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relevance of Differential Ownership o f Productive Assets (DOPA) in 
generating exploitation and classes as persistent features of a competitive 
economy; and the possibility of providing robust microfoundations to 
Marxian economics by means of neoclassical models.
A dynamic generalisation of Roemer’s theory is provided: exploitation 
and classes are persistent phenomena, if agents discount the future. However, 
the normative relevance of time preference is dubious and, with no time 
preference, in equilibrium exploitation disappears in the long run, even if 
DOPA and classes persist. Chapter 4 proves that it is sufficient to allow 
agents to save -  unlike in the static models in which agents face no 
intertemporal trade-offs -  to contradict Roemer’s results. Hence, asset 
inequalities seem normatively secondary, though causally primary in 
explaining exploitation and several doubts are raised on the possibility of 
providing robust microfoundations to Marx’s concepts by means of 
Walrasian general equilibrium models.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of exploitation, inequality, and classes to 
economies with maximising agents and, possibly, unemployment and capital 
accumulation. First, the main conclusions of chapter 4 are strengthened and 
generalised: if capitalists discount the future, there are equilibria with no 
accumulation and persistent exploitation. However, this result depends on a 
strictly positive rate of time preference, rather than unemployment or capital 
scarcity. Second, chapter 5 pursues one of the main substantive and 
methodological issues raised in chapter 4, namely the mechanisms generating 
exploitation, inequalities, and classes as persistent features of a competitive
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economy. In fact, the role of capital scarcity is more properly evaluated in an 
accumulating economy, which, unlike static and subsistence models, can 
naturally accommodate two arguably crucial features of a general theory of 
exploitation, namely technical progress and unemployment.
Chapter 5 shows that without technical progress, there is no equilibrium 
with persistent accumulation and exploitation. Moreover, along balanced 
growth paths -  in which the whole economy grows at a uniform rate and 
reaches a steady state -  exploitation disappears, although DOPA and capital 
scarcity persist. Instead, unbounded labour-saving technical progress may 
yield persistent exploitation by ensuring persistent unemployment in the 
labour market. This is encouraging, but there are at least two features of the 
result that seem dubious. First, it relies on the arguably strong assumption of 
unbounded technical progress, whereby in the limit no labour is necessary to 
produce goods. Second, in the equilibrium with persistent exploitation, both 
prices and labour expended tend to zero, due to the increase in productivity, a 
rather unappealing feature in a theory of exploitation. This suggests that the 
model presented in chapter 5 is but a first step in the analysis of the relation 
between exploitation, inequalities, and growth.
More generally, chapters 4 and 5 suggest two main lines for further 
research. From a substantive viewpoint, they raise the issue of the appropriate 
definition of exploitation and the distinction between exploitation and 
welfare inequalities. The results presented raise doubts on Roemer’s 
interpretation of Marx’s theory of exploitation as “a kind of resource 
egalitarianism” (Roemer, 1994a , p.2) and on the claim that his property
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relations (PR) definition of exploitation based on DOPA generalises Marx’s 
theory capturing its essential normative content -  interpreted as requiring “an 
egalitarian distribution of resources in the external world” (ibid., p.3). In fact, 
“The legitimacy of Roemer’s reformulation depends in large part on the 
validity of his claims concerning the role of DOPA in capitalist exploitation” 
(Skillman, 1995, p.311). However, since DOPA is proved to be necessary but 
not sufficient to generate persistent Marxian exploitation, Roemer’s PR 
definition should be seen as incorporating a different moral concern, rather 
than as a generalisation of Marx’s labour-based definition. In general, the 
question arises whether DOPA should be a basic moral concern, both in itself 
and in a theory of exploitation, or rather a different role of DOPA should be 
stressed as a causally primary, but normatively secondary wrong.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether Roemer’s non-relational 
definition of exploitation as unequal exchange of labour captures the Marxian 
notion of exploitation, or indeed a notion of exploitation essentially different 
from welfare inequalities. In chapter 4, the unequal exchange definition of 
exploitation is shown to be different from subjective welfare inequalities, if 
agents discount the future, due to its more objectivist leaning. Yet, the two 
concepts are strictly related, and it is legitimate to wonder why “should 
Marxists be interested in exploitation.” Interestingly, Roemer’s own PR 
definition provides some suggestions for further research. In fact, not only 
can the same arguments as for the unequal exchange definition be used to 
show that the PR definition is related to the notion of welfare inequalities, but 
does not coincide with it; the PR definition also differs from welfare
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inequalities due to its inherently relational nature. In particular, dominance 
condition (3) - briefly analysed in Appendix 4.2 - which is not defined by 
Roemer, is not just necessary “to rule out some bizarre examples” (Roemer, 
1982a , p. 195) and it might play a more prominent role in a theory of 
exploitation as a feature of relations between people.
From a methodological viewpoint, it might be opportune to explore 
non-walrasian approaches to model exploitation and classes in a Marxian 
perspective. Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the property rights theory o f the 
firm  (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) may provide a 
promising framework to analyse Marxian exploitation, given its concern with 
power and the emphasis on the role of physical assets in explaining 
hierarchical relations and the existence of firms. Thus, although the dynamic 
implications of these models are yet to be fully explored, they might provide 
a framework to model exploitation consistent with the idea that asset 
inequalities are causally primary, but normatively secondary, in the 
explanation of exploitative relations, given various sources of contractual 
incompleteness (e.g., Marx’s labour/labour-power distinction).
Finally, although chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the definition of Marxian 
exploitation as unequal exchange of labour does not necessarily capture the 
essence of exploitative relations within a country, it may be a useful concept 
to understand some features of economic relations between countries. In 
recent work in progress, we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
an international economy with capital flows, which generalises Roemer 
(1983a). Countries maximise their national product and differ both in wealth
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levels and -  unlike in chapters 4 and 5 -  in their labour endowment. In the 
dynamic equilibrium, countries can be partitioned based on their position on 
the international credit market (net borrowers, net lenders, neither) and a 
phenomenon of unequal exchange emerges as an equilibrium feature of a 
perfectly competitive economy. The status of each country in the system of 
international relations can also be derived: more advanced countries are net 
lenders and benefit from unequal exchange, while less advanced countries are 
net borrowers and suffer from unequal exchange.
From a theoretical viewpoint, unequal exchange emerges due to profit 
maximising behaviour and differential levels of development and wealth 
across countries. Thus, it can arise in a perfectly competitive environment 
where international economic relations are mediated only by markets, while 
non-competitive phenomena are not necessary to understand (and possibly 
condemn) international inequalities. However, consistently with the results in 
chapters 4 and 5, perfectly competitive markets and differences in 
development and wealth do not provide foundations to unequal exchange as a 
persistent phenomenon. This suggests that non-competitive practices may be 
crucial to understand the persistence of unfair international relations.
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